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Science Studies
Probing the Dynamics of Scientific Knowledge
Sabine Maasen and Matthias Winterhager
“The sociology of science, once marginal, has become a growth
industry practiced by an increasing number of scholars … It often
comes as the nucleus of the so-called STS (science, technology, and
society) programs and centers” (Bunge 1991a: 524). While this obser-
vation is shared in principle by a growing number of colleagues, both
science studies and sociology of science, in particular, only rarely have
1been introduced in a systematic and easily accessible fashion. Maybe
due to its enormous success, the field of science studies rather com-
mits itself to studying the various phenomena accompanying societies
that differentiate specific systems, institutions, and practices to pro-
duce systematic knowledge rather than to self-reflection, or even less,
to introducing itself. At the same time, however, due to its success,
science studies has become a field that cannot be described but as
heterogeneous. From the 1960s onward, and with a special thrust in
the 1980s, science studies conquered novel territories (e. g., science
policy, PUS, cultural studies), has employed various methodologies
(e. g., discourse analysis, ethnomethodology, bibliometrics) and theo-
ries (e. g., network-theories), inquired into epistemological questions
(e. g., reflexivity in sociology of knowledge) as well as into the instru-
ments of research (e. g., the experiment) and – last but not least – has
2become institutionalized in wide range of departments and programs.
The expert in the field may take this lightly: “Although science studies
cannot ‘control’ its subject matter, it can pick its methodologies and
research questions very broadly and yet remain a recognizable field”
(Bagioli 1999: xiv). The novice to the field, however, may shrink back
from the double trend toward disunity’ (Bagioli): As sience studies
progresses, it further disunifies itself and the picture of science it
studies. Hence the urgency and difficulty of finding a path through
3this jungle.
     Finding a path, however, cannot possibly mean ‘unification’ of 
science studies (cf. Galison 1996) but rather attempts to give an idea of
what this interdisciplinary field, predominantly populated by socio-
4logists, historians and philosophers of science , is all about. In this
vein, one can basically choose between two options: Either try and
9
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write a comprehensive overview, necessarily sketchy if it comes to the
details of each single approach. In this way one gets a map of science
studies designed for preliminary orientiation in the field. Alternative-
ly, one can select one overarching concern and probe more deeply into
its various aspects, thereby learning about science studies per exem-
plum.
     Basically, this book has been set up according to the latter option:
We chose one overarching concern, namely the dynamics of scientific
knowledge, and present nine self-contained studies that touch upon
this concern in highly different ways: They encompass the whole
range of scientific cultures: the natural and social sciences as well as
the humanities; they cover issues as diverse as climate research (Aant
Elzinga), historiography (Wolfgang Prinz), and methods such as bib-
liometrics (Anthony van Raan) as well as the role of metaphor in
science (James J. Bono). Their heterogeneity notwithstanding, the
studies presented all inquire into, or are themselves examples of, the
dynamics of scientific knowledge. Moreover, the types of dynamics
analyzed or exhibited not only result from intrascientific but from
extrascientific processes as well: As to the former, Diane Paul, for
instance, explores the use of biostatistical concepts in tracing the histo-
ry of eugenics, hence, inquires into the heuristic value of analytic tools
that have been developed in another discipline. In a similar manner,
Peter J. Richerson and Rob Boyd advance the analysis of human
culture by analogizing cultural to biological evolution. Other scholars
investigate the dynamics resulting from extrascientific exchange: Nico
Stehr ponders the need for a so-called ‘knowledge politics’ and Bruce
Lewenstein critically discusses the emergence of what has become
known as ‘public understanding of science.’ Last but not least, Wil-
helm Krull testifies to the way in which science policy makes use of
those (online-)observations of the dynamics of scientific knowledge
production that science studies provide. Summarizing, although each
article represents a self-contained study, the collection as a whole
sheds light on one of the most intriguing phenomenon in the field of
science studies today: the dynamics of scientific knowledge.
     However, we will not leave the readers all alone in their attempt to
make their way through the individual contributions. Instead, we will
first introduce the overarching issue, that is, why ‘dynamics of scien-
tific knowledge’?, and embed this question in the broader context of
science studies (cf. “Science Studies – Dynamics of a Field”). Second,
10
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S.   9- 54) T01_01 introduction.p 286938514456
Science Studies
each single contribution will be characterized as regards its connection
to the overarching issue (cf. “Nine Studies in Science”). Third,
throughout the book, each article will be preceded by a little vignette
integrating each study into its broader context of research. Thus, in
the end, we try and save a little of the former option of writing this
book and do both: give a sketchy map of science studies and probe
more deeply into some of its territories.
Why ‘Dynamics of Scientific Knowledge’?
Knowledge in a Knowledge Society
Knowledge has become a major concern in many of today’s societies.
Consequently, this concern is no longer confined to those who
produce it but it is also the daily business for those who organize,
communicate, regulate, and use it. In fact, the increasing significance
of knowledge has already led to a new label: ‘knowledge society,’
indicating that knowledge and society are mutually constitutive for
each other. What are the defining characteristics?
– Knowlege is seen as a central, if not primary resource for societal
reproduction, thus neighbouring, if not prioritizing money and
power, the two other key resources driving the engine called
society.
– In particular, this is indicated by the increase of knowledge-based
professions that currently spread into ever-more parts of contem-
porary societies. On the collective level, expertises abound and
compete. On the individual level, this translates into acquiring a
portfolio of expertises throughout one’s career.
– Developments such as the ones mentioned above are said to be
caused by several processes: e. g., by the scientification of knowl-
edge, the globalization of data and information networks, as well as
by the growing perception of risk and contingency which signifi-
cantly increases both the supply of and the demand for knowledge.
– This not only leads to new ways of dealing with the constant flux
of knowledge (i. e., ‘lifelong learning’), it also directs critical
reflection to the source of data, information, and knowledge:
science. Deeply entrenched with other subsystems of society (e. g.,
economics, politics, law) it co-produces both benefits and risks for
individual and collective actors.
11
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Hence, no wonder that science attracts new attention: Society wants to
know more about science as a specialized subsystem, designed to
produce ‘true’ knowledge, in particular, about its cognitve and organ-
izational specificities, as well as about its relation to other subsystems
within society and ‘the public,’ in general. In short: It wants to know
more about the dynamics of science responding to the dynamics of
society, presumably turning the latter into a ‘knowledge society.’
     Presently, ‘knowledge society’ is not a well-defined term but rather
entails different messages for different audiences, political and scientif-
ic ones, in particular. One asymmetry is most telling: Namely, while
the label knowledge society abounds in science policy programs and
the media, it is far less often to be found in the academic discourse:
The Science Citation Index notes only 14 entries for the last 8 years.
Without carrying the interpretation too far, this observation may
safely be said to imply two messages: First, apparently science has yet
to acknowledge, and to participate in, the general societal discourse on
the role of (scientific) knowledge. Second, if it comes to defining the
role of (scientific) knowledge in society, science is neither the leading
nor the primary voice. Thus, in a nutshell this observation tells us
what is at stake: A new role for knowledge in society implies to look
anew at science as the most prominent institution that produces it
systematically.
     Those who face up to this challenge respond – broadly speaking –
in two ways, either directly or indirectly. The direct response is given
by those authors who attempt to theorize the ‘postmodern’ condition
of science on a general level; the indirect response is given by the
plethora of scholars who study science in its various appearances and
from various perspectives: its semantics, institutions, methods,
instruments, histories, social practices, techniques … While this book
is about a variety of seminal approaches in this field of science studies
that need and should be read in their own right, this introduction
would like to render those research strategies intelligible by way of
addressing their background, the (alleged) ‘postmodern condition of
science,’ first. To this end, we will touch upon some major theories
regarding the role of science today. Their common concern: Do we
live in a Knowledge and / or in a Science Society? Next, we will
address the epistemological issue implied in this question: Do the
dynamics in both science and society really endorse a postmodernist
stance? Third, we will give a historical account of science studies
12
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dealing with knowledge dynamics. Only thereafter will we return to
the studies convened in this book and their, if indirect, responses to
the role of science in society today. Generally speaking, they all
conceive of science as part and parcel of society and their dynamics,
interactively produced. They all look for instruments that are appro-
priate for analysis of, or intervention into, various instances of this
dynamics. This is what unites the studies in this collection and also
indicates one of the concerns of science studies, in general.
Knowledge and / or Science Society?
In 1994, Michael Gibbons and colleagues challenged the received view
of science and society by postulating that a new mode of producing
knowledge is about to emerge. Whereas the traditional mode relies on
producing science in academic places, according to disciplinary
schemes, and only thereafter applying the knowlege thus produced to
the extra-academic field, the new mode operates differently, sooner or
later integrating the convential mode: Most of all, the new production
of knowledge, called ‘mode 2,’ transcends academic circles by pro-
ceeding in a multi-, if not transdisdisciplinary fashion. Instigated more
by general problems than by disciplinary questions, the context of
application is the decisive frame of reference. The type of communica-
tion between the parties is characterized by consulting and negotiation
and the organizational setting is flexible and transient. Accordingly,
the level of institutionalization is low.
     This proposal has met with enthusiasm and criticism alike. While
politicians and research agencies readily accepted this new picture and
put it on their agenda (‘mode 2’ since then figures most prominently
in documents on science and funding policies), the reactions of (so-
5cial) scientists were mixed. Notably Gernot Böhme and Nico Stehr
(1986) as well as Peter Weingart (2001) explicitly reject the view accord-
ing to which science is about to lose its significance for the societal
production of (true) knowledge. Above all, they counter with an in-
creasing trend toward scientification of ever-more spheres of life. In
this process, thus Böhme and Stehr, science is the decisive produc-
tive force, not knowledge, in general. Still, they refuse to talk about
‘science society’ and rather stick to the term ‘knowledge society’:
The focus is not merely science but the relationship between scientific
knowledge and everyday knowledge, declarative and procedural knowledge,
13
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knowledge and non-knowledge. It is only after one acquires a sense of the
societal significance of such opposites and oppositions the full sociological
significance of knowledge begins to emerge. Such a perspective ensures that
one realizes the extent to which knowledge can form the basis of authority;
that access to knowledge becomes a major societal resource and the occasion
for political and social struggles (Böhme / Stehr 1986: 8).
In short: While the radical view as expressed by Gibbons et al. or
Helmut Willke (1998, 1999) considers science as one among many
different and equally important sources of knowledge, the moderate
view as expressed by Stehr and Böhme, regards science as the domi-
nant source of knowledge to which other forms of knowledge relate, if
by way of adapting it to their local requirements. Being knowledge-
based, does have equivocal effects on society, however: In a knowl-
edge society, both the scope and contingencies of actions increase
simultaneously. For instance, Stehr notes that the breadth of expertise
and the society’s penetration with reflexive knowledge leads to both,
more data gathering and surveillence and to new possibilities for
escape. Likewise, globalization prompts worldwide networks of
knowledge and locally specific transformations (cf. Stehr 1994). Not
surprisingly, paradoxes such as those dynamize the evolution of a
knowledge society: Better knowledge and different technologies are
produced to cope with unintended effects of science and technology.
‘Post’- or Modern?
Unveiling the dynamics of scientific knowledge in a knowledge
society is thus based on a constructivist epistemology: It focuses on
the making and remaking of (scientific) knowledge(s) in societies. This
stance may easily be regarded as ‘postmodern,’ implying that, ulti-
mately, (scientific) knowledge is beyond rational analysis. In our
reading, however, the observation that the production of knowledge
(including scientific knowledge) is not only dynamic, but increasingly
so, results from interrelated processes in science and society: These
can be rationally reconstructed while, at the same time, acknowledg-
ing contingency and the growing significance of extrascientific
knowledges.
     Interestingly enough, the dynamics of scientific knowledge is
inherent in modernist and postmodernist accounts. From a modernist
stance, the dynamics of scientific knowledge was but a matter of
14
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temporary imperfectness. Ultimately, thus the hope, imperfect knowl-
edge would, by specifying the unknown, prompt specified questions,
thereby leading to perfect knowledge. Most importantly, this goal,
though always imaginary, safeguarded the production of new knowl-
edge against discredit: Eventually there would be no more unruly
dynamics but stable knowledge, that is, truth.
     This very promise of modern science of stabilizing knowledge,
however, became subject to severe doubts. Accompanying scientific
practice from its inception, these doubts have been raised in two
variants (cf. Bauman 1992: 290ff.): Variant One, the modernist critique,
holds that newly gained knowledge does not make sense within the
realm of existing knowledge, thus is in need of novel explanations
and / or theories. Variant Two, the postmodernist critique, states that
newly gained knowledge is but one among others, maybe not even the
best one, thus is in a steady state of competition and local adaptations.
While Variant One legitimizes the ongoing production (and, hence,
the dynamics) of knowledge in the name of truth, Variant Two
undermines the trustworthiness of scientific knowledge itself: Scien-
tific knowledge may not provide the certainty needed to stabilize
knowledge once and for all. Ironically for some, both variants thus
enforce the production of better, more competitive, more trustworthy
knowledge.
6     In Bauman’s analysis, today both types of doubts amalgamize:
Based on the conviction that there is no such thing as certainty
anymore, scientists of any epistemological creed persist in producing
more knowledges in an effort to counter contingency with pluralism.
The search for truth as well as the search for equally plausible or
locally more plausible stories keeps the engine going. Put in a nutshell,
the dynamics of knowledge seems to be the most stable trait of the
7practice called science, modern or postmodern.
     If anything, the differing diagnoses of the role of science in society
show that currently things are in a state of transition and the same
holds for science studies. Science studies is a dynamic field in the
midst of dynamic societies: Its epistemologies, its research agendas
and methods, its style of communication and transfer functions are
part of the overarching systematic reflection that modern societies
entertain in order to cope with the (unintended) consequences of their
modernization. By conceiving of the sciences as epistemic-institution-
al ensembles and historically changing cultural practices, the field
15
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provides a theoretical and empiral basis for comprehending the
dynamics of scientific and technological developments as well as the
mutual interpenetration of science, technology, and society (cf.
Nowotny 1998: 9f.).
     As to the question what STS (Science and Technology Studies) is
good for, we follow David J. Hess in that it is always a wise thing to
appreciate the history of science and technology, in general, but today,
this is not enough: In addition, science studies serves an increasing
demand for orienting and legitimizing science politics and science
management. Moreover, science studies provides a forum at which the
growing public concern with science, technology, and social values
can be articulated. Be it the issue of institutional dynamics of science
or the general place of science and technology in society,
the future of STS lies in its ability to provide a site for public debates on issues
of social importance, and for the evaluation of major research programs and
technological decisions (Hess 1997: 155f.).
Science Studies: Dynamics of a Field
Thus, the task of observing knowledge today seems to have assumed a
new quality. Various schools of thought, most prominently sociology
of knowledge, history of ideas, and the interdisciplinary field called
science studies has argued from its inception that knowledge and the
social conditions, in which it occurs, are not independent of one
another but deeply influence each other. Although scholars and
schools differ as to the question in which way or on what level this
mutual influence occurs, they nowadays all agree upon one basic,
anti-positivist insight: The interrelation of knowledge and society is
no sign of impurity or falsity in need of remedy. Rather, knowledge
comes in socio-historical and situational packages that need to be
analyzed in full. What is true for knowledge, in general, is true for
scientific knowledge as well. Moreover, throughout about seven
decades scholars in the realm of science studies attempted to cope with
an increasingly dynamic interrelation of science and society: Not
surprisingly, epistemologies, approaches, and objects of study vary
enourmously. Put sketchily, one might recount the history of science
studies as follows:
16
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The Beginnings
Early on, scholars became interested in the relation between science
and technology on the one hand, and the (capitalist) state on the other.
St. Simon, Marx and Engels, Weber, although no scholars of science
proper, were interested in the ways in which social structures and
ideas, values and beliefs influenced each other. Weber’s Protestantische
Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, for instance, had a considerable
impact on the early sociology of knowledge, launched by Max Scheler
and Karl Mannheim in the 1920s. Their guiding notion was that
knowledge and society are related. Center stage was not science,
however, but ideologies and other forms of political knowledge.
     Indeed, for a long time, science was thought to be excluded from
being infected by the social. If anything, scientific errors could be
attributed to the social (cf. Lakatos 1971 and Laudan 1977): The early
sociologists of knowledge in Germany had deliberately exempted
scientific knowledge from their project. Elsewhere, however, scholars
began to explore the relation of science and society. While pursuing
different projects, they shared the assumption that the production and
acceptance of knowledge cannot be understood as resulting from
internal processes (alone). Other than positivists would have it,
scientific knowledge was seen as to depend on external, i. e., social
processes as well (or even entirely). In 1931, Boris M. Hessen, for
instance, held that Newton’s work was a child of his class and time
and that his work was an attempt to solve technological problems
posed by the rise of capitalism (Hessen 1931). Hessen’s work shaped
the Western Marxist sociology of science between the 1930s and
1960s, inspiring, among others, John Desmond Bernal.
     Bernal’s school was mainly interested in science policy and focused
on the social conditions or scientific research as well as the uses and
8misuses of science. By contrast, Michael Polanyi’s epistemology
emphasized the importance of practical skills and nonverbal commu-
nication, that is, the ‘tacit knowledge’ that conditions scientific work
(Polanyi 1958). By implication, no one could understand how best to
promote science who was not a scientist herself. On Polanyi’s ac-
count, there was no alternative to freedom of scientific inquiry and
adminstrative control of scientific resources by a scientific elite. The
Bernal / Polanyi debate fundamentally was about how best to organ-
ize, support and direct science in a democratic political culture:
Humanist versus elitist, political management versus self-regulation
17
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characterize the political implications of the opposing stances, affect-
ing science studies until today, albeit ambivalently (cf. Rouse 1992: 5f.).
The Institutionalist View
If indirectly, Marxist notions and Durkheimian notions had inspired
Robert K. Merton to study science systematically, thereby establish-
ing what nowadays – after several modifications – is known as
science studies (cf. notably Merton 1945). According to his institu-
tionalist view, social factors indeed play a decisive role in shaping the
products of science. In particular, he stressed the role of scientific
ethos, which comprises four ‘institutional imperatives’: universalism,
communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism (cf. Zucker-
man 1988, Felt / Nowotny / Taschwer 1995: chapter 3). Following
Mannheim in this respect, these norms safeguarded the autonomy of
science and the objectivity of scientific knowledge, thereby securing
science as an institution against corruption through social, political
and economic interests. In this structural functional analysis, sociolo-
gy of science is about investigating the institutional framework both
allowing and conditioning the emergence of science as an autonomous
cognitive system: “Specific discoveries and inventions belong to the
internal history of science and are largely independent of factors other
than purely scientific” (Merton 1970: 75). Methodically, the work was
9based on discourse analyses of scientific documents.
     Until today, the institutionalist perspective has two main objec-
tives: It focuses on the internal structure of science and on its relation
to other societal subsystems. Pertinent questions are, for instance,
what are the norms guiding scientific activities? How did the discipli-
nary structure of science emerge? What are the interdependences
between science and other societal subsystems, such as politics,
economy and the media? Further issues are funding policies, knowl-
edge transfer, evaluation, and so on. The institutionalist branch does
not, however, investigate scientific knowledge as such (with the
notable exception of bibliometric analyses, cf. below).
     As regards the dynamics of science, Merton’s approach offers two
kinds of explanation (cf. Hornbostel 1997: 89f.): According to the first
one, in scientific fields characterized by highly accepted goals, theo-
ries and methods, social factors, notably the social organization of
research, modulate scientific production of knowledge by way of
promoting or hindering scientific progress. As cognitive and social
18
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criteria correspond, the dynamics of science results but from empiri-
cally calibrating these norms that tend to be conflictive: On this view,
science proceeds selectively, yet cumulatively. According to the sec-
ond, if not strongly developed, kind of explanation, cognitive critera
of producing and evaluating knowledge may vary. In less stable fields
of research, that is, social factors may influence scientific contents and
procedures, too. Thus, the dynamics of science proceeds on the cogni-
tive level as well. Institutionalized norms no longer (fully) correspond
cognitive criteria for reward, but the latter most likely become an
10autonomous resource of competition for reputation and power.
     In the words of Joseph Ben-David, summarizing the situation of
institutionalism in the late 1960s, this brand of science studies is about
the “… institutional study of scientific activity (as distinct from the
study of concepts and theories of science)” (Ben-David 1970: 429).
Hence, while the sociology-of-knowledge paradigm will soon focus
on the contents of theories in science, the institutional paradigm
inquires into the emergence and development of science as an institu-
tion: issues such as size, growth or stagnation, innovation, choice of
topic become subject to comparative analysis; differences between
premodern and modern science; between different stages of a national
research system as well as between various national research systems.
Basically, these studies either look for universal and constitutive traits
of modern research (besides Merton, cf. also Luhmann 1990), such as
curiositas, scientific ethos, reputation, or they look for specific institu-
tional steering mechanisms, such as funding and organization of
research. Both types of studies rest on a role theory of social action:
Institutions shape the activities of goal oriented actors. To its critics,
institutionalism testifies to what Whitley has termed a “black boxism”
(Whitley 1972) that ignores controversies and discontinuities in
11science in favor of considering it a homogeneous cognitive system.
The Kuhnian Challenge
This view was severely challenged by Thomas S. Kuhn whose work
on “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962) regarded the
development of science as a succession of competing paradigms.
Knowledge was seen as the outcome of paradigm-bound science which was
itself identified by the existence of strongly bounded social structures with
powerful mechanisms of cognitive and social control. While the Mertonian
19
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sociology of science has linked knowledge production to general and rather
diffuse norms, the post Kuhnian sociology of knowledge sought coherent and
strongly bounded communities as the major, if not only, locus of knowledge
production (Whitley 1984: 684).
As regards the development of science, there are several interrelated
claims that constitute Kuhn’s approach:
– Science proceeds as ‘puzzle-solving,’ guided by a paradigm that is
shared by the respective community of scholars. This state of a
discipline Kuhn called ‘normal science.’
– As research proceeds anomalies may appear, i. e., discoveries which
contradict the ruling paradigm. The normal puzzle-solving activity
breaks down and the paradigm runs into crisis.
– Eventually the community of scholars responds to crisis by looking
for an alternative paradigm and then to move on to the new one.
This occurs as a ‘Gestalt-switch’ and constitutes a revolution
because it cannot be “settled by logic” (Kuhn 1962: 93). It entails a
change of world views, and thus a process of conversion as the
paradigms involved are incommensurable (cf. Kuhn 1962: 147).
If, with a considerable time lag and equally considerable range of
interpretations (cf. Weingart 1986 and Maasen / Weingart 2000, chap-
ter 4), the notion of paradigm, and notably the notion of paradigm
shifts, ultimately initiated an anti-positivist turn in various (social)
sciences, sociology of science included (cf. also Heintz 1993). Here,
Kuhn’s considerations became not only accepted by those who sought
to capture the intellectual dynamics of science but especially by those
who – in view of a rapidly growing scientific system, both govern-
mental and industrial – plead for a paradigm shift in research planning
as well: While the mainstream à la Merton had largely ignored the
existence of ‘science policy’ and ‘big science,’ in particular, a renewed
‘science of science’ should and could provide the means to observe,
organize, and steer science. The dynamics of science, according to this
view, was in need of a rational way to plan research (van den Dae-
le / Krohn / Weingart 1979). By stating that science was indeed open to
social and politcal influences and subject to stages of maturity, Kuhn’s
theory was regarded as a promising step in this direction of research.
In the 1970s, scholars began to inquire into the interdependence of
20
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social and cognitive factors in science, such as into the emergence of
subfields (cf., e. g., Mullins 1972, Edge / Mulkay 1975). Other scholars
analyzed the possibilities and limits of governmental intervention into
research and the latter’s orientation toward socio-political goals
(Böhme / van den Daele / Krohn 1973, 1978).
     Ironically, while Kuhn’s theory had provided the starting point for
this more externalist kind of investigations in sociology of science, the
empirical studies that followed revealed severe limitations of this
approach. Both lines of research mentioned above testify to this result.
In the case of emerging subfields, Mulkay, for example, found scientif-
ic communities to be much more amorphous and tenuous than stated
by Kuhn. Moreover, Kuhn had underestimated the impact of unex-
pected discoveries, lateral processes between neighbouring disciplines
as well as the branching off of specialized fields of research. Analo-
gously, Böhme, van den Daele, and Krohn could not confirm that the
external influences increased throughout the maturation of a theory.
On their finalization hypothesis, orientation toward external goals
and responsiveness toward external control should have been minimal
in pre-paradigmatic stages and maximal in post-paradigmatic stages.
Rather, thus the authors, scientific communities turned out to be
highly penetrable at all stages of theoretical development. Science
policital intervention, in particular, regularly produces cognitive
pluralization and institutional specialization rather than unification
and stabilization. Hence, Kuhn’s unitarian model of science and his
monist principle of explaining the development of science qua para-
digms (cf. Whitley 1974) could neither guide systematic comparison
nor research planning (cf. Hohn 1998).
Quantification and Measurement of Science
From a methodological viewpoint, the majority of science studies in
the past and still today can undoubtedly be characterized as qualita-
tively oriented research. However, there is also a long tradition of
using quantitative data and methods in the field. Until the 1950s, there
were only few papers on the measurement and quantification of
science. At that time, Eugene Garfield first published in Science
(Garfield 1955) his idea of a Science Citation Index, and, in fact, a few
years later he started the production. Although originally developed
as a new tool for searching the scientific journal literature, the SCI
right from its beginning turned out to be valuable for quantitative
21
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S.   9- 54) T01_01 introduction.p 286938514456
Sabine Maasen / Matthias Winterhager
studies of science as well. Derek John de Solla Price was the most
prominent scholar who discovered the potential of the SCI as a unique
source for empirical studies in history and sociology of science. In his
book Science since Babylon he studied the growth curves in science
with mathematical models, based on publication counts for very long
time series (Price 1961). Together with the follow-up study Little
Science, Big Science (Price 1963) his work became most influential and
stimulated a growing number of papers on all aspects of quantitative
measurement of science.
     As Garfield consequentially improved his product through imple-
mentation of new technologies, the SCI became available as a database
on tapes and during the 1970s even online. What had formerly been
impossible with the print version of the SCI could now be realized by
means of advanced computer retrieval systems: counting publications
and citations on all levels of aggregation for journals, subfields, fields,
disciplines, research groups, institutions, countries etc. Researchers
from various disciplines began to use the SCI and other literature
databases for publication and citation analyses; bibliometrics estab-
lished as a new specialty. Francis Narin pioneered the application of
bibliometric methods for evaluative purposes and the production of
science indicators (Narin 1976). With his successful delivery of
bibliometric measures for integration into the Science Indicators
volumes of the US National Science Board he demonstrated that there
is a real demand for the ‘products’ of quantitative studies of science.
Bibliometrics showed up as an applied science – and, in fact, until
today science policy and science administration agencies in many
countries purchase bibliometric studies.
     The boom in science indicators in the 1970s led to a conference
“Toward a Metric of Science: The Advent of Science Indicators” in
Stanford, where Yehuda Elkana, Robert Merton, Joshua Lederberg,
Henry Small, Arnold Thackray, Harriet Zuckerman and others
reviewed the state of the art (Elkana et al. 1978). Most of the critical
arguments on the theoretical and methodological problems of indica-
tor construction, which have been reported at this meeting are still up
to date (cf. Glänzel 1996). Also in the 1970s, Henry Small developed a
method for ‘mapping’ science by co-citation cluster analyses (Griffith
et al. 1974, Small / Griffith 1974). With these cocitation maps it is
possible to draw two-dimensional representations of the cognitive and
12social structures of specialities in science.
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     It was during the 1980s and 1990s that the scientometrics commu-
nity established itself in a more formal way with regular international
conferences and an international society. The development was
enforced by the fact that the ‘customers’ of bibliometric studies
(science policy and administration) expressed a steadily growing
13demand on reliable indicators for all sorts of evaluation tasks. More
and more researchers have got direct access to the data sources via
CD-ROM and the Internet (Web of Science), and the number of
bibliometric studies is continuously growing worldwide.
     However, with so much demand for bibliometric indicators today
there is also some danger for the field to get too much commercial-
ized. A balance between basic and applied research is essential for the
health of the field (van Raan 1997), but some of the bibliometric
research teams may become too dependent on the ‘business’ of
indicator production. Important theoretical and methodological
problems are unsolved and we are still waiting for a clear answer to
the question “Which reality do we measure?” (Weingart et al. 1990).
The Constructivist View
Throughout the 1980s – completely unaffected by quantitative
approaches in science studies – the constructivist branch of the field
started competing with and thereby striving to replace institutional
accounts of science.
There seems to be little point in focusing our analysis of cognitive norms on
general rules dealing with logical consistency, verifiability or replication as if
these notions can be taken as analytically unproblematic; for the meaning of
such rules will be as varied as the specific contexts in which they can be seen to
operate. This has become increasingly clear as a result of historical analysis and
the growing number of sociological case studies (Mulkay 1980: 56).
Students of constructivism, summarily labeling their branch of science
studies ‘Sociology of Scientific Knowledge’ (SSK), predominantly
14began to look at the epistemic dimension of science. Other than
Merton and more radical than Kuhn would have it, constructivist
notions do not restrict the influence of social factors to issues such as
theory choice. Instead, they state that the production of scientific
15knowledge is socially conditioned ‘through and through.’ This rela-
tivistic position has become known as radical externalism: Context
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determines content, or even context is content. Reality does not deliv-
er objective criteria that would allow us to judge a theory as true or
wrong. Rather, scientific theories undergo a multi-stage process in
which, by way of successive “deletion of modalities” (cf. Latour /
Woolgar 1979; Fleck 1980: 101), situative observations are transform-
ed into context-free statements, thereby stabilizating the theories un-
derlying the latter. Based on Emile Durkheim, the classical sociolo-
gy of knowledge (Karl Mannheim, Max Scheler), the work of Ludwik
16Fleck , informed by science theoretical positions expressed by the
late Wittgenstein as well as by Imre Lakatos, Mary Hesse and Paul
Feyerabend, but also oriented toward the Interpretative Sociology,
notably Ethnomethodology, David Bloor was among the first to for-
17mulate a radical externalist programmatic called “strong program.”
The central tenets are:
1 It would be causal, that is concerned with the conditions which bring about
belief or states of knowlege … 2 It would be impartial with respect to truth
and falsity, rationality, success or failure … 3 It would be symmetrical in its
style of explanation. The same types of causes would explain, say, true and
false beliefs … 4 It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation
would have to be applicable to sociology itself (Bloor 1976: 7).
Leaving open the answer as to how exactly social and cognitve factors
interfer, more precisely, what exactly is ‘social’ in science, two main
strands of research emerged to fill this gap: One centers upon science
as knowledge, the other one upon science as practice (cf. Heintz 1993).
     At the beginning of contructivist reasoning in sociology of knowl-
18edge ‘the social’ equalled external factors conditoning science.
Scholars following the so-called interest model hold that
opposed paradigms and hence opposed evaluations may be sustained, by
divergent sets of instrumental interests usually related in turn to divergent
19social interests (Barnes / McKenzie 1979: 54).
Authors such as H.M. Collins and Michael Mulkay, as well as scholars
who belong to the tradition of Symbolic Interactionism and the Chi-
cago School advance a discourse model of scientific knowledge, stress-
ing that knowledge emerges in communication by way of negotiation.
The final result can neither be reduced to the individual researcher nor
24
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to the problem at hand, but is a reality that has been interactively
produced in controversial fashion.
Through contestation and modification, the meaning of scientific observations
as well as of theoretical interpretations tends to get selectively constructed and
20reconstructed in scientific practice (Knorr-Cetina / Mulkay 1983: 11).
The decisive turn for many approaches consisted in a shift of attention
from science as knowledge to science as practice (– thus a title of a
sampler by Andrew Pickering 1992). In the following years scholars
became interested in ‘the making of,’ hence, a constructive model of
science.
In the old framework, disorder, turbulence, agitation, circumstances were to
be eliminated for a world of order, logics and rationality to appear and be
maintained. In the new framework, order is nothing but local circumstances
obtained from, and maintained by, dissolved from time to time in disorder; if
you eliminate the opportunism, the context, the fiction building, the agitation,
the reconstruction, the rationalisation you get nothing at all (Latour 1981: 70).
On this view, science and everyday communication are not different in
kind; truth and reality are the consequence, not the cause of scientific
research. In this vein, constuctivists, among other things, looked into
the making of the objects under study (e. g., the lab mouse; cf. Amann
1994), into the significance of instruments and experimental practices
(e. g., cf. Lenoir 1988) and other “inscription devices” (Latour / Wool-
gar 1979), into the making of facts (e. g., real life experiments, cf.
Krohn / Weyer 1989), or into the making of connectable results of
research (e. g., by writing a scientific article, cf. Knorr-Cetina 1984),
into the management of uncertainty (Star 1985), as well as into the
social and material mechanisms deciding over scientific controversies
(Collins 1981). Other scholars go so far as to declare the epistemic
boundaries between human and non-human actors as purely scientif-
ic attributions. Latour and Callon, for instance, accordingly to their
‘actor-network theory’ regard both fishermen and scallops as agents in
a complex game and consequently as both having agency, and thus
explanatory power (Callon / Latour 1992). In the actor-network theo-
ry, context and content are products of networks: As the latter ex-
pand, the former, be it facts or technologies, become more robust.
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Likewise, social structure changes through conflicting relations in the
21network, i. e., an agonistic field.
Recombinations in Science Studies
Throughout the 1990s, the constructivist program, in general, has
increasingly met with criticism. Especially two distinguished publica-
tions stimulated heated debates about contructivism and even on
science studies in general: “Higher Superstition: The Academic Left
and its Quarrels with Science,” written by biologist Paul R. Gross and
mathematician Norman Levitt (Gross / Levitt 1994) and “Transgress-
ing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of
Quantum Gravity” by physicist Alan Sokal: The latter submitted a
parody of postmodern science criticism to the cultural studies journal
Social Text, without telling the editors that it was a parody. Three
weeks after publication Sokal revealed the hoax in an article in Lingua
Franca. The book of Gross / Levitt and even more Sokal’s experiment
caused a long-standing debate, generating numerous articles on
different platforms. Sometimes labelled as “science wars,” the issue
already has its own web sites with extensive documentation of the
discourse (http://members.tripod.com/ScienceWars and http://physics.
nyu.edu/faculty/sokal).
     But criticism also came from the inside of science studies:
Constructivist studies have not provided a better understanding of what re-
searchers see as negotiable and what they consider beyond dispute, what they
implicitly or deliberately accept as knowledge to be taken for granted as given
institutional arrangement and what they contest … Elements of a sociocogni-
tive order beyond the level of locally contingent episodes of interaction and
beyond individual choices and preferences will have to be invoken in order to
say anything specific about why and how some researchers succeed in getting
some of their knowledge claims widely accepted while others fail (Hagendijk
1990: 5).
There is a growing number of scholars who refuse to participate in
what may be termed “hyper-contingency-theory” (Hohn 1998),
consuming itself in fruitless debates about different relativistic
positions. They rather want to return to types of science studies that
allow to account for issues such as ‘spontaneous discoveries,’ ‘scientif-
ic consensus,’ ‘reliable knowledge’ and ‘robust theories’: While not
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denying constructivist insights altogether, these scholars want to bring
back institutionalist insights and / or the material world into the ex-
planatory horizon of science studies.
     First, the so-called material stance presents one way of granting the
constraints or resistances of the empirical world a causal role. It is best
expressed by Ian Hacking according to whom science is practice if
understood as “a play between many things: data, theory, experiment,
phenomenology, equipment, data processing” (Hacking 1992: 55).
Together with Andrew Pickering and David Gooding, Ian Hacking
thus reinstates all elements, including empirical research, as equally
crucial forces in the development of scientific knowledge. In this view,
for example, non-conclusive or contradictory experiments clearly
22restrict possible interpretations. This re-introduction of the empiric-
al-materialist level seems to counter-balance an over-stretched exter-
nalism.
     Second, a new branch of science studies, ‘Cultural Studies of
Scientific Knowledge,’ regards science as a result of conflicts over
knowledge and power in a society. While in a way one may consider
23this just a new brand name for old approaches , it is special in that it
lends toward the explicitly ‘critical’ end of theorizing (to raise but a
few flags: radical science movement; post-Marxist, feminist, antiracist
schools of thought). Cultural studies of science
– considers science not a distinguishable kind of knowledge but
24rather a fundamentally heterogeneous endeavor ;
– insists upon the local, material and discursive character of scientific
practice;
– acknowledges that the traffic across the boundaries between science
25and society is always two-way;
in short:
Cultural studies ‘of science’ are located within ongoing conflicts over knowl-
edge, power, identity, and possibilities for action … Yet, in doing so, they aim
to participate in constructing authoritative knowledge of the world by
critically engaging with the scientific practices of making meanings (Rouse
261992: 21, 22).
This happens in the midst of contested and contestable, from time to
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time changing values which are themselves subject to contemporary
STS. Exceeding Merton’s institutional and technical norms, scholars
inquire into “temporal, national, gender, democratic and other values
as they ground institutions, theories, design, methods, policy, and
other dimensions of science and technology” (cf. Hess 1997: 147).
     Third, sociology of science voiced yet another opposition toward
equalling science studies with sociology of knowledge: Scholars re-
think the institutionalist approach. According to the radical construc-
tivists, scientific insights are but social constructions. As has been
mentioned above, pertinent studies inquire into the research practices
(Latour / Woolgar 1979; Knorr-Cetina 1984; Lynch / Livingston /
Garfinkel 1983) as well as into the communicative procedures in
scientific discourse (Collins 1981; Mulkay / Gilbert 1984; Engel-
27hardt / Caplan 1987). However, as Zaheer Baber remarked in a
review on various works in science studies, “… the issues raised by
Robert Merton are still around with us” (Baber 1992: 18).
     In the 1980s, Richard Whitley, for example, suggested to conceive
of science as profession:
Science today is a highly general umbrella term which covers a vast range of
activities conducted by a large number of qualified personel in a variety of
work organizations for a variety of purposes (Whitley 1984: 299).
Accordingly, the academic model of scientific work is no longer suffi-
cient for understanding the professionalized sciences. He thus investi-
gates the institutionalized conditions of science on a macrosociological
level, thereby combining structural functional analyses of science as a
reputational system, analyses of professionalization in science with
insights of recent sociology of science. As Baber noted later, research-
ers indeed care a lot about, for instance, reputation and funding, hence
are concerned with (if not, absorbed by) institutional structures fram-
ing research. Consequently, authors such as Arie Rip (1993), Suzan
Cozzens (1986) Hasse, Krücken, and Weingart (1993) as well as Uwe
Schimank (1995a) plead for a stronger consideration of institutional
factors.
     Even more radically, Mario Bunge concludes his review on the new
sociology of science. Not only does he reject the latter’s preference for
looking at “science from afar” (Bunge 1992: 71) but also does he note
the failure to address nonlocal and topical questions such as, for
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instance, the “decline of epistemic communism” (sharing data and
materials due to increased competition); the increase “in exaggerated
claims and unabashed publicity” or “the mounting number of fraud
and plagiarism;” “the prosperity of anti-and pseudoscientific doc-
trines” (cf. Bunge 1992: 71). These and related questions call for a
renewal of institutionalist accounts in science studies.
     In brief, the time seems right to re-acknowledge institutional
factors in science studies, both for political and scientific reasons: As
to the former, research policy has become an important part of politics
today. Pertinent topics are the analysis of innovation in science, the
difficulties of implementing scientific results, or the conditions for
inducing societally useful topics of research. Thus, on the one hand,
extrascientific dynamics enhances the need for investigating the
possibilities of politically regulating or intervening into science as an
institution. On the other hand, by way of intrascientific dynamics,
neo-institutionalism has been revived in various disciplines, such as
the political sciences (March / Olson 1989), organization theory
(Powell / DiMaggio 1991), and economics (Granovetter 1985). From
this perspective – internal differences notwithstanding – institutional
rules, juridical norms and formal organizational expectations restrict
the range of activities of an individual actor and promote conformity,
yet allow for creativity within limits. The logic of action follows a
“logic of appropriateness” (March / Olson 1989).
     In recent times, inspired by both rational choice theories (e. g.,
Esser 1990) and interactionist approaches, neo-institutionalist ac-
counts increasingly focus on creative agency in dealing with roles and
norms that, for the most part, are diffuse, fragmented and contradicto-
ry. On this view, actors pursue their goals strategically on the basis of
(yet are not fully determined by) the roles and norms typical of the
organization or subsystem in which they act. While acting strategical-
ly is not confined to certain subsystems, the modes and goals of
strategic action differ considerably from subsystem to subsystem:
Scientific actors are headed for reputation, political actors strive for
power, and economic actors go for money. Accordingly, scientists act
for system specific goals under conditions of system specific norms.
Academic structures (e. g., scientific innovation, acquisition of funds)
shape their reputation-seeking activities: Those norms and the sub-
systemic code of truth are distinct markers of scientific activity. Neo-
institutionalists thus insist on an epistemic differences of science with
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respect to other spheres of societal action. At the same time, however,
this claim is not to reject and replace sociology of knowledge-type of
sciences studies. Rather, it is about complementing the latter as both
paradigms differ in explanans and explanandum: ‘Social construction
of contents’ and ‘institutional traits of modern science as societal
subsystem’ can mutually enrich each other (cf. below).
     If it comes to the question of how institutions are produced and
reproduced by action, neo-institutionalism still needs to be elabor-
ated. Besides allusions to habitualization theories (Berger / Luckmann
1966) and advanced theorizing in rational choice theory (cf., e. g.,
North 1990), scholars inquire into what they call actor-oriented
institutionalism (cf., e. g., Mayntz / Scharpf 1994): In this line of think-
ing, research regulation results from a complex constellation of actors,
differing in interests and power to influence the subsystem. Although
restricted by juridical and organizational norms the outcome of
28regulating activities in research policy is by no means determined.
The intricate relations between these actors (governmental, corporate,
research institution, scientists) can be studied with the help of a variety
of approaches in game theory (cf., e. g., Coleman 1982), by way of
modelling “critical masses” (Marvell / Oliver 1993) or dynamic social
processes (Mayntz / Nedelmann 1987). On a different note, network
theories of various brands inquire into less formal social linkages that
play an important part in the making of science (e. g., invisible col-
29 30leges , specialty groups, agnostic alliances , transscientific fields).
Epistemology Reconsidered
Summarizing, for these and other questions, science studies may be
well-advised to broaden or pluralize its paradigmatic outlook on
science: science as knowledge, science as practice, science as material
culture, science as profession, science as institution, science as subsys-
tem all yield interesting insights into the dynamics of making and
remaking reliable knowledge. As regards the relationship of construc-
tivist and institutionalist accounts, we follow Hohn in stating that
science studies is not about ‘either / or’ but about combining both, if in
different ways, depending on the problem at hand. Scientific activity is
neither fully determined by externalist nor by internalist factors. True
to social constructivism, science does not dispose of a priviledged kind
of rationality but is – like other forms of political or economical
activities – characterized by ‘bounded rationality’ and confined to
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strategies of ‘satisficing.’ However, unlike other social subsystems,
science is indeed based upon “institutionalized factual critique”
(Luhmann 1970: 241) and upon cognitive innovations (cf. Whitley
1984). Whether or not one agrees with Hohn that, ultimately, institu-
tionalism is a kind of constructivism, therefore calling for epistemic
integration (cf. Hohn 1998: 306), one may proceed from an empirical
stance first. One might hold that scientific knowledge
is constrained to a greater or lesser extent by input from the material world …
and that the relative importance of this influence as compared with social
31processes is a variable that must be empirically studied (Cole 1992: x).
Research is regarded as a kind of problem solving determined by vari-
ous factors in unforeseeable, yet – at least post-hoc – detectable ways.
     Epistemologically speaking, we thus hold that stances that as yet
lack a generic name may prove most promising, namely those which
neither adher to positivism nor to radical versions of constructivism.
As far as Cole is concerned, he suggests to speak of “realist construc-
tivism” (Cole 1992: x): why not? Ultimately, science should not be
about epistemology but about doing research. Likewise, science
studies should not be exhausted with epistemological questions but
study science. Recent research in the realm of history and philosophy
of science, pursued in this spirit, gives evidence to the ways in which
one can most fruitfully combine constructivist and ‘Mertonian’
32approaches (cf. Galison 1987, Giere 1988, Hull 1988 and Cole 1992 ).
For instance, research on the ‘dynamics of cumulative disadvantage’
helps to better understand the relatively stable disparities between
women and men in salary and rank, which, in turn, provide a basis for
policy issues (cf. Hess 1997: 59–64). In particular, as affirmative action
programs have become disputed, the research suggests alternatives in
personnel management, e. g., by modifying institutional mechanisms
that magnify cumulative disadvantage.
     On a general level, as knowledge – scientific knowledge, in particu-
lar – has become a much-embraced and, at the same time, much-con-
tested part of society, science studies should and can assume an active
role in observing the intricacies and pitfalls of the interactions of
science and society. In the end, science studies forms part of an disil-
lusioned kind of enlightenment: The (if loose) couplings between
science and politics, economy, the media as well as its close interaction
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with the general public are in need of observations and interventions.
As the observations can only approximate truth and as the interven-
tions can only approximate the intended effects and prompt unintend-
ed ones as well, observations have to be incessant and interventions
re-assessed. Most fundamentally, that is, both observations and
interventions are themselves part of the game named dynamics of
science and society and hence, themselves, part of the reflexive
exercise called sciences studies. The scene of action: amidst knowledge
societies (cf. Weingart 2001).
Nine Studies in Science
This brief and by no means exhaustive tour d’horizon of science
studies was meant to show that – yes – it is an ensemble of heteroge-
neous endeavors only loosely connected by their subject: science. Yet,
there are some trends and common concerns. Science studies today
– reconsiders the issue of institutionalism and constructivism: In-
creasingly, scholars call for epistemological rapprochement;
– disposes of a broad array of methodological tools – both qualitative
and quantitative ones – that currently become combined and re-
combined, depending on the issue at hand;
– is a decidedly interdisciplinary endeavor, albeit biased by the schol-
ar’s disciplinary background;
– goes transdisciplinary: Not only does science studies disclose the
complex dynamics of science and other societal subsystems ever-
more intricately, but also do politics and the general public ask
more intensively for scientific expertise on specific issues and
scrutinizes science, in general. Several applied programs like Public
Understanding of Science (PUS) or Science Indicators rely on and
are strongly connected to basic research in science studies.
– Shows a considerable degree of institutionalization in both teaching
and research.
In response to internal specialization and increasing external demands,
science studies reflects upon the dynamic interaction of science and
society in more sophisticated ways. While this book cannot represent
all types and levels of analyses, it probes more deeply into some of the
most recent and promising aspects:
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     Eugenics – Looking at the Role of Science Anew. Diane Paul’s
article on “A Statistical Viewpoint of Historical Hypotheses: The
Case of Eugenics” presents a fascinating attempt to reorient historio-
graphic insights by way of using analytical tools that were originally
developed in another discipline: in biostatistics. By deliberately
employing statistical methods and concerns, Paul ventures into a new
set of metaphors, a new vocabulary even, and, hence, a new way of
framing the issue of eugenics. The long-standing notion according to
which scientific advances played a central role in eugenics’ decline
thus is confronted with issues such as ‘independence of evidence’ or
the ‘dangers of pseudo-replication.’ Although not alien to historio-
graphic thinking, the impact of these concepts is increased by being
couched in these terms. What is more, ultimately, we are in a position
to tell different stories. Paul’s study shows that and how the transfer
of concepts dynamizes accounts in history of science.
     Humanities – Inquiry Into the Growing Demand for Histories. In a
similar manner, Wolfgang Prinz in his article on “Making sense” takes
recourse to metaphors in order to elucidate the function of ‘telling
stories’ in historiography. Therapeutic metaphors and analogies to
storytelling, in particular, help to illustrate his claim that historiogra-
phy, more than reconstructing the past, is about constructing the
present. Histories thus, by necessity, come in the plural, they are
selective and (politically) biased – on the grounds of which they, too,
are not stable but highly dynamic entities. By employing therapeutic
intervention as a heuristic tool, Prinz suggests to regard the historio-
graphical endeavor “to uncover the truth about the past as integral
part of a complex psychodynamical process that takes place in the
present” (Prinz, this volume, 82).
     Bibliometrics – Monitoring Emerging Fields. Anthony van Raan
and his collaborators present an example of the quantification and
measurement of science. In the past, scientometrics has often been
associated with the boring business of simple number-counting of
publications and citations. However, modern bibliometric methods
show an advanced potential of application for analytical studies in
sociology and history of science, as well as for science policy. Van
Raan’s case study on environmental medicine demonstrates that
scientometrics is more than just the production of tables with citation
statistics: Sophisticated bibliometric methods can be used as a tool for
exploring the cognitive and social structures of new, unorthodox (i. e.,
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interdisciplinary) fields in science. The study shows that it is possible
to delineate an upcoming interdisciplinary field bibliometrically and
that emerging themes as well as the most important groups in the field
can be identified and analyzed with bibliometric means. Thus, quanti-
tative approaches in science studies can provide a valuable information
for peer review and evaluation processes.
     Science Policy – Making Universities Cope with Science Today.
Wilhelm Krull, in his article, explains the dramatic challenges for
universities on the threshold of the twenty-first century. With the
example of Germany, he analyzes the most important dimensions of
change that universities are currently undergoing. His examination is
arranged around the following critical issues, which are relevant for
universities in most countries today. As regards funding, the role of
the state will decrease and that of the private sector will substantially
increase. World wide web and multimedia technology is leading to
more and more virtual colleges, and university attendance will loose
importance. Traditional disciplinary specialization will fall back
against more inter- and transdisciplinarity. Evaluation and perfor-
mance assessments, i. e., indicators for research and teaching ‘outputs,’
will play a significant role in budget allocations. Internationalization
will be enforced not only in students but also for the teaching staff.
All these trends produce a climate of dynamic change for universities.
     Evolutionary Theory and the Social Sciences – Increasingly a
Mutual Exchange. Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, in their
contribution on “Culture is Part of Human Biology …,” argue for the
use of evolutionary concepts in the domain of the social sciences.
Specifically, they talk about blurring the boundaries between the
biological and the social to explain human culture. This statement, to
be sure, does not entail a plea for reductionism, one way or the other.
Rather, human culture being a highly complex phenomenon that
needs an evolutionary account on both the biological and the social
level. On the so-called coevolutionary view, culture, like genes, create
patterns of heritable variation. As natural selection will operate on
any pattern of heritable variation, it will affect both culture and
genes. Moreover, genes act as selective environments to culture as
culture acts as selective environment to genes, if on different time
scales. Only a complex interaction of both can explain the enourmous
adaptivity of human culture and the dynamics of its constitutive social
institutions.
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     Climatology – Innovative Research Strategies in a Dynamic Field.
On a more general, historiographical level, Aant Elzinga’s article on
“Climate Research in the Field” is concerned with science policy
doctrines and their history, with particular reference to their theoreti-
cal underpinnings as viewed from a social epistemological perspective.
With the example of polar expeditions and research in Antarctica, he
investigates the discourse on “Global Climate Change” in a novel
way: He looks at the complex dynamics of the research process in this
field. The case of climate change is particularly intriguing in that it is
not only one of the major scientific issues that made its way up to the
headlines of news magazines during the 1990s but it is also one of the
most prominent domains for studying risk communication among
science, politics and the public (cf. Weingart et al. 2000). Moreover,
the field is a typical example of science in mode 2: highly interdiscipli-
nary, sharing knowledge from many different disciplines; highly dy-
namic, rapidly developing; basic science and at the same time with a
high potential of application to the needs of mankind.
     Metaphors – Moving Targets in the (Social) Sciences. James J. Bono
explicitly addresses the role of metaphors in science. He pleads for
metaphors as instruments of thought and action in every kind of
activity, scientific ones included. In line with Elizabeth Grosz, he
insists on metaphors as most evidently blurring the boundaries be-
tween discourse and practice: They are both discursive and practical
entities in that they are not just pieces of text but performative.
Drawing on a study by Lily Kay (2000), Bono gives the following
example: “Without the metaphoric construction of heredity – espe-
cially DNA – as informatic code, the mobilization of molecular
biology and affiliated disciplines in the late twentieth century to
produce an entire array of instruments, recording devices, and proto-
cols to ‘read’ the molecular alphabet in which the book of life is
written could not be imagined” (Bono, this volume, 227). The theoret-
ical and experimental dynamics of those disciplines and their impact
on societal discourse, according to this view, is subtly revealed by
disclosing the performative power of metaphorical concepts upon
which we reason and act.
     Science and the Public – Pushing PUS with Science Studies. Bruce
Lewenstein analyzes the complex interaction of science, politics and
the media, which partly is also addressed by Elzinga’s case study on
climate research. Although surveys about public attitudes toward
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science and technology have been done already some 30 years ago,
only since the 1990s the new field Public Understanding of Science
(PUS) began to establish itself in the context of science studies. Lewen-
stein gives a critical view of PUS programs which have been introdu-
ced in most industrialized countries in recent years. He discovers a
fundamental contradiction between democratic ideas of equal partici-
pation and the meritocratic ideal that produces scientific elites. Elite
scientists do not understand the public’s perception of science and
therefore will be unable to produce PUS programs which serve the
public well. PUS programs should not primarily be about scientif-
ic results but about scientific procedures. Put differently, PUS-pro-
grams should be less about ‘public understanding of science,’ and more
be about ‘public understanding of science.’
     Knowledge Politics – The Paradox of Regulating Knowledge Dy-
namics. Nico Stehr focuses on modern societies’ ways to cope with
the dynamics of knowledge they increasingly rely on. As has been
noted earlier, knowledge societies are confronted with a dilemma:
More knowledge, even if systematically produced, may not only add
up in a cumulative but also in a competitive fashion. Who de-
cides? Adapting knowledge to local conditions changes knowledge
and may have unintended consequences. Who knows? The issue of
observing (novel) knowledge-in-practice, too, is not only a matter of
intrascientific quality control but also (and increasingly so) becomes a
matter of trans- and extrascientific assessment procedures. Both, the
subject of regulation and the regulatory practices are under constant
surveillance. In the end, however, regulating knowledge, hence, is
about dynamizing (i. e., regulating) discourses on regulating knowl-
edge.
     In brief: The studies tackle the issue of eugenics, the humanities as
well as climatology and environmental medicine. They inquire into
science policy and knowledge politics and address topics such as
regulating knowledge, and reorganizing universities. Moreover, they
reflect upon the public understanding of science. Finally, they explore
methods to grasp the intricate dynamics of (scientific) knowledge by
way of bibliometrics, metaphor analysis, and address the dynamics of
human culture with the help of coevolutionary theorizing and
modeling. They do so with full-fledged articles, or essays, include
tables and graphs or diary notes, lend toward historical or systematic
analysis, respectively, make use of qualitative or quantitative methods.
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With respect to subject matters addressed, methods used or style of
writing – traditional or experimental – the authors convened in this
book thereby touch upon issues and interests that characterize the
intellectual career of the very scholar who once brought science
studies to Germany and is still engaged in various projects, often in
cooperation with colleagues in Europe and the US – Peter Weingart.
As he is thoroughly critical of labels, we thus do not even begin to
ascribe labels to him. Suffice it to say, that, while always having been a
critical observer of science-in-society, he never gave up a rationalistic
view: Science as an institution and as a mode of systematically produc-
ing trustworthy knowledge, to him is a success story, if in need of
constant surveillance. Science studies, notably sociology of science,
can help to understand the emerging paradoxes resulting from tighten-
ing couplings between science and other societal subsystems, such as
politics, economy, and the media (cf. Weingart 2001), producing
phenomena such as fraud, problems of legitimation, the urgency to go
public, etc. In general, however, for those interested, we refer to his
website (http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/iwt/pw) and, with this volume,
give a specific presentation of science studies that, by implication and
some explicit references, scattered throughout, is designed to charac-
terize his work as well. Another title for this book thus could be:
Science Studies According to Peter Weingart. May it be an inspiring
source of dynamic thinking in science studies as his ideas have been
inspiring to us!
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Notes
1 Leaving aside introductory sections in books and articles, the
most notable exceptions are: the two-part article by Mario Bunge
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(1992), introductions by David J. Hess (1997) and by Ulrike Felt,
Helga Nowotny, and Klaus Taschwer (1995), the handbook edited
by Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen, and
Trevor E. Pinch (1994), contributions by Bettina Heintz (1993,
1998), the reader edited by Mario Bagioli (1999), two samplers and
a booklet by Peter Weingart (1972, 1974, 2001).
2 Next to obvious locations such as departments for history,
philosophy, sociology, history of science, and, of course, science
studies, one finds the field also in medical, law, or art schools and
– least obvious perhaps – in mining schools (cf. Bagioli 1999: xvii)!
3 “The World Wide Guide to Science Studies” in the Internet, al-
though not exhaustive, is most telling if it comes to demonstrate
the heterogeneity of the field today: HS: History of Science, HM:
History of Medicine, HPS: History & Philosophy of Science, HT:
History of Technology, PM: Philosophy of Medicine, PS: Philos-
ophy of Science, SciEd: Science Education, SS: Sociology of Sci-
ence, SST: Sociology of Science & Technology, STPol: Science,
Technology, & Public Policy, HSTM: History of Science, Tech-
nology, and Medicine, HST: History of Science and Technology,
STS: Science & Technology Studies (http://scistud.umkc.edu/
wwg/info/subject.html, December 1997). The internal heterogneity
notwithstanding, the field is characterized by lively interactions
and a considerable degree of institutionalization. Associations,
newsletters, conferences, programs, and centers all testify to the
fact that science studies has become of particular interest. While
for a long time this interest has been confined to the intrascientific
realm, throughout the last 25 years transdisciplinary arenas have
emerged in which science studies play an increasingly important
role, science policy and ‘public understanding of science’ being
most pertinent examples.
4 One could, of course, easily extend this list by adding anthropol-
ogy, feminism, cultural studies, literary criticism, etc. Our location
in, and account of, science studies, however, although committed
to an interdisciplinary outlook, primarily is a social scientific one.
Alternatively, David J. Hess, in his introduction into science
studies, makes a point of ordering the chapters along the broader
disciplinary divisions: the ‘philosophy of science, ‘the sociology of
science,’ the ‘sociology of knowledge’ and the ‘critical and cultur-
al studies of science.’ It is thus a helpful source of quick and com-
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prehensive introductions into the disciplinary constituents of sci-
ence studies (cf. Hess 1997).
5 Beyond the pros and cons, Peter Weingart addressed the underly-
ing paradox guiding the recurring calls for inter- or transdisiplina-
rity in the face of ever-more fine-grained specialization of knowl-
edge production (cf. Weingart 2000: 40): In his view, on the level
of both organization and contents of scientific pursuit, interdisci-
plinarity and specialization do not contradict each other but are
mutually reinforcing strategies of knowledge production. Eventu-
ally, and despite all claims to the contrary, inter- or transdiscipli-
narities, rather than eventually leading to a, if distant, ‘unity of
science,’ regularly lead to new demarcations and specializations in
(scientific) knowledge – thereby inevitably dynamizing the latter.
“The discourse on interdisciplinarity is, in effect, a discourse on
innovation in knowledge production” (Weingart 2000: 30).
6 One might as well say: two types of erosions (the erosion of truth,
the erosion of certainty), but this does not imply the erosion of
authority of science at large. Even though scientists produce dif-
ferent, if not contradicting results, science as an institution is still
regarded as most trustworthy (Hartz / Chappell 1997).
7 This, to be sure, holds for rationalists and relativists alike. The
most striking difference between the two factions is this: While
rationalists still believe in unequivocality, relativists adhere to
strict ambivalence. Stories, reasons, or meanings are meanings for
certain persons, tribes, communities, produced in certain social,
cultural, historical situations. From a perspective, however, that
looks at the dynamics of any kind of knowledge, including scien-
tific ones, these positions are but further incentives for producing
‘true’ knowledge or ‘yet another story,’ in other words: for produc-
ing more and different knowledge.
8 Today, as Bunge points out, they would rather be classified as
internalists for they never claimed science to have a social content
(Bunge 1991: 529).
9 Opinions vary as to whether and how strongly Merton was an
internalist or an externalist. Bunge, voting for a middle position,
states that his school “practiced a kind of externalism and internal-
ism, never embraced constructivism and relativism, and did not
underrate the importance of ideas” (Bunge 1991: 533). From a
constructivist perspective, however, things look differently: Based
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on epistemic realism, Merton’s scientific products were exempted
from ‘social contamination’ (Knorr-Cetina) – an assumption
heavily attacked by constructivists.
10 Hornbostel rightly argues the latter kind of explanation to be as
promising for connecting institutionalist to non-institutionalist
accounts of science (Hornbostel 1997: 90; cf. also Merton 1977:
68).
11 To explain the functioning of science on the basis of norms
deduced from highly selective documents published by a few
scientists, has been heavily criticized: Law regards it a “selfvalidat-
ing methodological and theoretical system. We look for norms, we
choose certain types of data – those where we expect to locate the
norms, and we go on to interpret that data normatively. If we fail
to find shared norms we take it that our methods are not good
enough, or that the area has not been institutionalized properly”
(Law 1974: 168). Generally, empirical data raised doubts as to
whether following those norms would have a functional effect for
the development of science at all (cf. Weingart 1972, 1974).
12 Until the late 1970s, spread over a variety of scientific journals, so
many papers in quantitative studies of science had been published,
that a specific journal for this growing scientific community was
due. Thus in 1978 the first issue of Scientometrics was published.
Established as an international forum “For all Quantitative
Aspects of the Science of Science, Communication in Science and
Science Policy” the journal covers important research con-
tributions not only from Europe and the US, but also from
other regions with a strong tradition in quantitative studies of
science – like India, Russia, Hungary and other east European
countries.
13 Another application relying on science indicators is Pierre Bour-
dieu’s account of science as a bipolar field, one pole – scientific –
being autonomous and self-referentially organized, the other pole
– societal – being heteronomous and politically / strategically
organized (cf., eg., Bourdieu 1975, 1988). Based on a conflict
model, science thus is a field of competition for reputation and
power, i. e., symbolic, cultural and economic forms of capital.
Other than Merton’s ‘sporting’ and rule-oriented account of
scientific endeavor, Bourdieu conceives of science as war for
authority, in which scientific-technical skills and social power are
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inextricably intertwined. The rules guiding the scientific contro-
versies are neither explicated in methodologies nor social norms,
but regulated by a discipline-specific habitus – it materializes in
practices of accumulating symbolic capital that are transmitted by
way of disciplinary socialization. Bourdieu studies these practices
of maximizing scientific prestige with the help of science indica-
tors, notably publication and citation data – in his view, these data
mirror objectively the activities of scientific knowledge producers
(for a critique, cf. Hornbostel 1997).
14 Since the late 1970s, the constuctivist sociology of science
branched off into a variety of directions. To mention but a few, cf.
Michael Mulkay’s discourse analysis (Mulkay et al. 1983; Gil-
bert / Mulkay 1984), Steve Woolgar’s work on reflexivity in sociol-
ogy of knowledge (Woolgar 1988), the laboratory studies (Latour /
Woolgar 1979, Knorr-Cetina 1984); studies on the experiment and
on the technical culture in science (Gooding 1990, Lenoir / Elkana
1988), studies on scientific controversies (Collins 1981), ethnome-
thodoligical studies (Lynch 1985, Lynch et al. 1985), the actor-
network approach (Latour 1987, Callon / Latour 1992). Today, the
delineations between the individual schools are not as clear-cut
anymore. As an example, lab-studies are nowadays interested in
transcending the confines of the laboratory and ask for more gen-
eral phenomena in the realm of scientific discourse and transscien-
tific negotiation.
15 This wording is by Sal Restivo, thereby referring to mathematics
(cf. Restivo 1992).
16 Fleck’s work on “The Emergence and Development of a Scientif-
ic Fact,” published in 1935 (here: Fleck 1980), has been appreciat-
ed only lately, namely after its discussion by Baldamus (1977) and
its translation into English by Merton (1977). “… the initial
repression of his work was due to the fact that it anticipated a
sociology of science which nobody could have possibly under-
stood or predicted at the time” (Baldamus 1977: 151). In a way,
Fleck assumed the role of a hybrid: Being periphal to all reference
groups, he was in no way restricted by forms (and forces) of
disciplinary consensus. As a great many of his ideas have been
taken up by the “new socologists of science,” however, Fleck will
not be discussed separately in this introduction either but only
occasionally referred to.
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17 In reaction to critiques as regards the notion of ‘interest’ and,
notably, the transition from interests to knowledge cf., among
others, Hasse / Krücken, Weingart 1995), the authors de-radica-
lized their approach: “It is claimed that interests inspire the con-
struction of knowledge out of available cultural resources in ways
which are specific to particular times and situations and their over-
all social and cultural contexts …. It is true that no laws or neces-
sary connections are proposed to link knowledge and the social
order” (Barnes 1977: 58). What is more, authors cautioned against
dispensing of scientific rationality per se: “The strong thesis does
not imply, however, that there is no distinction between the vari-
ous kinds of rational rules adopted in a society on the one hand,
and their conventions on the other. There may be a hierarchy of
rules and conventions, in which some conventions may be justified
by argument in terms of some rational rules, and some subsets of
those rules in terms of others. None of these possibilities imply
that rational rules go beyond social and biological norms of tran-
scendent rationality” (Hesse 1980: 56).
18 The following is based upon Heintz 1993.
19 A well-known study in this vein has been pursued by Paul
Foreman, relating antirationalist tendencies in Weimar Germany
to the early acceptance of the anticausal program entailed in
quantum physics. (For a thorough critique, cf. the compilation by
Karl von Meyenn 1994.)
20 Interestingly, Mulkay and Gilbert in a study on accounting for
error among scientists found the following: “Whereas correct
belief is portrayed as exclusively a cognitive phenomenon, as
arising unproblematically out of rational assessments of experi-
mental evidence, incorrect belief is viewed as involving the intru-
sion of distorting social and psychological factors into the cogni-
tive domain” (Mulkay / Gilbert 1984). Discourse analysis can thus
provide a detailed account of the argumentative resources scient-
ists rely on if accounting for scientific insights as true or false, yet
cannot answer theoretical questions as to how these attributions
relate to scientists’ interests in evaluating contradicting claims (cf.
Hornbostel 1997: 116).
21 This approach has been heavily criticized for confusing identities
and relations and, in effect, maintaining the differences between
natural and social entities (cf., e. g., Gingras 1995).
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22 This, for instance, has been called “Widerstandsaviso” by Fleck
(Fleck 1980: 124).
23 See the collection of authors convened under this rubric in Rouse
1992, 2.
24 On this, Michel Foucault provides some of the key concepts. In
particular, scholars rely on his notion of a ‘dispositif’: It refers to
science as a “hererogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions,
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical,
moral, and philantropic propositions …” (Foucault 1980: 194).
(Scientific) knowledge, on this view, is intimately connected to
forms of power: “The exercise of power perpetually creates knowl-
edge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of
power” (Foucault 1980: 52)
25 A large faction of the work in the realm of ‘Public Understand-
ing of Science’ (PUS) is done by scholars who adopt a critical cul-
tural stance, pertinent approaches and issues being as diverse as ‘sci-
entific literacy,’ the analysis of scientific and technical controver-
sies in a democratic culture and ‘ethnoscience’ (cf., e. g., Nelkin 1994).
26 On a polemical note Rouse concludes his programmatic by
stating: “… social constructivism is antagonistic to the cultural
authority claimed by the natural sciences, but uncritical of scientif-
ic practices. Cultural studies reverse this stance, aiming to partici-
pate in constructing authoritative knowledge of the world by
critically engaging with the sciences’ practices of making mean-
ings” (Rouse 1992: 22).
27 Scholars focus on micropractices in research as well as on their
relation to political and economic interests. In a prototypical
manner, Latour’s study on Louis Pasteur (Latour 1984; 1987) or
Lenoir’s study on research in the German Kaiserreich (Lenoir
1992) show so-called ‘seamless webs’ of social factors conditioning
science. These and other case studies revealed useful insights into
the making of scientific facts and also – implicitly or explicitly –
rejected and replaced the institutional paradigm.
28 An overlap can be seen here between science studies and
Technology Assessment (TA) as a separate field with a similar
development. From the beginning of the 1970s, TA has been in-
troduced as an instrument to monitor critical issues in science and
technology in governments and parliaments in many countries.
Although the USA played a leading role in TA during the 1970s
43
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S.   9- 54) T01_01 introduction.p 286938514456
Sabine Maasen / Matthias Winterhager
and 1980s, in 1995 the US Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) was finally closed down. The voluminous out-
put of OTA is still available (http://www.wws.princeton.edu/˜ota/),
but today there seems to be much more TA activity in Europe
(Vig / Paschen 1999). All the official OTA assessments from 1990–
1995 are archived at this site, along with many background papers
and other documents.
29 Based on Price (1963)
30 Collins / Restivo (1983)
31 Accordingly, we agree with his evaluation of constructivism:
“Constructivists do show that the doing of science is not the
rational rule-governed activity it has been depicted as and that
serendipity and chance play a significant role in the construction
of local knowledge outcomes. Studies done by social constructi-
vists do suggest (but have not yet demonstrated) that local knowl-
edge outcomes may be influenced by social variables. These
studies have not proved that the extent to which theories match
data from the empirical world has no influence on local knowledge
outcomes. They show that science is underdetermined but do not
show that it is totally undetermined” (by empirical data) (Cole
1992: 229).
32 In his book on “Making Science,” Cole (1992) argues that it is
social variables interacting with cognitive variables that influence
the foci of attention and the rate of advance in science. Social
variables alone, however, cannot explain the communal acceptance
of a scientific solution.
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Looking at the Role
of Science Anew
Among the most troubling phenomena of the last century, one finds the politi-
cal, moral and scientific issue of eugenics. As is well-known, eugenics became a
movement mostly within the framework of public health throughout the
Western industrial countries, especially Britain, the United States, the Scandi-
navian Countries and Germany. The underlying notion was that the endan-
gered or already degenerated heriditary stock could only be improved by the
control of individual reproductive behavior and / or the reform of social insti-
tutions held to be counterselective (cf. Kevles 1985). Thus eugenists focused on
human reproduction and its institutions, notably on the choice of mates and
marriage (cf. Schallmeyer 1918). The selection-oriented social analysis was
translated into a comprehensive scheme of social reform. In Germany, this was
carried to extreme measures, and ultimately became associated with the atroci-
ties of  the Third Reich (cf. Weingart et al. 1988).
     For obvious reasons, eugenics has become the center of a long-standing
debate engaging scientists and the public alike. In particular, historians and
sociologists of science inquire, among other things, into the rise and fall of an
overwhelming ideology, the change of values connected to it, as well as into
the role of scientists, professions, and politicians involved. Thus part of the
history of eugenics is the history of scholarly attempts at understanding it. The
question is: What is the role of science if it comes produce, obscure, and / or
enlighten eugenics as a powerful tool of reasoning and intervention that regul-
ates the behavior on the level of individuals and populations? Thus far, histor-
ians of science tended to tell stories that ‘make things straight’: In these stories,
science played a significant role in both the waxing and waning of eugenics.
     Only recently, scholars began to doubt that story, among them Diane Paul
and Peter Weingart. Both authors stress the idea that by importing ideas or
instruments from other disciplines dealing with related phenomena one makes
use of a rich heuristic base from which on may look at certain stories (in sci-
ence studies) anew. Diane Paul, for instance, suggests to employ specific statis-
tical tools that reckon with methodological concerns similar to the historians’,
such as the issue of sampling data or the independence of evidence. In fact, she
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calls those statistical terms a “set of productive metaphors.” Treating concepts
as metaphors is precisely the approach Weingart uses when he, for instance,
looks into the fate of Darwinian terms, or metaphors, such as “struggle for
existence.” From this perspective, one can observe the specific ways in which
various disourses make use of a term thereby expanding and changing both its
meanings and pragmatics over time (Weingart 1995). Statistics or metaphors
are but two tools that help to regain the distance necessary to avoid (probably
all too pleasing) short-cuts in science studies, notably in history of science.
Diane Paul’s historical account of the role of science in eugenics, guided by
statistical concepts, is a powerful case in point.
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A Statistical Viewpoint on the
Testing of Historical Hypotheses:
The Case of Eugenics
Diane B. Paul
Introduction
This essay represents an exercise in what might be called a non-specu-
lative, non-abstract philosophy of history. Most historians seek to
establish causal connections. Since statisticians’ stock in trade is
distinguishing cause from correlation, I suggest that we might glean
fresh historiographic insights from their work. I do not mean by this
that historians should become more quantitatively-oriented, much less
that they ought to make use of specific statistical tools. Indeed, no
parametric (and for most historians, few if any non-parametric) sta-
tistics are applicable to their domain. But statisticians do reckon with
methodological issues – involving sampling, replication, independence
of evidence, and so forth – that are deeply germane to the historians’
task. I argue that a sensitivity to statisticians’ concerns and methods
might suggest a new vocabulary, new ways of framing issues, and a
new set of productive metaphors. The point is not to (further) scien-
tize history, but to propose a potentially useful heuristic for thinking
about problems of ascribing causation to events in the human past.
     To illustrate its value, I reanalyze a long-standing debate in the
history of eugenics. Both Peter Weingart’s work and my own involves
a critique of the view that scientific advances played a central role in
eugenics’ decline. I begin with a synopsis of the received view, fol-
lowed by an account of the arguments that have convinced most
historians that this view is unsatisfactory. Taking a ‘reflexive turn,’ I
then reevaluate aspects of the critique in light of methodological
considerations prompted by a recent encounter with the field of
biostatistics.
The Received View and its Critics
On the once-conventional view, support for programs of selective
breeding flourished at a time when the science of genetics was in its
infancy and eroded as the science became more sophisticated, expos-
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1ing eugenics’ technical flaws. Thus in the first flush of enthusiasm
for Mendelism, geneticists attributed many mental, moral, and tem-
peramental traits to heredity, and often to single Mendelian factors. If
individuals with bad heredity could be prevented from breeding, it
seemed that the problems of ‘feeblemindedness,’ pauperism, sexual
promiscuity, and crime would quickly be controlled. According to
Charles Davenport, then America’s leading geneticist, after only a
single generation of segregating mental defectives and anti-social
individuals from society during their reproductive years, “the crop of
defectives will be reduced to practically nothing,” as would the host of
social problems they create (1912: 286).
     However, by the 1920s it had become evident that most traits, and
certainly behavioral ones, were influenced not just by one but several
factors, now called ‘genes.’ Moreover, these genes acted in complex
ways with each other and the environment, so there was no unilinear
relationship between a gene and a character. Most important, discov-
ery of the Hardy-Weinberg principle (which makes it possible to
calculate the frequency of carriers when the frequency of the gene is
known) destroyed the hope that selection against undesirable traits
could eliminate or even greatly reduce them. It is an implication of
that principle that, when a trait is recessive and rare, most of the
deleterious genes will be hidden in apparently normal carriers. Since
the affected individuals represent only the tip of an iceberg, their
sterilization or institutional segregation would do little good. To
appreciably reduce the incidence of a trait, it would be necessary to
prevent the numerous heterozygotes from breeding. But even if this
were politically possible, there was no way to identify them. Thus the
scientific facts made increasingly clear that such a policy was unrealis-
tic, and support for eugenics – at least in its more interventionist
forms – therefore faded. Although many geneticists continued to voice
eugenic ideals, they no longer endorsed practical measures to control
human breeding. Geneticists had been leaders of the early eugenics
movement, which was crippled by their withdrawal of support. Or so
2goes the customary interpretation of eugenics’ rise and fall.
     It continues to inform much popular writing on genetics and
eugenics. Textbook authors seem to find it especially appealing,
perhaps because it short-circuits inconvenient ethical and political
debate. If eugenics were based on technical errors, which have long
been exposed, it is a historical curiosity, not a matter of contemporary
58
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S.  57- 70) T01_02 paul.p 286938514470
A Statistical Viewpoint …
concern. It is also attractive to geneticists, who like scientists general-
ly, are naturally disposed to view “science as a progressive social
factor which enlightens and dispels prejudices” (Roll-Hansen 1988:
295). As geneticists, they have a particular incentive to attribute
eugenics’ decline to increasing scientific sophistication. The troubling
history of their field is constantly invoked by critics of contemporary
human and medical genetics. It is surely comforting and convenient to
assume that geneticists, who once enthusiastically supported eugenics,
also exposed its shortcomings. It shows that they were ultimately
reliable and, by implication, that their heirs are worthy of trust.
     In more sophisticated versions, this interpretation has also appealed
to historians of science with a strong rationalist / realist orientation.
Thus, in a series of important papers, Nils Roll-Hansen has defended
the view that science has been a socially-progressive force, in the
history of eugenics as elsewhere. While not ignoring the significance
of ideological and political factors, particularly the post-World War II
emphasis on individual rights, Roll-Hansen has consistently stressed
that increasing knowledge of human heredity made clear the ineffi-
ciency of eugenical selection, and hence was largely responsible for the
decline of eugenic thinking in the 1940s and 1950s (1989: 343–345). In
his rightly influential history of eugenics, Daniel Kevles similarly
acknowledges the role of non-scientific factors, while according
scientific developments an important role in eugenics’ decline. Kevles
distinguishes ‘mainline’ from ‘reform’ eugenicists; the former tended
to be socially and politically conservative, infected by racial and class
bias, and scientifically naive, while the latter tended to be liberal or left
in their thinking, reject racial and class bias, and understand that too
little was known about human heredity to justify coercive measures.
In Kevles’s view, an important factor in turning the reform geneticists,
such as J.B.S. Haldane, Lancelot Hogben, Julian Huxley, and H.S.
Jennings, against mainline eugenics was “the rapidly advancing field of
genetics” (Kevles 1985: 124–125).
     Today, the view that eugenics was unable to withstand its encoun-
ter with scientific fact, or was even seriously undermined by it, is no
longer fashionable in history or social studies of science. It cuts
against the grain of constructivist accounts of knowledge, which as
Barbara Herrnstein-Smith notes, stress “the participation of prior
belief in the perception of present evidence,” as opposed to realist and
rationalist accounts, which “insist on the possibility of the correction
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of prior beliefs by present evidence” (Herrnstein-Smith 1991: 140).
But even historians not inclined toward constructivism have come to
doubt whether the undoubted advance of science played a significant
role in the waning of eugenics. The doubts arise from the following
considerations:
1. The scientific developments conventionally said to have eroded
support for eugenics occurred in the 1910s, long before eugenics
became disreputable. The multiple-factor explanation of continu-
ous variation was first suggested by the English biometrician Karl
Pearson in 1904, followed by the Swede Herman Nilsson-Ehle in
1908–09 and by the American Edward M. East in 1910, while R.A.
Fisher’s famous paper, “The correlation between relatives on the
supposition of Mendelian inheritance,” appeared in 1918. Discov-
ery of the Hardy-Weinberg principle and recognition of its impli-
cations also occurred early. The work of G. H. Hardy and (inde-
pendently) Wilhelm Weinberg dates to 1908; its consequences for
eugenics were first noted – by East – and refined by R.C. Punnett in
1917.
2. A related consideration is that a thorough critique of eugenics long
predated its decline. Thus, the methodological problems that
vitiated much of the work that issued from the Eugenics Record
Office at Cold Spring Harbor were identified by the biometricians
Karl Pearson and especially David Heron in Mendelism and the
Problem of Mental Defect, published in 1913–14. Heron in particu-
lar identified numerous technical flaws in the work of Charles
Davenport and other American Mendelian eugenicists in a series of
very well-publicized critiques (Spencer / Paul 1998).
3. The researchers responsible for the growth of relevant knowledge
and correction of error were themselves eugenics enthusiasts. They
included Nilsson-Ehle, East, Pearson, Heron, and even Punnett
(who is often misconstrued as a critic [cf. Paul / Spencer 1998: 122]).
4. Although the Hardy-Weinberg theorem undermined claims for the
rapidity of selection, it did not demonstrate that eugenics was futile.
As noted earlier, it had often been said in the 1910s that one or two
generations of eugenical selection would be enough to eliminate the
problem of mental defect. But as the implications of the theorem
were absorbed, it became evident that this claim was untrue, and by
the early 1920s, the nature of the mistake was well-understood.
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However, the new understanding seems not to have led anyone
committed to eugenics to abandon their stance. Nor is there any
reason it should have. For one thing, mental defect was not consid-
ered rare. Indeed, the raison d’être of the eugenics movement was
fear of the normal population being swamped by the ‘feeblemind-
ed.’ As R.A. Fisher showed, on standard assumptions about the
incidence of the trait, substantial progress would result from a few
generations of eugenical selection. And, as Fisher also noted, the
point of eugenics was never to eliminate the last defective individu-
al. Moreover, even if selection did work very slowly, most eugeni-
cists would continue to support policies to prevent mental defec-
tives from breeding. In their view, even a small reduction in the
trait was better than none. H.S. Jennings, who did much to make
the implications of the Hardy-Weinberg theorem clear to the pub-
lic, reflected a common view when he wrote: “Even though it may
get rid of but a small proportion of the defective genes, every case
saved is a gain” (Jennings 1931: 207).
5. In at least some respects, eugenics gathered steam in the 1930s. If
science exposed the futility of eugenical selection, how can we
explain the fact that between 1933 and 1940 compulsory steriliza-
tion laws were adopted by all of the Scandinavian countries, Ger-
many, and Japan (among other states), while existing laws were
more rigorously enforced? In the 1910s and 1920s, there was con-
siderable opposition to compulsory sterilization on the grounds
that the statutes were ineffective, rested on unfounded assumptions
about the heredity of the targeted defects, promoted sexual promis-
cuity, and were biased in their application. In the U. S., most eugen-
icists favored segregation. But opinion shifted in the 1930s. Promi-
nent foes of sterilization now came to think it sensible. The turn
from segregation to sterilization was presumably a response to the
world-wide economic depression. Sterilizing institutionalized
individuals, who could be returned to the community, reduced the
burden on the public fisc.
     That is not to claim that science was superfluous. Indeed, it
clearly mattered in at least two ways. First, it prompted eugenicists
to modify their arguments. The claim that feeblemindedness could
be eliminated in a generation or two was effectively abandoned.
Moreover, the Hardy-Weinberg theorem provided resources for
critics. Both in- and outside the genetics community, the claim that
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selection was too slow to justify the effort was frequently employ-
ed by critics of segregation or sterilization. What it did not do was
convince proponents of these practices to change their mind. Here
as elsewhere, prior beliefs were remarkably stable in the face of
apparently contradictory evidence. Individuals who thought that
mental defectives should not be permitted to breed had very little
trouble accommodating the Hardy-Weinberg principle.
6. Revelations of Nazi atrocities did produce widespread revulsion
against genetic explanations of individual and group differences in
general, and eugenics in particular. In the 1950s, “cultural deter-
minism” reigned (cf. Nelkin / Lindee 1995: 34–37). But this devel-
opment obviously had nothing to do with science. As Weingart
notes,
the crucial factor in the [post-war] loss of legitimacy of eugenics and
race-biology, in conjunction with the overwhelming moral indictment, was
a shift in political values, i. e. the restoration of the rights of the individual
and not, as is often claimed by the scientific community, the prevalence of
‘good science’ – the new genetics – over ‘bad science’ – German race-hy-
giene – and / or the end of the ‘abuse’ of science by corrupt political regimes
– the Nazi’s suppression of genetics (Weingart 1999: 173).
Moreover, the rejection of eugenics was very uneven. Many scientists
did not share the new enthusiasm for cultural explanations of human
differences; their misgivings were reflected in resistance to the first
version of a 1949 UNESCO statement asserting that all races were
genetically equal (Provine 1986). As early as the mid-1950s, a backlash
against the dismissal of eugenics was evident. Prominent molecular
scientists, perhaps emboldened by the discovery of the double-helical
structure of DNA and unraveling of the genetic code, argued that
recent medical and military developments necessitated what they
explicitly called ‘eugenics.’ In the view of these scientists, advances in
medical treatment were allowing many individuals who would in the
past not have reproduced to enjoy near-normal fertility. At the same
time, expanded medical and military uses of atomic energy, especially
atmospheric nuclear testing, were increasing the load of deleterious
mutations. Moreover, many commentators assumed that a perceived
population explosion would anyway require restraints on human
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breeding. If it were necessary to control population quantity, they
reasoned, why not also control population quality?
     In the 1950s and 1960s, scientists such as H.J. Muller, Bentley
Glass, and Linus Pauling in the U. S., Francis Crick, Julian Huxley,
and N.W. Pirie in Britain, and Hans Nachtsheim in Germany (as well
as the American theologians Paul Ramsay and Joseph Fletcher),
argued that there was an urgent need to replace the current laissez-
faire system of reproduction. In 1952, Nachtsheim even attempted to
resurrect the Nazi sterilization law of 1934 (Weingart, Kroll, and
Bayertz 1988; Weingart 1999: 175; Paul and Falk 1999). A number of
commentators thought they saw a trend, with eugenics again becom-
ing fashionable (cf. Paul, in press). They could hardly have been more
wrong. By the mid-1970s, eugenics was definitely in disrepute, at least
among those who came to speak for the public in the realm of repro-
ductive genetics.
     This turn of events seems most plausibly explained by the social
turmoil that began in the 1960s. The anti-war and civil rights cam-
paigns challenged established authority, a trend reinforced by the
patients’ rights and womens’ movements that followed in their wake.
A series of scandals involving experiments on human subjects under-
mined the assumption that physicians could be trusted to act in their
patients’ best interests. At the same time, women demanded control of
their economic resources, their life decisions, and especially their own
bodies. ‘Autonomy,’ ‘choice,’ and ‘self-determination’ became femi-
nist dictums, and the concept of ‘reproductive responsibility’ was
replaced by ‘reproductive rights.’ In the new perspective, reproduc-
tion was an entirely private matter, in which the state had no business
meddling. These are the main elements in the case against the conven-
tional view that attributes the decline of eugenics to the progress of
genetics. To summarize: The scientists responsible for the develop-
ments said to have undermined eugenics were themselves eugenicists,
whose discoveries occurred too early to provide plausible explana-
tions for shifts in attitudes that began only in the post-World War II
period. The most oft-cited scientific discovery – the Hardy-Weinberg
principle – was not after all inconsistent with advocacy of eugenical
selection. Nor can scientific discoveries explain the sudden resurgence
of eugenic discourse in the 1950s and 1960s and its equally rapid
fading.
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Rethinking the Critical Case
For all these reasons, the conventional account seems to fail. But its
critics are also vulnerable at several points. Thinking about statistical
methodology directs our attention to the following problems in both
the received and more recent views:
1. Sampling bias: Whose views are to be sampled? I have looked
primarily at geneticists. But I could have selected a different focal
group, such as doctors, social workers, home economists, or politi-
cians. Moreover, it is possible – even probable – that none of these are
reflective of the views of the public(s). As Martha Nussbaum notes,
all cultures involve conflict over norms, and ‘what most people
think is likely to be different from what the most famous artists and
intellectuals think’ (Nussbaum 1997: 127–128). In general, norms
are articulated by elites. What looks like a general cultural shift may
instead reflect shifts in thinking among elites or even the replace-
ment of one set of elites by another. In this case, it is relevant that
beginning in the 1970s, bioethicists began to replace scientists as the
primary spokespersons on social and ethical issues in genetics.
During the 1950s and 1960s, most books on genetics-related issues
were authored by distinguished scientists, and it was to scientists
that journalists and conference-organizers typically turned for
guidance on such issues. But by the 1970s, that discourse was
dominated by bioethicists. Having emerged as a distinct intellectual
discipline in the 1970s, bioethics was inevitably affected by the
patients’ rights and feminist movements, and it embraced as its core
value the principle of respect for autonomy. Thus underlying
norms about reproduction may in fact have been much more stable
than we would be led to believe if our evidence were limited to
statements by professionals.
2. Ascertainment bias: This related kind of bias, in which skewed
results arise from the way in which cases come to our attention,
vitiated much work in eugenics itself. For example, Heron pointed
out that some data collected by the Mendelian eugenicists was
tabulated and analyzed only when at least one child in each family
was mentally defective, thus creating an excess of defectives. But
ascertainment bias is equally a problem for historians. My work,
like that of many others, considers (a handful) of individuals, who
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came to attention because they were famous and published in
leading journals. If they constituted an unrepresentative sample,
adding more instances would not help. The result would be what
statisticians call “pseudo-replication.”
3. Multiple endpoints: What counts as evidence for the truth of our
hypothesis? The problem of deciding what to measure is notorious-
ly severe when the subject has fuzzy boundaries and is hard to
define (Gilovich 1991: 59). The term “eugenics” has protean mean-
ings. Some definitions are extremely broad, incorporating virtually
any activity in the realm of human breeding. For example, today
prenatal diagnosis is sometimes considered eugenics on the grounds
that it involves selection of fetuses. But it is more often excluded on
the grounds that the technology serves individual rather than social
purposes and / or that the means employed are voluntary rather
than coercive.
     How eugenics is defined has political implications. Critics of
contemporary genetic testing generally prefer an expansive defini-
tion, thus associating testing with disfavored practices of the past.
Supporters, on the other hand, tend to favor a narrow definition,
thus divorcing testing from those same practices. However, the
choice of definition also matters greatly for any thesis about
eugenics’ decline. When an earlier generation of historians claimed
that eugenics fell into disrepute in the 1930s, they referred not to
the general idea of improving human heredity through selective
breeding but to the specific beliefs about class and race superiority
and specific practices associated with the ‘mainline’ movements.
That is why these histories characterize geneticists such as J.B.S.
Haldane and H.S. Jennings as critics of eugenics, notwithstanding
views about who should and should not breed that would, on the
broader definition now (implicitly) adopted by most historians,
mark them as proponents. Underlying disputes about continuity or
discontinuity are often disguised conflicts over definition.
     Even if we could agree on the meaning of eugenics, it is not
obvious what the best indicators of its waxing and waning would
be. Passage of laws or other concrete policies? If so, which? Atti-
tudes? If so, whose? I have used passage and enforcement of the
sterilization laws as a measure of support for eugenics. But there is
considerable evidence that advocates of such laws were generally
indifferent to the cause of mental defect; in their view, it was
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irrelevant whether feeblemindedness was attributable to heredity or
environment. What mattered was that institutionalization was
expensive and that mental defectives made bad parents. On this line
of reasoning, there is no inconsistency between increasing support
for sterilization and declining belief in the power of genes to shape
mentality and behavior. Thus changes in respect to sterilization
may correlate poorly with hereditarian beliefs or other convention-
al markers of eugenics.
4. ‘Optional Stopping’ (or ‘Variable Windows’): This is an analogue
to the problem of multiple endpoints, involving shifting timeframes
rather than kinds of evidence. When does one stop counting?
Roll-Hansen has noted that it may take considerable time for the
implications of some scientific developments to be recognized and
incorporated into practice. He is right. Perhaps the discovery of
multifactorial inheritance and the complexity of gene action had
long-delayed effects. But without specifying a timeframe in ad-
vance, the temptation will be to stop at the point that the hypothe-
sis is confirmed.
5. Particularity: History is always the single realization of a process.
This problem of having one sample path of course unites studies of
nature and society: paleontology, historical geology, evolutionary
biology, systematics, the study of the origin of life, perhaps even
cosmology – as well as the histories of science or, for that matter, of
printing, or peasant revolts, or changing styles of dress. There was
one Cambrian explosion – or only one we can study – just as there
was only one Copernican and one industrial revolution, and one
world-wide Depression. Only Emile Durkheim founded French
sociology – and only once.
     Of course to test historical hypotheses, we can sometimes make
use of ‘natural experiments.’ One form of natural experiment is the
comparative method (cf. especially Adams 1990). The industrial
revolution occurred in multiple places, as did the eugenics move-
ment. But use of the comparative method to look for fundamental
commonalities is fraught with difficulty. In the history of eugenics,
there are such a such a small number of cases that we quickly use
up the ‘degrees of freedom.’ Moreover, these cases are not inde-
pendent of each other: The eugenics movement in Germany was
influenced by eugenics in the United States, which was influenced
by eugenics in Britain, and so forth.
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6. Interaction: R.C. Collingwood enjoined historians to get inside of
an event, into people’s heads, to rethink the thoughts and relive the
experience of historical actors. But as even scholars sympathetic to
Collingwood have noted, this approach can take us only so far,
since historical events and states of affairs occur ‘over the heads’ of
the participating individuals (cf. Dray 1989: 9). Charles Rosenberg
has made a similar point in arguing the need for etic as well as emic
approaches in the history of science on the grounds that the larger
conceptual, social, and material structures in which their work is
embedded “are often opaque to the objects of one’s research”
(Rosenberg 1988: 566).
The need to take account of woods as well as trees (in Rosenberg’s
phrase) means that we face the problem of sorting out interacting
factors, a task that is particularly daunting when there are a large
number of weak interactions, and so small contributing causes. In
biology, effects may be masked – or exacerbated – depending on the
company they keep. While there can be an effect of A regardless of B,
and of B regardless of A, whether A matters may also depend on the
presence and level of B. Even the direction of A can reverse depending
on B.
     In the realm of parametric statistics, the analysis of variance, for all
its limitations, provides a tool for untangling the effects of multiple
factors, each having not only “main” effects of their own, but also
effects only in conjunction with other factors. Of course we can not
use anova to sort out complexly interacting factors in history. But we
can be attentive to the fact that particular scientific developments may
be causally efficacious only when linked to specific social events. That
point is illustrated by the history of the Hardy-Weinberg theorem. In
the 1920s, it seemed to most people to provide a better reason to ex-
pand eugenic efforts (by identifying the hidden carriers) than to aban-
don them. By the 1970s, the same theorem seemed instead to provide
self-evident proof of eugenics’ futility. What changed were our values.
When individual rights came to be held in high esteem, the theorem
came to carry quite different implications than it had previously.
     In short, the study of statistics directs our attention to the impor-
tance of replication and independence of evidence, to the dangers of
pseudo-replication and of sampling and ascertainment bias, to the
temptations of optional stopping, and in general to the difficulty in
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concluding that a factor is causally efficacious in the world. Historians
are of course well aware of these issues, which have all been described
under other labels. But employing the language of another discipline,
particularly one focused on causes, can bring some of their features
into sharper relief. It can also help us to be more genuinely reflexive
about our own work.
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Notes
1 For a more detailed account of the history of this argument cf.
Paul and Spencer (1998).
2 According to Buchanan et al., earlier historians believed that:
“Eugenics was abandoned as the science of genetics progressed,
leaving genetic scientists increasingly dubious of the factual claims
of the movement” (Buchanan et al. 2000: 39).
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Inquiry Into the Growing
Demand for Histories
The disenchantment of the world through the intervention of science and
technology did not leave the humanities unaffected: From the mid-1960s
onward they have repeartedly considered themselves as being in a state of
crisis. Notably, they criticize the dominance of the natural sciences, not least
when it comes to public attention and funding, but also with respect to the
more and more scientific standards of communication and organization. While
macro-analytical studies have shown that the humanities participated in the
general growth of the academic system in the 1970s, and actively respond-
ed to it by internal specialization and differentiation (cf. Weingart et al. 1991:
14ff.), representatives of the humanties painted a different picture. They not
only insisted on being a special ‘culture’ (Snow 1959) or ‘tribe’ (Becher 1989)
but, more precisely, on a special function, namely that of ‘compensating’ for
what got lost in contempary society: Most prominently, Odo Marquard
suggested that the humanities were important in that they tell stories that help
to sensitize and orient people in a throroughly scientized world (cf. Marquard
1985; accordingly, this function would need a specific science policy, cf.
Pöggeler 1980). In this view, the scholarly research of, say, cultures, languages
and histories contributes to enlighten and empower people so as to rationally
act with and among modern technologies.
     Historians, while engaging in non-academic enterprises as well (e. g., exposi-
tions), predominantly pursue this task within the confines of academia.
Interestingly, internal specialization shows, among other trends, a shift toward
modern history, social history, history of non-European countries as well as
of technology including science and medicine (cf. Weingart 1991, chapter 2.3)
– obviously, these histories are designed to equip the members of contempo-
rary globalized, high-tech societies with orienting knowledge. Accordingly,
the discipline engages in epistemic self-reflection: In particular, it reflects upon
its self-proclaimed specificity of telling stories. Its narrativity (cf., e. g., Rüsen
1987), its rhetorics (cf., e. g., White 1990), its centrisms (eurocentrism, andro-
centrism, …) center stage in various debates. Writing histories (or his-tories, for
that matter) has become a target for science studies as well (cf. also Paul, this
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volume). Thus far, however, scholars have predominantly concerned them-
selves with external factors, such as growth, specialization and differentiation
as well as with science policy (Frühwald et al. 1991); with views held from
within the humanities (Prinz / Weingart 1991), as well as with transdisciplinary
productions of humanist knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994). In the following
essay, Wolfgang Prinz suggests to conceive of histories (whatever their area of
research or methodology) as serving a specific demand – the demand for an
overwhelming cultural concern in making sense. Histories, more than re-con-
structing the past, construct the present. Seemingly complying with the
historians’ own account, Prinz gives the theme a special twist, though: Making
sense does not so much result from science political ambition (cf. above) but
from folk psychological necessity.
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Making Sense
Making Sense
Wolfgang Prinz
We,
amnesiacs all,
condemned to live in an eternally fleeting present,
have created the most elaborate of human constructions,
memory,
to buffer ourselves
against the intolerable knowledge of the irreversible passage of time
1and the irretrieveability of its moments and events.
I am a fan of historical studies and I have always admired them from
an amateur’s perspective. Still, at the same time I have always had
mixed feelings when it comes to understand what scholars in historical
studies are actually doing and what the point of their business is.
Today I believe I know the answer. The point of their business is
making sense of facts. Yet, I am not sure whether I really understand
what this means. For instance, since I find it difficult to think of sense
as a thing that is somehow inherent, or residing in facts I cannot see
an obvious difference between the making and the faking of sense.
Further, since I think of sense as a thing that always needs to be
shared with other contemporaries I cannot see an obvious difference
between the making of history and the making of politics. Of course,
I realize that many scholars in the field hate this proximity and alleg-
ed affinity, but I also know that a number of others enjoy it quite well.
Mixed Feelings
My mixed feelings about history are threefold, with admiration, envy,
and trust as chief ingredients.
     First, I admire historians for the coherence of the stories they tell
and for the boldness with which they create them from scarce sources
and documents – that is, from highly selective left-overs that provide
evidence about a very small number of events, as compared to the vast
pool of events that may actually have happened. To be sure, my
admiration is not only for the beauty of the stories but also for the
boldness of the claim that they tell the truth.
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     Second, my envy has ever pertained to the high appreciation and
esteem historical studies earn in our culture. In a way, it is a hallmark
of the ideology of modern Western civilization, that the best way to
understand what is going at a given time is to explain it in terms of
what has happened before. Interestingly, this principle is not only
applied to macro-social entities like cultures, states, or peoples, but to
micro-social entities such as firms, families, or individuals as well:
Everybody believes that the study of the past is a prerequisite for the
understanding of the present, and everybody is convinced that histori-
cal studies, as we know them, can do this job quite well. This is why I
envy them.
     Still, and third, I also distrust them. The reasons for my distrust are
the reverse of the coin that explains my admiration. If it is true that
the stories about the past are bold constructions on the basis of highly
selective evidence, it is, in my view, indispensable that reflections
about selectivity and bias (both deliberate and imposed) become an
integral part of the scientific endeavor to construct such stories. I do
not see much of these reflections, though, and this is what fuels my
distrust.
     I was trained as an experimental psychologist, and this may explain
part of the story. Psychologists, too, are trained in selecting and
interpreting data that help them to understand other people’s actions.
However, they are systematically trained to distrust what people tell
them and even mistrust their own understanding of what they see
these people doing. Moreover, when it comes to relating data to
theories, psychologists have developed a methodological culture of
taking the selectivity of their data base into account – as well as the
inevitable bias inherent in such selectivity. Given this background, my
mixture of admiration and distrust may not be too surprising. Like-
wise, my feeling of envy can be traced back to my professional
background, too. Psychologists, unlike historians, do not often enjoy
public appreciation for doing their job well. Therefore, my envy
comes as no surprise.
     What does it actually mean to tell a story about events that happen-
ed in the past? For the rest of this chapter I will discuss two aspects of
selectivity and bias inherent in historical studies. First I will discuss
the issue from the viewpoint of the facts to be conveyed. How are
stories produced from facts and how do facts get picked and glued
together for the sake of telling stories? This may be called story
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semantics. Second I turn from story semantics to story pragmatics and
discuss selectivity and bias from the viewpoint of the discourses
addressed by stories. How do stories get adapted to the audiences
they want to speak to and how do new stories get streamlined to catch
attention and compete with old ones?
Ways of Making Sense
What does it mean to tell a story about events that happened in the
past? How can the story we tell today be related to the events that
happened yesterday? In which sense can such stories be true? First I
will examine how stories get individuated and how the facts for a
given story are selected. Then I will turn to the inner workings of
stories about human actions, that is, the basic semantics of integrating
and making sense of their bits and pieces.
Picking facts. Stories need to have a beginning and an end, and this is
true of both fact and fiction. Stories about historical events are both
written and read in the understanding that they pertain to facts, that is,
events that have actually taken place. Facts, however, have no inherent
beginnings and ends, and therefore the beginning and the end is
always in the story about the facts and never in the facts themselves.
This may be trivial to state, but I do not see much reflection of this
triviality in historical studies. Quite on the contrary, they often
convey the impression that their stories begin and end where the
happenings that are being told have their natural and inherent opening
2and closing.
     Let us suppose that we have fixed where our story begins and where
it ends. Further, let us assume that we know a number of facts about
events that have happened in the domain and the time of our story.
For the sake of the argument, suppose that we know of 1,000 such facts.
Obviously, we are then faced with the issue which of these events be-
long to our story and which not. How do we decide which ones we
should pick? Again, the facts themselves do not tell us. It is the frame-
work of the story we have in mind that helps us make our decisions.
     The story we have in mind determines where it begins and where it
ends and what belongs to it. Let me call this top-down selectivity. At
the same time, we are faced with heavy bottom-up selectivity. Bot-
tom-up selectivity arises from the simple fact that what we can know
about events that happened in the past can always be merely a tiny
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sample of all the events that actually happened. To put it in an ex-
tremely naive form, 1,000 events of which we know, in the time
window and in the domain of our story, may be 1,000 out of 1,000,000
that have actually happened.
     Even worse, the sample is by no means representative. It is, on the
contrary, biased in various ways. Such biases of what we can know as
compared to what actually happened have often been discussed. I will
not go through them systematically, but only mention some of them.
For instance, one source of bias comes from the fact that most of what
we know about events in the past is derived from intentional artifacts,
that is, objects and documents fabricated by certain individuals for
certain purposes. We may have access to the events contained in, or
documented by, these artifacts, but to the huge number of events that
are not thus documented, we have no access at all. Second, only a tiny
fraction of all these artifacts has survived until today. The vast majori-
ty got lost, and it is certainly not by chance which ones got lost and
which survived. This creates another source of bias in what we can
know about past events. Third, the information that we actually access
and, hence, the pieces of knowledge we actually know, will once more
form a subset of those pieces that we could know if we had access to
all sources still available.
     Interestingly, this picture is completely homologous to what
textbooks on Psychology have to say about the functional locus of
forgetting in human memory. According to text-book wisdom, forget-
ting (i. e., selective loss of information) may occur at three different
levels: encoding, storage, and retrieval. If an event that has actually
occurred in the past is no longer available for report in the presence,
this may be for three reasons. One is that it was never entered into the
memory system at all; second, that it was in fact entered into the
system but got lost during storage; and third, that it was entered, is
still there, but cannot be retrieved.
     The problem here is not that we know so much less than actually
happened. The problem is rather that the sample of events of which
we know can never be taken at random from the population of events
that actually happened. Both top-down and bottom-up selectivity are
ubiquitous and inevitable in historical studies and there is no way to
escape from the biases inherent in them.
     What can one do in a situation like this? Again, I cannot resist
drawing on a psychological analogy: When a person suffers from a
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deep-seated unsolvable conflict, psychotherapy has two basic options.
One is to suppress, or even repress, the unpleasant thoughts related to
this conflict and to find a way to lead a decent life all the same. The
other is to make the unpleasant thoughts explicit and give them a role
in the client’s life (which will then be somewhat less decent, at least
for some time). When we translate these two options from psycho-
therapy to history, one is to forget about selectivity and tell stories as
straight as possible. The other is to recognize selectivity and tell
stories with this proviso. Any historical study has to choose its
position somewhere between these alternatives.
Gluing facts together. Stories are, of course, much more than mere
collections of certain facts, as my cartoon-like sketch has suggested so
far. Rather, the point of a telling story is to make sense of certain facts
by gluing them together in a particular way. Once more, there is a
tricky relationship between making sense of the facts contained in a
story and making sense of (and, hence, legitimizing) the story itself.
The story makes sense (as a story) to the extent it shows that the facts
make sense (as facts). How, then, can (stories about) events that
happened in the past make sense?
     With respect to this, the business of history is once more closely
related to that of psychology. This is because both of these endeavors
are (at least in large parts) concerned with explaining and evaluating
human action and because both share (at least to some degree) a
common conceptual framework for doing so. Much of this framework
is provided by the beliefs and convictions shared by folk psychology
(or, more specifically, by the wisdom of its Western-culture brand).
Folk psychology provides a framework of basic semantic principles
for understanding human action. The logic of folk psychology serves to
glue facts together and makes stories coherent. Whether or not and
how a fact gets integrated into a given story depends on whether or
not and how it fits into the folk-psycho-logic of the story. Therefore,
this logic acts as another constraint on possible stories and, hence, as
another source of selectivity.
     The semantics of folk-psychology is used in two major discourses:
action explanation and action evaluation. As concerns action explana-
tion, folk psychology offers two views: a subjective view that looks at
the action as originating in, and caused by, the acting subject him /
herself, and an objective view that looks at the action as caused by
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factors acting upon the actor, irrespective of whether or not they are
mentally represented.
     The subjective view makes use of the logic of reasons. This view
explains the occurrence of certain actions in terms of certain mental
states preceding them and, presumably, causing them. People perform
certain actions for certain reasons. For instance, a person who is
hungry may have the wish to get rid of this state, and he / she may
believe that this wish can be satisfied by having a meal. This belief-
and-desire-type of account is ubiquitous in action explanation in
every-day discourse and much of both historical and psychological
discourse still relies on it. Of course, when it comes to explaining
more complex actions than having a meal like, for example, taking
far-reaching political decisions etc., belief-and-desire explanations
may assume much more complex forms. Still, the basic scheme is
unaltered: The occurrence of a certain action is explained by (a com-
plex chain of) mental antecedents. In such cases, the chain of anteced-
ents will often take the form of a dialogue – be it internal within the
actor him / herself or external between the actor and some of his / her
contemporaries.
     Conversely, the objective view makes use of the logic of causes.
This view explains the occurrence of certain actions in terms of certain
causes that either lie in the actors themselves or their environments.
Causal action explanations can bypass, as it where, the actor’s mental
awareness. For instance, we may account for the fact that a person acts
in a particular way in a particular situation by tracing this action back
to a state or a trait we attribute to him / her (e. g., we think: my
colleague did not say hello to me this morning, because he was in a
bad mood – or because he is a reserved person anyway). Or we may
attribute the occurrence of an action to external conditions (e. g., my
colleague did not say hello to me, because his parents did not teach
him adequate social behavior, or the like). In our everyday folk-
psychology discourse these two forms of action explanation are
mainly applied to the behavior of individuals. However, they can be,
and in fact are, likewise applied to the behavior of collective agents
such as governments, administrations, or corporations.
Evaluating facts. At first glance, the logic of causes seems to be
entirely different from the logic of reasons. Unlike rational explana-
tions that refer to mental states as causes, causal explanations refer to
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nonmental causes like states and traits in actors or their environments.
However, when one turns from action explanation to action evalua-
tion, it becomes apparent that the two views are not that much
different. Their common ground becomes obvious when it comes to
the discourse of evaluating actions in moral terms. For the discourse
of evaluation it plays no major role whether we explain the action in
terms of reasons or causes. In both cases we take it that the agent
could have acted otherwise and is therefore responsible for the action.
Hence, at least in the discourse of evaluation, folk psychology tends to
believe that human agents are capable of exerting control not only
over the network of reasons (of which they are aware anyway), but
also over the network of causes of their actions (of which they are
usually unaware). In a way, the discourse of action evaluation requires
that causes be converted into reasons – in which format they are then
entered into consciously controlled action decisions.
     In sum, I submit that the logic inherent in folk psychology puts
strong constraints on ways in which stories about past events can
make sense. By saying that I do not mean to say that historical expla-
nations are just psychological explanations. I’m far from claiming that
folk psychology provides a sufficient framework for historical expla-
nation. What I do claim, however, is that folk-psychology categories
form a necessary constraint for historical explanations: There is no
way of coming up with stories about past events that do not conform
to the logic of reasons and causes for action explanation. Still, histori-
cal stories differ from psychological stories in several respects. For
instance, psychological stories tend to be stories about the actions of
individuals and their explanation in terms of reasons. Conversely,
historical stories tend to be stories about the actions of collective
agents and their explanation in terms of causes.
Ways of Sharing Sense
What does it mean to tell a story about events that happened in the
past? How are the stories that one can tell constrained by the fact that
they are communicated and addressed to certain audiences? How are
our ways of making sense affected by the ways of sharing sense? Let
me mention three of such constraints.
Syntax. Every storyteller knows that telling stories is a particular form
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of literature that requires a particular format and follows a particular
syntax. Stories are more than just linear concatenations of facts that
follow each other according to a temporal, rational, or causal scheme.
Rather, their implicit syntax requires that their plot follows a basic
scheme, requiring (more or less) stable states in the beginning and the
end and culminating in (more or less) exciting happenings in between
– thereby converting, as it were, the initial state into the end state.
     There is yet another sense in which stories are more than just
concatenation of facts in accordance with certain schemes. Good
stories have a point and good storytellers have a way of communicat-
ing their story such that its point becomes apparent. The point of the
story is what people still remember after they have forgotten most of
the facts. Again, a story’s point has two faces: It makes the causal and
rational structure underlying major events in the story apparent in a
new and interesting way and, at the same time, it thereby makes it
obvious that this particular story about these particular events makes
sense and is justified as a story. In a way, then, a story’s point is the
meeting point for the making and the sharing of sense.
Audiences. S / he who tells a story usually has a particular audience in
mind, to which the story is addressed. Quite obviously, the storytell-
er’s notion of his / her audience puts important constraints on the way
the story is being told. The audience and the story form part of a
particular discourse whose participants share some basic knowledge in
the domain the story belongs to, some basic beliefs and expectations
about major issues in that domain and, perhaps, some basic rules
about the proper way of exchanging and discussing views about these
issues. Therefore, when it comes to telling stories audiences are not
accidental circumstances. Instead, they are constitutive facts in the
sense that s / he who tells a story has no way of escaping and freeing
him / herself from the story’s audience – however implicit it may be.
     This is true of both facts and fiction, but for stories about facts it
has crucial implications. One is that it creates a dual commitment on
the storyteller’s part. On the one hand, s / he is committed to the
known facts about past events. At the same time, however, s / he is
committed to present and future audiences of the story in the making,
and there is often no obvious and no easy way to convey the logic
underlying human action in the past to a present-day audience, let
alone unknown future audiences.
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     Another implication is that storytellers will always tend to pick one
out of several possible audiences – even if they are not aware of it.
Picking an audience is, in a way, equivalent to selecting the discourse
of which the story in the making is supposed to form part. Hence,
picking an audience determines to which beliefs and expectations the
story will have to speak, which issues it will have to touch upon and
which expectations it will have to fulfill. Stories about past events can
obviously speak to a number of different audiences, such as the
scientific community (in a narrow or a broad sense), the political
community, communities discussing ethical, moral, or legal issues, or
even the broad community of laymen with historical interests. The
stories historians have to tell can be addressed to each of these com-
munities, and each of them puts different constraints on the way these
stories should be told.
Markets. Whenever a story about certain events in the past is born, it
enters into a world of already-existing stories about the same, similar,
or at least related events. In other words: it enters into a story market
where, in the long run, only the fittest stories will survive. Yet, unlike
living beings, stories do not compete with each other directly. Instead,
what they compete for is attention and prominence in the discourse
they are meant to form part of. In a way, these discourses and the
mentality of their participants is, at any time, formed and shaped by
the reception of a certain body of already existing texts and stories.
This is the mental scenario the new story encounters and this scenario
forms the market place in which any new story has to struggle for
survival. Stories speak to certain other stories (and compete with
them) by virtue of the fact that they speak to certain audiences that
constitute themselves on the basis of certain texts and stories. This is
what the logic of discourse amounts to: story audiences and story
markets are two sides of the same coin.
     Therefore, each discourse has ist own story market, and a given
story’s fitness on this market is determined by the rules and criteria
that apply to that discourse. On each of these markets a number of
factors will contribute to a story’s survival, for example, how true it is,
how realistic, rational, how straight, informative, instructive, how
authentic, coherent, convincing, how enlightening, exciting, entertain-
ing it is, etc. Though strictly scientific discourses should only be
committed to truth, that is, the extent to which the story reflects
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happenings in the past, even these discourses are also committed to
some of the other criteria, and this applies even more to most of the
remaining discourses.
The Past and the Present
My conclusion, then, is that the business of telling stories about the
past has two faces: reconstructing the past and constructing the
present. My point here is not that these two faces exist – this is a
commonplace notion. My point is rather that, contrary to common-
place wisdom, the commitment to the present is much stronger than
that to the past, and that this applies to both the making and the
sharing of sense. I realize, of course, that not many scholars of history
will be prepared to accept this message. This may not be surprising in
view of the fact that reflections about the past play an explicit role in
their daily business, whereas constraints arising from the present are
only implicit. Further, since deep-rooted ideology tells us that the
present is constrained by the past, we cannot easily accept the notion
that our understanding of the past should, in turn, be so much con-
strained by the present.
     Like in the theory of therapeutic intervention, there are two
options here. One is to stick to that ideological belief and keep on
uncovering the truth about the past. This is what happens in analytic
therapy. The other option is to regard the endeavor to uncover the
truth about the past as an integral part of a complex psychodynamic
process that takes place in the present. This is what happens in
cognitive therapy. Scholars of history are in the uncomfortable
position to find their way between the Scylla of the past and Charyb-
dis of the presence.
Man may well ask the animal:
Why do you not speak to me of your happiness
But only look at me?
The animal does want to answer and say:
Because I always immediately forget what I wanted to say
–
But then it already forgot this answer and remained silent:
3So that man could only wonder.
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Notes
1 Sonnabend, Geoffrey (1946) Obliscence: Theories of Forgetting
and the Problem of Matter, Chicago / IL: Northwestern Universi-
ty Press (p. 16).
2 A beautiful recent example is provided by the opening statements
in three major authoritative accounts of modern German history.
“Am Anfang war Napoleon”, “Im Anfang war das Reich” and “Im
Anfang steht keine Revolution” – these are the very first sentences
by which Thomas Nipperdey, Heinrich August Winkler and
Hans-Ulrich Wehler speak to, and compete with each other in the
way they open their respective accounts of German history in the
past two hundred years (cf. Volker Ulrich’s review of Winkler,
H. A. [2000] Der lange Weg nach Westen. Bd. 1: Deutsche Geschich-
te vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Untergang der Weimarer
Republik, München: C.H. Beck, in “Die Zeit” 13 / 2000, which it-
self opens with the assertion: “Auf den ersten Satz kommt es an.”)
3 Nietzsche, Friedrich ([1874] 1980). On the Advantage and Disad-
vantage of History for Life, Indianapolis / IN, Cambridge / MA:
Hacket Publishing Company, Inc., (p. 8).
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Monitoring Emerging Fields
In 1958, a young man with a B.S. in chemistry from Columbia University
borrowed US-$ 500 from Household Finance to produce an index to the
current scientific literature in chemistry and the life sciences. It was Eugene
Garfield, who at that time developed what we know today as Science Citation
Index (SCI) or Web of Science. 40 years later Garfields company, the Phila-
delphia-based Institute for Scientific Information (ISI), employes 850 people
with offices in 7 countries and sells a variety of library and information science
products, indexing more than 8000 leading scientific journals in 35 languages.
In 1992, ISI was acquired by Thomson Scientific, a subsidiary of The Thom-
son Corporation, a leading international business (annual revenues of US-$ 6
billion, common shares listed on stock exchanges). But the history of Garfields
idea to set up an index of cited literature is not just a story of economic success
(Cronin et al. 2000). Immediately after the SCI appeared on stage, scientists
recognized it as a unique source for science studies, namely sociology and
history of science. Derek John DeSolla Price was among the first, who
discovered the potential of the SCI to give empirical insights into structures
and developments of science (Price 1963). Although primarily produced as a
tool for searching scientific articles, the SCI provides access also to aggregated
data on disciplines, specialities, journals, institutions, countries and other
entities. In fact during the past four decades the SCI together with its little
‘sisters’ SSCI (Social Sciences Citation Index) and A&HCI (Arts & Humani-
ties Citation Index) became the major source for a new scientific field: biblio-
metrics.
     A major product of bibliometric research are indicators, in most cases built
from selected and aggregated counts of publications and citations. These indi-
cators turned out to be important not only for studies in history and philoso-
phy of science, but also for purposes of science policy and administration.
Since 1972 the US National Science Foundation publishes biannual volumes of
‘science indicators’ (National Science Board 2000), including publication and
citation statistics for international comparisons. Combined with other mea-
sures and peer review, bibliometric indicators can be used in the context of
research evaluation. Bibliometricians have been heavily offended because of
the political consequences which their indicators can have (MacRoberts 1989).
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The question ‘Which reality do we measure?’ (Weingart et al. 1990) still needs
to be answered as well.
     Although the origin of the SCI is in the United States, there is much more
bibliometric research activity in Europe than in the US. The largest group,
headed by Anthony van Raan, is affiliated with the University of Leiden in the
Netherlands. On the following pages van Raan and his collaborators present a
lesson of what can be achieved with modern bibliometric methods – far be-
yond the pure number-counting of publications and citations. It is a valuable
example for the application of sophisticated bibliometric methodology in
exploring the interdisciplinary structures of new, unorthodox scientific fields.
In fact it shows how such a field can be delineated and how emerging themes
as well as the most important groups can be identified and analysed with biblio-
metric means.
References
Cronin, Blaise / Atkins, Helen Barsky (eds.) (2000) The Web of Knowledge: A
Festschrift in Honor of Eugene Garfield, Medford / NJ: Information Today
for the American Society for Information Science & Technology (ASIST).
MacRoberts, Michael H. / MacRoberts, Barbara R. (1989) “Citation Analysis
and the Science Policy Arena”. Trends in Biochemical Sciences 14 / 1, pp.
8–12.
National Science Board (2000) Science & Engineering Indicators – 2000, Arling-
ton, VA: National Science Foundation (NSB-00-1).
Price, Derek John DeSolla (1963) Little Science, Big Science, New York / NY:
Columbia University Press.
Weingart, Peter / Sehringer, Roswitha / Winterhager, Matthias (1990) “Which
reality do we measure?” Scientometrics 19 / 5-6, pp. 481–493.
86
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S.  85- 86) T01_04 raan.vignette.p 286938514506
Exploring Interdisciplinary, ‘Unorthodox’ Fields
A Bibliometric Methodology for Exploring
Interdisciplinary, ‘Unorthodox’ Fields of Science.
A Case Study of Environmental Medicine
Anthony F.J. van Raan, Martijn S. Visser,
and Thed N. van Leeuwen
This article tackles the problem of how to explore a ‘not well-defined’
or ‘unorthodox’ field of science. Often, such fields are problem-
oriented and interdisciplinary. ‘Environmental medicine’ is taken as an
example, and used to explore two central questions: First, what are the
most important groups, for example, in Europe and particularly in
Germany, and how do they perform? Second, what themes are possi-
bly emerging in this field of research? Before answering these ques-
tions, we have to ask what the field of environmental medicine look
likes, how it can be defined, and how it can be ‘delineated.’ We
present a first approach based on several bibliometric techniques,
which can be regarded as part of our well-developed practice, in
combination with some novel strategies.
First Approach: Definition of the Field on the Basis
of Scientific Journals
How to Define ‘Environmental Medicine’
The objective of this study is to answer two central questions con-
cerning the interdisciplinary research field ‘environmental medicine.’
First, what are, worldwide, the most important and / or possibly
emerging themes in this field? Second, how well are German research
groups and institutes performing in this field, also in relation to
possibly emerging themes?
     Before we can answer these questions, we have to start by asking
what the field of environmental medicine looks like, how it can be
defined, and how it can be ‘delineated.’ This study presents a first
approach based on a combination of several techniques that can be
regarded as part of our well-developed CWTS practice, along with
some novel strategies. Our approach can be seen as a general method
for exploring ‘unorthodox,’ mostly interdisciplinary fields of science.
Therefore, it contributes to a much-needed extension of analytical
tools in the study of interdisciplinarity (cf. Weingart / Stehr 2000).
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     ‘Umwelt-Medizin’ or ‘Environmental Medicine’ is not an estab-
lished, well-categorized research field within the important interna-
tional databases, neither in the multidisciplinary Science Citation
Index nor in the widely used medical database MEDLINE. Therefore,
we have to develop a method to define, or to delineate, this ‘unor-
thodox’ field as well as possible.
     We took the following approach: On the basis of a first survey via
Internet on environmental medicine (Umwelt-Medizin), we identified
nine German research centers, mainly university institutes, in Aachen,
Bochum, Düsseldorf, Gießen, Göttingen, Mannheim, Marburg,
Munich, and Tübingen. We emphasize that this survey was certainly
not intended to be exhaustive, and also should not have been, because
the idea was to find ‘starting points’ via the Internet.
     The next step was to collect publication data from these institutes.
Most institutes make their publication lists over a longer time period
(e. g., from 1995) available through their websites. This enabled us to
identify the central international journals in the field of environmental
medicine. Our first round was sufficient for this purpose. It was not
necessary to collect a large number of relevant journals, because we
developed a specific, iterative procedure to create a large set of envi-
ronmental-medicine-relevant journals. In fact, five major journals
formed the ‘seeds’ for an advanced journal-to-journal, citation-based
analysis that ultimately generated a ‘landscape’ of about 70 journals
grouped into several clusters. These ‘seed-journals’ are: Environmen-
tal Health Perspectives, Journal of Toxicology and Environmental
Health, International Archives of Occupational Health, Archives of
Environmental Health, and Industrial Health.
     It should be noted that our Internet survey also found more
nationally oriented, German-language journals and other periodicals.
Although these national communication outlets are certainly impor-
tant, particularly for daily practice, we did not consider them in this
study, because our objective was to position European and particular-
ly German groups on the international map of environmental medi-
cine. We also noticed that several journals with an international status
are published in the German language as well. The ‘problem’ with
these journals, however, is that their articles are, on average, cited
considerably less frequently in the international literature than those
in English-language journals.
     As mentioned above, we created a ‘landscape’ on the basis of
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citation relations between journals, starting with the five ‘seed jour-
nals.’ An extensive description of the journal-to-journal citation
cluster analysis is given in Tijssen and van Raan (1994), together with
other ‘bibliometric mapping’ methods. The more closely together
journals were positioned on the map, the stronger their citation links.
The results of our analysis are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Bibliometric map of environmental medicine and related
fields. This map is based on citation relations between journals
(iteration procedure starting with ‘seed journals’ indicated by boxes;
cf. main text).
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We view this landscape as a preliminary but good approximation of
the research field ‘environmental medicine.’ Because this landscape
was based on journal-to-journal citation relations, it contained only
journals covered by the Science Citation Index. Therefore, it was not a
‘perfect’ representation of the field. Nonetheless, it certainly yielded a
very useful map to guide the further steps in the analysis. SCI-covered
journals represent the better and best international journals in most
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scientific fields, and thus SCI-covered journals form the ‘hard core’ of
most natural science and medical fields.
     As discussed above, the more nationally oriented (German-language)
journals were not entered into our analysis because they were not
covered adequately by the SCI. This made some subfields or special-
ties, particularly those with a typical national focus (and [parts of] the
research groups concerned), ‘invisible’ on our map. Nonetheless, once
scientific work had been published in the international, mostly SCI-
covered literature, it would appear in our analysis.
     The following clusters can be seen in Figure 1: Environmental
toxicology and chemistry (‘north’ side of the map, 1), applied toxi-
cology (center-left, 2), carcinogenesis research (‘south-west’, 3),
environmental and in particular occupational health (‘east’, 4), epide-
miology (‘south-east’, 5), and allergies and respiratory diseases (‘far
south east’, 6). General journals such as Nature, the Journal of Bio-
logical Chemistry are included in the ‘nearest’ cluster. These clusters
can be regarded as subfields of environmental medicine. Figure 2 is the
same as Figure 1, but now these six clusters are indicated. Thus we
have found a first thematic division of environmental medicine. We
consider Clusters 1, 2, and 4 as the most central subfields, and the
journals in these clusters as the core journals of environmental medi-
cine. These journals, such as Environmental Toxicology & Chemistry,
Chemosphere, Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxi-
cology, and Environmental Science & Technology, are given in Appen-
dix 1.
     These journals, however, also belong to ‘already established’ fields
within the Science Citation Index. These fields (first 10) are environ-
mental science, toxicology, public health, pharmacology and pharma-
ceutics, environmental engineering, allergy, dermatology, chemistry,
genetics and heredity, and neurosciences. This clearly shows the
‘interdisciplinary composition’ or ‘interdisciplinary profile’ of envi-
ronmental medicine. Later, we will compare the profile of the field as
a whole (‘the main stream profile’) with that of outstanding groups or
institutes within the field. Significant ‘deviations’ of these outstanding
groups from the main stream may indicate important developments.
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Figure 2: Bibliometric maps of environmental medicine and related
fields. Same as Figure 1, now the six clusters as discussed in the main
text are indicated.
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The total number (worldwide) of core-journal publications in the
period 1995–1998 was 24,714 of which 1,569 came from Germany.
Table 1 shows the division of publications over the most active
countries.
     The German ‘share’ in environmental medicine research was 6.4
percent compared with 7.4 percent for science as a whole (1995). We
conclude from these figures that Germany is internationally somewhat
underrepresented in environmental medicine as far as our set of core
journals defined above is concerned. Sweden, the Netherlands, and
particularly Finland are quite ‘over-active’ in environmental medicine.
However, we stress again that environmental medicine is mainly an
applied research field. Therefore part of the German contribution will
be in German-language journals that are not covered by the SCI, or in
SCI-covered journals that do not belong to the clusters identified in
Figure 1. A similar situation probably applies to France.
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Table 1: Numbers of Environmental Medicine Publications 1995–1998
Country Number Percent
US 9,765 39.5
UK 1,673 6.8
Germany 1,569 6.4
Canada 1,469 5.9
Japan 1,147 4.6
Italy 861 3.5
Sweden 818 3.3
France 797 3.2
Netherlands 782 3.2
Spain 583 2.4
Finland 556 2.3
All other 4,694 19.0
Total 24,714 100.0
It is interesting to analyze which journals other than the core journals
themselves frequently cited the core journals. These citing journals
represent the ‘direct periphery’ of environmental medicine. Their
names in conjunction with those of the above core journals reveal the
mainstream themes of environmental medicine. Most of them address-
ed occupational / industrial / working environment and health, micro-
biology in relation to environmental contamination, and xenobiotica.
Furthermore, we found several major environment-related themes
within toxicology: eco-toxicology, genetic toxicology, neuro-toxico-
logy, inhalation-related toxicology, and food toxicology; water-relat-
ed themes such as aquatic toxicology and marine pollution; drug-relat-
ed themes such as applied pharmacology, drug metabolism, and regu-
latory toxicology; plus a major allergy theme of contact dermatitis.
Analytical chemistry proved to be very important as the ‘instrumental’
part of environmental medicine. The first 10 of these citing journals,
such as Water Environment Research, Analytical Chemistry, Drug
Metabolism and Disposition, and Environmental Pollution are given in
Appendix 2. The list of these citing journals shows the strong links
between the set of environmental medicine core journals and, above
all, water-related problems, analytical methods, and cancer research.
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Most Prominent European Research Groups
The approach described in the foregoing section provides us with a
journal-based delineation of the field. This could be used as the basis
for a further bibliometric analysis. Within the set of core journals as
defined in the foregoing section, we identified the most prominent
research groups / institutes on the basis of the articles published in
1995–1998 in all journals from the three clusters. We distinguished
between two types of ‘prominence’ in this analysis: the most active
groups in terms of number of publications and the most influential
groups in terms of number of citations received (high ‘impact’). It has
to be pointed out that the ‘most active’ groups are often the large
institutes (and have a large publication output for this reason). None-
theless, it is clear that very good research work can be done in smaller
groups as well. Therefore, we decided that the best way to identify
prominent groups was to look for the most influential groups; that is,
groups with a high impact in the first place, plus a publication output
above a specific threshold.
     First, Table 2 presents the European (31) groups belonging to the
100 most active groups worldwide, ranked according to number of
publications in 1995–1998. All these groups / institutes had 50 or more
 3publications (P 50), hence, a minimum of circa 12 publications per
year. In order to assess the scientific influence of these groups, we
measured the ‘impact’ of each group or institute. This was done by
counting all citations received by these 1995–1998 publications from
1995 up till mid-1999, and calculating the average number of citations
per publication (CPP). This is our first impact indicator. The next
section presents a detailed discussion of the methodology and a more
extensive set of indicators. Within these 31 most publishing European
 3groups (P 50), we selected the best 10 percent (in terms of high im-
 3pact) by taking CPP 3.0. These groups / institutes are marked in bold.
     We wish to emphasize that this exploratory study pinpointed
groups / institutes by their main organization (e. g., university) only. It
is possible that several groups within one university or large institute
published in our set of core journals. Because this study regarded
them as one ‘group,’ in such cases, we were actually dealing with all
the environmental research activities of that university or large insti-
tute as a whole. A more detailed study would be necessary to focus on
specific departments.
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Table 2: European groups with the most publications.
Ranked according to numbers of publications 1995–1998
P  CPP  
Karolinska Institute Stockholm 226  3.64  
University London 186  2.75  
ETH Zurich 154  7.14  
Finnish Institute of Occupational Health 146  2.83  
University of Lund 122  4.15  
RIVM, Bilthoven (Utrecht) 116  3.23  
Agricultural University of Wageningen 115  5.79  
University of Utrecht 107  4.20  
University of Amsterdam 94  3.33  
University of Milan 91  2.52  
University of Birmingham 83  2.49  
University of Umea 81  3.41  
University of Uppsala 78  3.27  
Zeneca, Macclesfield (UK) 76  4.28  
Free University of Amsterdam 74  3.86  
National Institute of Working Life, Stockholm 73  1.99  
University of Leuven 65  3.12  
University of Kuopio 63  1.87  
University of Stockholm 62  5.53  
University of Lancester 59  5.85  
University of Helsinki 58  3.48  
Natiotanl Public Health Institute, Kuopio 56  2.66  
University of Munich 56  2.14  
University of Lyons 56  3.00  
University of Jyvaskyla 55  3.49  
University of Göteborg 55  2.95  
University of Odense 53  4.64  
TNO Zeist (Utrecht) 53  1.91  
University of Düsseldorf 52  2.44  
University of Bayreuth 50  6.82  
CSIC Barcelona 50  6.18  
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Three German universities were present in this list: Munich, Düssel-
 3dorf, and Bayreuth. Only Bayreuth was above the CPP 3.0 threshold.
The impact of Bayreuth was by far the largest, and in fact one of the
highest on the list. Therefore, we may conclude already that this is a
prominent German research group in environmental medicine, at least
according to our definition of this field given above. We emphasize
however that a more detailed assessment of research performance will
be presented in later on in this article. It should also be noted that we
did not find the Bayreuth group in our Internet survey. The reason for
this will be discussed below.
     Table 3 reports the 15 German groups with the most publications
(groups marked in italics are among the European groups given in
Table 1; i. e., groups with P > 50), again ranked according to number
of publications in 1995–1998. CPP (1995-mid-1999) is also indicated.
We have already noted the high impact of the University of Bayreuth.
Table 3: German groups with the most publications.
Ranked according to numbers of publications 1995–1998
P CPP
University of Munich 56 2.14
University of Düsseldorf 52 2.44
University of Bayreuth 50 6.82
University of Würzburg 47 3.70
University of Mainz 46 2.67
University of Hamburg 43 2.58
Free University of Berlin 42 3.02
Free University of Berlin 42 3.02
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 42 3.17
University of Tübingen 42 2.95
University of Göttingen 41 2.78
GSF München 41 2.58
University of Dortmund 38 3.26
BASF Ludwigshafen 32 1.61
University of Ulm 33 3.88
Fraunhofer Institute Schmallenberg 32 1.63
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Very high-impact (CPP ‡ 10.0) groups in Europe that are not reported
in Table 2 because their number of publications was lower (i. e., 10 < P
< 50) are:
University of Granada 32 10.78
Brunel University 21 35.43
University of Helsinki 12 10.08
The extremely high impact of the group at Brunel University, Uxbridge,
UK is immediately apparent. This can be explained only by some
very frequently cited publications. The next section will discuss highly
cited publications as indicators of ‘hot topics,’ and come back to the
performance of the Brunel group.
     We emphasize that the above figures are a first indication of
research output and impact. A more detailed analysis of selected
groups / institutes is presented in Section 3. We also emphasize that
German research groups, in general, may score lower than, for exam-
ple, UK groups because of the relatively low impact of German-
language papers in journals covered by the SCI. This may have quite a
dramatic influence on a SCI-based performance assessment of Ger-
many compared with other countries (particularly the commotion
around the article by the UK Chief Scientist Robert May in Science,
May 1997). This will be discussed extensively in a forthcoming paper
(cf. van Leeuwen / van Raan 2000).
     We conclude from the above that our bibliometric analysis permits
a preliminary identification of European groups or institutes that can
be characterized as highly active and / or highly influential. Prominent
European groups can act as ‘benchmark’ institutes for comparisons
with German institutes. As indicated above, this is particularly the
case for highly productive, high-impact groups such as at the Karo-
linska Institute in Stockholm, ETH Zurich, University of Lund, and
the Agricultural University of Wageningen.
     We stress that the numbers of publications given in Tables 2 and 3
may differ considerably from the numbers derived from publications
lists in, for example, the annual research reports of the groups or
institutes concerned. Our analysis considers only those publications
that meet the following two selection criteria: (1) general, for example,
only publications covered by the Science Citation Index and related
indexes, as well as only publications of a special ‘article type’ (cf.
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methodology discussion in the appendix), and (2) specific: a further
selection by the set of journals described above.
Important Themes Identified on the Basis
of Frequently Cited Publications
We applied a third bibliometric analysis to our journal-based defini-
tion of environmental medicine: most cited papers in the period
1995–1998. The importance of such an analysis is twofold. First, it
reveals the groups / institutes with publications of the highest impact,
which is an indication of the quality of the research groups concerned.
Second, we consider the topics of these high-impact publications as
important themes, hot topics. Not necessarily all of them will be
breakthroughs or new developments (review publications with an
extensive state of the art of a research field can also be cited very
frequently!). In most cases, however, high-impact papers will be
nonmainstream contributions.
     On the basis of the titles of the top-100 most cited publications,
List 1 presents a number of ‘hot topics.’ In the case of frequently
cited review papers, however, it is mostly not a ‘hot topic’ but an
important though ‘classic’ theme. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish
between types of articles in this analysis. Frequently cited review
topics are given in italics.
List 1: Important research themes
Cytochrome-P450 Inhibitors
Estrogenic environmental pollutants
Male reproductive health and xeno-estrogens
Biodegradability and aging of chemicals
Endocrine disrupters
Phyto-estrogens and cancer
Estrogens and dentistry
Aquatic colloids
Sorption by soil models
Antrazine in surface water
Oxidative damage to DNA
Particulate / ultra-fine particle air pollution
Phytoremediation of contaminants
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Metal-ion binding to humic substances
Organochlorine compounds and cancer
Harbor contaminants
Ion-trap mass-spectrometry
PCB’s
Plants to remove heavy-metals from soils and aquatic streams
Apoptosis
Neuro-toxicity
Pesticides and breast cancer
EDTA in natural water
Mercury in coastal waters and rivers
Land-ocean interaction
Photo-catalytic degradation
Carcinogenicity of diesel exhaust
Fly-ash and acute lung injury
Many of the high-impact publications originated from US groups or
institutes. The first 10 US groups within the set of top-25-cited publi-
cations were: Merck & Co.; Tufts University, Boston (in cooperation
with the University of Granada); Connecticut Agricultural Experi-
mental Station, New Haven; Texas A&M University; University of
Florida (in cooperation with groups from Denmark, Finland, France,
UK, and Tulane University in New Orleans); Cornell University; US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, in cooperation with Procter
& Gamble and the Agency of Toxic Substances and Diseases Registry
in Atlanta); College of William & Mary, Williamsburg (in cooperation
with several other US groups); University of Missouri; University of
Rochester (in cooperation with Tulane University and the University
of Florida).
     When identifying the European groups contributing to the top-25
impact publications, then the position of Brunel University immedi-
ately strikes the eye. This university was involved in 6 of the top-25
publications. We already mentioned the very high impact of the
Brunel group in the foregoing section. It is clear that this was based
mainly on this remarkably high share of the top-25 cited publica-
tions.
     Other European groups contributing to the top-25 were: Universi-
ty of Granada (we also mentioned its very high impact) in cooperation
with Tufts University, Boston; Imperial Cancer Research Foundation,
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London, in cooperation with Brunel University; MAFF (UK) also in
cooperation with Brunel University; National University Hospital in
Copenhagen in cooperation with Brunel University, University of
Florida, Tulane University, University of Turku (Finland), National
Food Agency in Soborg (DK), University of Odense (DK), INSERM
in Rennes (F), University of Paris V, MRC in Edinburgh; University
of Helsinki (also mentioned earlier for its very high impact); RIZA in
Lelystad (NL) together with two Dutch firms; University of Geneva;
Rowett Research Institute (UK) in cooperation with the Institute of
Preventive and Clinical Medicine, Bratislava, and the Czech Academy
of Sciences.
Second Approach: Definition of the Field on the Basis
of Institute Names
Why a Second Approach to Define the Field?
The definition used so far to identify groups and institutes in envi-
ronmental medicine was based on a set of core journals. It is highly
possible that these groups and institutes do not ‘present’ themselves
with their institutional names as being ‘environmental medicine
research groups’ (e. g., ‘Institute for Environmental and Occupational
Medicine’). They may be, for example, departments of epidemiology,
departments of allergy research, or institutes of general environmental
research.
     On the other hand, many groups and institutes indicate specifically
that they are working in environmental medicine through their insti-
tutional names. They ‘advertise’ themselves, as it were, as environ-
mental research institutes. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the
field, it is possible that these research groups publish (substantial parts
of their work) in other journals than those used in Section 1 to define
the field.
     Therefore, we have to conclude that, alongside the journal-based
definition of the field, we need a second definition based on institute
names. The second analysis for identifying relevant research groups
searched in the entire Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Science
Citation Index (SSCI) in the period 1995–1998 for all institutes or
groups worldwide, with the following keywords (abbreviations) in
their institute’s name (in the address field of the publication record):
‘environm…’ (or ‘Umw…’) or ‘occupat…’ (or ‘Arb…’) together with
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‘med…’ or ‘hyg…’. For the SCI / SSCI, this analysis is possible only in
our CWTS bibliometric data-system. To our knowledge, no other
SCI / SSCI based system allows address keyword analysis.
     The search yielded a large set of groups and institutes, 15,962
publications worldwide, of which 1,410 came from Germany. Thus
the German share in the world total of environmental research defined
on the basis of institutional names was 8.8 percent. This differed from
the finding in Section 1 that revealed a German share of 6.4 percent
with the journal-based definition of environmental medicine. Most of
this difference was probably explained by the use of different jour-
nals.
Most Prominent European Research Groups
We used a frequency analysis to rank all European groups / institutes
(German groups / institutes in italics) with an average of at least five
publications per year, that is P > 20 (1995–1998), cf. Table 4. In
contrast to the journal-based method, the probability of having several
groups in one university or larger institute was small, because it would
be unlikely to find groups within a university or large institution with
similar names. Because we performed a detailed impact analysis on the
results of a combination of the journal-based and the name-based
methods, we shall present only publication numbers (output).
     It would be interesting to see how the groups and institutes identi-
fied with the two methods differed; the one based on a selection of
environmental medicine journals; the other, on the use of environmen-
tal medicine (or related terms) in the name of the group or institute.
The most obvious way to do this would be to compare the lists of
groups resulting from both analyses. Recall that the journal-based
method may reveal more than one research group in a university or
larger institute. These comparisons are discussed in the next section.
     Again, we stress that the publication numbers given in the above
tables may differ considerably from the numbers derived from publi-
cations lists in, for example, the annual research reports of the groups
or institutes concerned due to general (cf. appendix) and specific (insti-
tute name) selection criteria.
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Table 4: European groups with the most publications
Ranked according to numbers of publications 1995–1998
P P
Karolinska Inst. Stockholm 653
GSF München 411
University of Lund 181
University of Düsseldorf 173
University of Linköping 142
University of Birmingham 133
University of London, 86
Imperial College
University of Aarhus 81
University of Vienna 76
University of Göteborg 75
University of Glasgow 70
University of Umeå 67
University of Leuven 66
University of Helsinki 63
University of Uppsala 60
University of Aberdeen 57
University of Ulm 51
University of Bochum 49
University of Göttingen 47
University of Amsterdam 43
University of Essen 42
University of Padua 42
University of Freiburg 39
University of Tübingen 39
University of Erlangen- 36
Nuremberg
University of Brescia 33
Technical University of 30
Munich
University of Pavia 30
University of Newcastle 29
University of Wageningen 28
University of Montpellier 26
University of Milan 25
Finn.Inst.Occup.Health 24
University of Odense 24
Swedish University of 23
Agricultural Science 22
University of Bergen
University of Aachen 21
University of Florence 21
University of Hohenheim 20
University of Verona 20
Comparison of First and Second Field Definition
Many of the universities and institutes identified with the name-based
definition of environmental medicine had been found already with the
journal-based definition. As discussed at the end of the last section,
the journal-based definition is broader because it also includes groups
and institutes that do not name themselves explicitly with environ-
mental medicine. A comparison of both methods reveals that this is
particularly the case in Germany for the University of Bayreuth.
Another European example is groups / institutes at the ETH Zurich.
     On the other hand, groups and institutes that use environmental
medicine in their name (or related terms) may use other journals than
those in our core set. To study this possible difference, App 3 presents
the top-20 journals in 1995–1998 of all groups worldwide with envi-
101
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S.  87-122) T01_04 raan.p 286938514510
Anthony F. J. van Raan / Martijn S. Visser / Thed N. van Leeuwen
ronmental medicine or related terms in their name. It can be seen that
more than one-half of these journals belonged to the core journal set
used in the first definition of environmental medicine (App 1). This
explains the considerable overlap of groups and institutes in environ-
mental medicine found by both methods, as is clear from a compari-
son of Tables 1 and 2. Similarly, App 4 gives the top-10 journals for
German groups with environmental medicine (or related terms) in their
name. Here, the picture differed somewhat from the worldwide find-
ings. Only 3 of these 10 journals belonged to the core journal set (see
above). There were two German-language journals, one clearly within
the field (Zentralblatt für Hygiene und Umweltmedizin ) and another
with a general medical scope (Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift).
Two other journals were in English but devoted mainly to a German
audience, and belonged to related fields (Naunyn-Schmiedesberg Ar-
chives of Pharmacology and Fresenius Journal of Analytical Chemistry).
     Clearly, the German groups and institutes with environmental
medicine and related terms in their name often use journals ‘outside’
the core journal set as defined above. Undoubtedly, the choice of
German-language or primarily Germany-oriented (though English-
language) journals plays a role here. It explains why both methods will
reveal considerable differences in groups and institutes, as was the case
with the University of Bayreuth.
Research Performance of Selected German
and European Institutes
Research Impact
After identifying European and, in particular, German research groups
in environmental medicine on the basis of two different methods, we
performed a standardized bibliometric performance analysis. We ap-
plied our analysis to three selected German institutes / groups: one
large organization, GSF München, and groups at two universities,
Düsseldorf and Bayreuth. The same analysis was also applied to three
selected European institutes: Karolinska Institute in Stockholm as a
large (university-related) institution, and groups at two universities: in
the Netherlands, Wageningen (agricultural university) and, again in
Sweden, Göteborg. Publications were collected on the basis of both
methods of field definition combined.
     The core of our bibliometric approach can be described as follows:
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Communication, that is, exchange of research results, is the driving
force in science. Publications are not the only, but certainly very
important elements in this knowledge-exchange process. High-quality
work triggers reactions in fellow scientists. They provide the interna-
tional forum, the ‘invisible college’ in which research results are
discussed. In most cases, these fellow scientists perform their role as
members of the invisible college by referring in their own work to the
earlier work of other scientists. We all know that the process of
citation is a complex one, and that it certainly does not provide an
‘ideal’ monitor of scientific performance. However, the same criticism
holds for peer reviews as well (cf. Moxham / Anderson 1992). The
application of citation analysis at a statistically low aggregation level
(e. g., just one publication) is hardly meaningful in terms of perfor-
mance assessment. However, application to the work of a group as a
whole over a longer period of time does yield, in many situations, a
strong indicator of scientific performance, and, in particular, of
scientific quality given the correlation with peer review judgements
(cf. Rinia et al. 1998). An important, absolutely necessary condition
for the citation analysis is, nonetheless, that it be part of an advanced,
technically highly developed bibliometric method.
     Research output was defined as the number of articles from the
institute found in the Science Citation Index (SCI), the Social Science
Citation Index (SSCI), or the Arts & Humanities Citation Index
(AHCI). We included the following publication types as ‘articles’:
normal articles (including proceedings papers published in journals),
letters, notes, and reviews (but not meeting abstracts, obituaries,
corrections, editorials, etc.). We developed special software to calcu-
late a set of standardized, basic indicators.
Table 5: Bibliometric Research Performance Indicators 1995–1998
Country; Institution of
Group/Institute
P C CPP CPP
ex
Pnc JCSm FCSm CPP/
JCSm
CPP/
FCSm
JCSm/
FCSm
% Self
Cit.
GSF München 442 809 1,83 1,11 0,48 1,98 1,89 0,92  0,97  1,05 0,39
University of Bayreuth 51 279 5,47 3,57 0,24 2,57 2,06 2,13+ 2,66+ 1,25 0,35
University of Düsseldorf 131 372 2,84 1,81 0,35 3,15 3,09 0,90  0,92  1,02 0,36
Agricultural University
of Wageningen
139 543 3,91 2,40 0,42 2,40 2,01 1,63+ 1,94+ 1,19 0,38
University of Göteborg 99 225 2,27 1,72 0,46 1,89 2,13 1,20  1,07  0,89 0,24
Karolinska Institute 609 3.737 6,14 4,86 0,34 3,44 3,46 1,78+ 1,77+ 0,99 0,21
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The first column of Table 5 reports the number of papers published
(P); the second column, the number of citations (C) for the time peri-
od 1995–1998. The analytic scheme is as follows: For papers published
in 1995, citations were counted during the period 1995–1998; for 1996
papers, citations in 1996–1998; and so forth. There is ample empirical
evidence that in the natural and life sciences – basic as well as applied –
the average ‘peak’ in the number of citations is to be found in the third
or fourth year after publication (Moed et al. 1995). Therefore, a 4-year
analysis period is appropriate for impact assessment. The third indica-
tor column reports the average number of citations per publication
(CPP, calculated by dividing the total P of the entire time period by
the total C in that period counted as reported above). The fourth
column presents the same indicator, but now corrected for self-cita-
tions, CPPex. The fifth column contains the percentage of noncited
papers, Pnc. It should be emphasized that this percentage of noncited
papers covered, like all other indicators, the given time period (4
years). It is highly possible that publications not cited within such a
relatively short time period will be cited after a longer period of time.
     It is clear that these indicators are not very informative without
reference values. How do we know whether a certain volume of
citations or a certain citation per publication is low or high? There-
fore, it is absolutely crucial to make a comparison with (or normaliza-
tion to) a well-chosen international reference value, and to establish a
reliable measure of relative, internationally field-normalized impact.
Hence, the problem is to measure impact relative to an international
average. We tackled this as follows: We calculated the average citation
rate of all papers (worldwide) in the journals in which the institute had
published (JCSm, the mean Journal Citation Score of the institute’s
‘journal set’). Thus, this indicator JCSm (sixth column) defined a
worldwide reference level for the citation rate of the institute. It was
calculated in the same way as CPP, but now for all publications in a
set of journals instead of all publications of an institute. Details on
these calculations are reported in van Raan (1996). By comparing these
two indicators, we were able to assess whether the measured impact
was above or below international average. A novel and unique aspect
of our comparison with a worldwide reference value was that it took
into account not only the type of paper (e. g., normal article, review)
but also the specific years in which the papers were published. This is
absolutely necessary, because the average impact of journals may
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reveal considerable annual fluctuations and large differences per article
type (cf. Moed / van Leeuwen 1995, 1996).
     The comparison of the institute’s citation rate (CPP) with the
average citation rate of its journal set (JCSm) introduced a specific
problem related to journal status. For instance, if one institute pub-
lishes in prestigious (high impact) journals and another institute in
rather mediocre journals, the citation rate of articles published by
both groups may be equal relative to the average citation rate of their
respective journal sets, even though the first group evidently performs
better than the second. Therefore, we developed a second internation-
al reference level, a field-based world average FCSm (seventh column
of Table 5). This indicator is based on the citation rate of all papers
(worldwide) published in all journals of the field(s) in which the
institute is active and not just the journals in which the institute’s
researchers publish their papers. Here, we used the definition of fields
based on a classification of scientific journals into categories developed
by ISI. Although this classification is far from perfect, it is currently
the only classification available to us in terms of an automated
procedure within our data system. We used the same procedure as
that applied in the calculation of JCSm (cf. van Raan 1996).
     Often, an institute is active in more than one field (i. e., journal
category). In such cases, we calculated a weighted average value, the
weights being determined by the total number of papers published
by the institute in each field. For instance, when an institute publish-
ed in journals belonging to the ISI category ‘Environmental research’
and in journals belonging to the category ‘Toxicology,’ then the
FCSm of this institute would be based on both field averages. Thus,
the FCSm indicator represents a world average in a specific (combina-
tion of) field(s). About 80 percent of all SCI-covered papers were
authored by scientists from the United States, Western Europe, Japan,
Canada, and Australia. Therefore, our ‘world average’ was dominated
by the Western world. Again, we observed a general increase of FCSm
values.
     Because worldwide citation rates are increasing, it is essential to
normalize the measured impact of an institute (CPP) to international
reference values. Therefore, we calculated the ratio of CPP to the
world averages discussed above, JCSm and FCSm. These ratios are
presented in the 8th and 9th columns of Table 5. When the ratio
CPP / JCSm was above 1.0, the impact of the institute’s papers exceed-
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ed the journal-based (i. e., the journals used by the group / institute)
world average.
     A particularly powerful indicator is CPP / FCSm. This ‘crown’
indicator relates the measured impact of a research group or institute
to a worldwide, field-specific (i. e., all journals in a field) reference
value. It is the internationally standardized impact indicator. This
indicator enables us to observe immediately whether the performance
of a research group or institute is significantly far below (indicator
value < 0.5), below (indicator value 0.5–0.8), around (0.8–1.2), above
(1.2–2.0), or far above (>2.0) the international (western-world-domi-
nated) impact standard of the field. As shown in Table 1, Wageningen
and, in particular, Bayreuth had a very high performance. The other
groups / institutes, GSF München, Düsseldorf, and Göteborg per-
formed around world average. We have to emphasize that the extend-
ed research performance analysis presented in this section addressed
a restricted number of selected groups / institutes, and not all the
groups / institutes identified in this study.
     An important issue is the level of aggregation or size of the institu-
tions. It is clear that the larger the group or institute, the more difficult
it is to maintain a high average performance, because there will often
be subunits with lower performance. Therefore, the larger an institute,
the more performance will tend to lower average values. In these
cases, it is better – and even preferable – to conduct the bibliometric
research performance analysis on the level of the smaller subunit as
well. Table 5 should also be examined in this light. There were
differences in size of about one order of magnitude! For instance,
Bayreuth had about 50 publications in the given time period, but GSF
München around 400 and Karolinska around 600. Particularly in the
latter case, we can speak of an exceptional performance, given the
score on the CPP / FCSm indicator and the size of the institute. Exam-
ples of middle-sized groups / institutes are Düsseldorf, Wageningen,
and Göteborg.
     The ratio JCSm / FCSm (10th column) is the institute’s ‘journal
status’ indicator. When it was above 1.0, the mean citation score of the
institute’s journal set exceeded the mean citation score of all papers
published in the field(s) to which the journals belonged. In other
words, the institute published in the higher impact journals of the
field. This preference for publication in the higher impact journals was
particularly strong in Bayreuth and Wageningen.
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Research Profiles and Interdisciplinarity
A further important part of our bibliometric analysis was to break
down the institute’s or group’s output (publications) into research
1fields. This ‘spectral analysis’ of the output is based on the simple
fact that researchers generally publish their work in journals belong-
ing to more than just one research field. E. g., researchers at an immu-
nology research institute will publish mainly in the typical immunolo-
gy journals, but also in journals classified to oncology, haematology,
and so forth. In this example, publications in immunology journals will
form the largest group, and, consequently, this field will be the largest
one in the research profile. Because we ranked fields in the profile ac-
cording to their size (in terms of numbers of publications), the field
immunology would be positioned as number one at the top of the pro-
file. A specific immunology group may have ‘genetics’ and ‘neurosci-
ences’ as second and third field in its profile. For another immunology
group, ‘oncology’ and ‘dermatology’ may take these positions. So this
breakdown of the institute’s or group’s output into research fields
provides a clear impression of all the fields involved in the research ac-
tivities of the institute or group. In other words, it provides us with
information about its interdisciplinarity (cf. van Raan 2000), and there-
fore we can also call such a research profile its ‘cognitive orientation.’
     Not only size (number of publications) was given in the profiles.
We also determined the indicator CPP / FCSm of the articles in these
different fields (with international field normalization always to the
specific field!), so that the fields within which the interdisciplinary
research profile of the institute or group reveals a high (or lower)
performance became visible. In our example above, this could mean
that we would find that the first immunology group was very strong
not only in its ‘core’ field of immunology but also in neurosciences.
     As discussed above, a research profile analysis can also be applied
to the field of environmental medicine as a whole and can be consid-
ered as a characterization of the ‘mainstream.’ This profile is given in
Figure 3. It is based on about 25,000 publications from 1995–1998. It
becomes apparent immediately that the field of environmental science
is the most important in environmental medicine, both in output as
well as in impact, followed by toxicology, public health, and pharma-
cology. Generally, in environmental medicine as a whole, public
health publications have a low impact. Figures 4–7 represent the pro-
files of Düsseldorf, Bayreuth, Wageningen, and Karolinska.
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Figure 3: Environmental Medicine
Research Profile: 1995–1998
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Figure 4: University of Düsseldorf
Research Profile: 1995–1998
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Figure 5: University of Bayreuth
Research Profile: 1995–1998
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Figure 6: University of Wageningen
Research Profile: 1995–1998
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Figure 7: Karolinska Institute
Research Profile: 1995–1998
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These profiles once again reveal that environmental science, toxicol-
ogy, and public health were the most important ‘component parts’ of
environmental medicine. However, interesting differences between
the various groups and institutes also emerged. Particularly significant
‘deviations’ in the profile of outstanding groups from the mainstream
profile (Figure 3) may indicate important developments.
     The Düsseldorf group (Figure 4) has a good (above international
average) performance in its major field of output, toxicology. Its
typical environmental science work showed a lower impact. Work in
pharmacology and pharmaceutics, as well as in immunology was
above international level. The profile shows that Düsseldorf was
characterized by considerably more neuroscience-related activities (in
terms of publication output) compared with the mainstream. The
international impact of the neuroscience work was, however, lower
than in that of other fields.
     Bayreuth (Figure 5) was a relatively small group (in terms of
number of publications) and therefore its profile was rather narrow.
As already noted above, this group showed a very good performance,
particularly in its major field, environmental science. Wageningen
(Figure 6) clearly showed a strong profile. Its most important fields
were public health, environmental science, and toxicology – all with a
high to very high impact. In particular, the public health work at
Wageningen was much stronger than in the mainstream of environ-
mental medicine (Figure 3).
     The Karolinska Institute in Stockholm (Figure 7) showed a strong
and also very broad profile, which was to be expected given its very
large size (particularly in terms of publications). The largest field was,
similar to Wageningen, public health, with an impact around interna-
tional level. The most striking observation for Karolinska, however,
concerned its neuroscience work. This field took a much more promi-
nent place in the institute’s profile compared with the mainstream. But
even more important was the extremely high impact of its neurosci-
ence publications. This finding was a strong indication that neurosci-
ence-related research is a theme of growing importance and, most of
all, scientific influence in environmental medicine. As already noted
above, a large institution such as Karolinska should be split up into
different departments. In such cases, it is most appropriate to conduct
a more extensive research performance measurement, as we do on a
2regular basis at our Center.
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International Scientific Cooperation
A further part of the analysis was to break down research perfor-
mance into types of cooperation. We distinguished between articles
originating from the group or institute only (‘no cooperation’), from
the group or institute with another group in the same country (‘natio-
nal cooperation’), and from the group or institute with a group
outside its own country (‘international cooperation). Results are re-
ported in Table 4 for the groups at Düsseldorf, Bayreuth, Karolins-
ka, and Wageningen.
Table 6: Bibliometric scientific cooperation data, institutes active in
environmental medicine, 1995–1998
Country; Institution of
Group/Institute
P C CPP CPP
ex
% Pnc CPP/
JCSm
CPP/
FCSm
JCSm
FCSm
JCSm/
FCSm
% Self
Cit.
University of Düsseldorf
Institute only 50 133 2.66 1.70 0.36 2.43 2.78 1.10 0.96 0.87 0.36
National 60 135 2.25 1.43 0.37 2.70 2.80 0.83 0.80 0.96 0.36
International 21 104 4.95 3.14 0.29 6.13 4.67 0.81 1.06 1.31 0.37
University of Bayreuth
Institute only 27 172 6.37 4.22 0.15 2.91 2.09 2.19 3.05 1.40 0.34
National 9 41 4.56 3.22 0.22 1.86 2.12 2.45 2.15 0.87 0.29
International 15 66 4.40 2.60 0.40 2.39 1.98 1.84 2.23 1.21 0.41
Karolinska Institute
Institute only 114 859 7.54 6.27 0.25 3.68 4.02 2.05 1.88 0.91 0.17
National 250 842 3.37 2.37 0.41 2.94 3.03 1.14 1.11 0.97 0.30
International 245 2,036 8.31 6.74 0.31 3.84 3.63 2.17 2.29 1.06 0.19
Agricaltural University of Wageningen
Institute only 29 51 1.76 0.93 0.48 1.70 1.36 1.03 1.29 1.25 0.47
National 57 150 2.63 1.56 0.47 2.06 2.06 1.28 1.28 1.00 0.41
International 53 342 6.45 4.11 0.32 3.14 2.32 2.05 2.79 1.36 0.36
A general phenomenon was that publications involving international
cooperation revealed a higher impact than publications from the
group or institute only, or in national collaboration (cf. Narin /With-
low 1990). Indeed, for Düsseldorf, publications based on interna-
tional cooperation attained a relatively high impact. It was strikingly
visible with the indicators JCSm and FCSm that the journals (and the
fields) involved in international cooperation had a considerably higher
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level of impact. For Wageningen, the international publications
showed a very high impact. For the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm
as well, international co-publications were the ones with the highest
impact. Remarkably, this was not the case for Bayreuth. Here the
publications of the group ‘on its own’ showed the highest impact, at
an excellent level. This is often proof of a strong and very successful
focus on the development of an own, important specialty.
Concluding Remarks
We have tackled the problem of what the field of environmental
medicine looks like, how it can be defined, and how it can be deline-
ated by combining two approaches based on bibliometric methods,
that is, methods exploring in an advanced way data originating from
the scientific literature. The first approach is based on identifying the
most important international journals for publications in environmen-
tal medicine. The second one is based on identifying institutes with
names in which environmental medicine and directly related fields are
mentioned. This procedure appears to be successful: Once the field is
defined, we are able to analyze it and to discover its main characteris-
tics and, in particular, its main ‘players.’
     Environmental medicine appears to be a typical interdisciplinary
field, ‘composed’ of quite a broad spectrum of established fields such
as environmental science, toxicology, public health, pharmacology
and pharmaceutics, environmental engineering, allergy, dermatology,
chemistry, genetics and heredity, and neurosciences. Looking at the
level of activity in different countries, we find that German activity in
environmental medicine is comparable to the average German share in
science as a whole. Hence, there is no strong ‘over-activity’ or ‘un-
der-activity’ of Germany in environmental medicine. In contrast,
countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Finland are signifi-
cantly ‘overactive’ in environmental medicine. We stress, however,
that the larger a country, the less it will show typical ‘over’- or ‘un-
der-activity,’ because activities in most fields tend increasingly toward
average values.
     Our analysis reveals the most prominent European groups and
institutes, both in terms of publication output as well as scientific
influence, measured in terms of their ‘impact’ revealed by bibliometric
performance analysis. This identification of most prominent groups
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and institutes is a crucial part of the study: First, it allows us to find
‘benchmark’ groups or institutes; and second, it allows us to find
significant ‘deviations’ from the ‘mainstream’ in the research themes
of excellent groups. Benchmark groups or institutes are important for
comparisons with German groups. Because these benchmarks are
outstanding groups, they can be drawn on as examples when consider-
ing how a specific group or institute could be restructured or reorga-
nized.
     The identification of research themes that deviate considerably
from the mainstream is essential for monitoring important, and possi-
bly emerging ‘hot’ research topics. As indicated above, environmental
medicine is an interdisciplinary field composed of many different basic
fields. The interesting point here is that our bibliometric methods
allow us to establish what basic fields are the most important ‘compo-
nents’ of environmental medicine as a whole. We have mentioned
these fields already, for instance, toxicology, public health, and aller-
gy. This may be called the ‘research profile’ of environmental medi-
cine mainstream research. Using the same analytical instrument, we
can also construct a research profile for each of the most prominent
European group or institutes, and see whether a group’s research
profile deviates significantly from that of the mainstream. For the
Karolinska Institute, we find that neuroscience research with very
high impact is part of the environmental medicine research profile.
     Another ‘deviation’ from the mainstream is given by very frequent-
ly cited publications. These are generally the publications that attract
exceptional attention in the research community. Therefore, careful
identification of, for instance, the 100 most cited publications in
environmental medicine is an interesting method for ascertaining
which topics and themes are regarded as very important.
     We have not investigated the performance of all European groups
in an extensive way, because this would be far beyond the scope of the
present study. We have compared research performance in a few
selected groups / institutes with a field-specific international standard
impact level and focused on performance in more detail through
research profiles.
     Finally, we have investigated scientific cooperation. A general phe-
nomenon is that publications based on international cooperation show
a considerably higher impact than publications from the group or
institute ‘alone’ or in national collaboration. Remarkably, this is not
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the case for Bayreuth. Here the publications of the group ‘on its own’
show the highest impact at an excellent level. This is often proof of a
strong and very successful focus on the development of one’s own,
important specialty. Once again, we have to emphasize that these
findings are the outcome of a still preliminary survey. In particular,
conclusions on research performance must be supported by further
findings from more detailed studies.
Notes
1 In research profiles, fields were defined on the basis of standard-
ized sets of journals; discussed on p. 105.
2 Cf., for example, van Leeuwen et al. 1996, available via our
website http://www.cwts.leidenuniv.nl
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Core journals of environmental medicine
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry
Chemosphere
Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology
Environmental Science & Technology
Bulletin of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology
Ecotoxicology and Environmental Science
Science of the Total Environment
Archiv für Toxikologie
Environmental and Molecular Mutagenesis
Mutation Research – Fundamental / Genetic Toxicology
Environmental Health Perspectives
Neurobehavioral Toxicology and Teratology
Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology
Archives of Toxicology
Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health A
Fundamental and Applied Toxicology
Neurotoxicology
Critical Reviews in Toxicology
Toxicology
Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology
Toxicology Letters
Human & Experimental Toxicology
Journal of Occupational Medicine
American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal
Environmental Research
American Journal of Industrial Medicine
International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health
British Journal of Industrial Medicine
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
Scandinavian Journal of Work Environment & Health
Archives of Environmental Health
Contact Dermatitis
Inhalation Toxicology
Occupational and Environmental Medicine
Industrial Health
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Appendix 2: Journals that frequently cite environmental medicine core
journals (1995–1998)
Water Environment Research
Analytical Chemistry
Drug Metabolism and Disposition
Environmental Pollution
Carcinogenesis
Journal of Chromatography A
Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety
Environmental and Molecular Mutagenesis
Atmospheric Environment
Toxicological Sciences
Appendix 3: Top-20 journals for all groups worldwide (1995–1998)
with environmental medicine or related terms in their name
Environmental Health Perspectives
American Journal of Industrial Medicine
Occupational and Environmental Medicine
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology
International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health
American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine
FASEB Journal
Carcinogenesis
American Journal of Occupational Therapy
American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal
Journal of Applied Physiology
Scandinavian Journal of Work Environment & Health
American Journal of Epidemiology
Toxicology
Toxicology Letters
Chemosphere
Archives of Environmental Health
American Journal of Physiology-Lung Cellular and Molecular
Physiology
Science of the Total Environment
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Appendix 4: Top-10 journals in 1995–1998 for German groups with
environmental medicine (or related terms) in their name
Naunyn-Schmiedesberg Archives of Pharmacology
Zentralblatt für Hygiene und Umweltmedizin
Int. Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health
Chemosphere
Toxicology Letters
Fresenius Journal of Analytical Chemistry
Radiation and Environmental Biophysics
Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift
Stem Cells
Environmental Health Perspectives
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Making Universities Cope
with Science Today
Universities are the basic building blocks of the science system in most
industrialized nations. Nearly all scientists have been educated in universities,
and in many countries universities form the largest sector within the national
research system. The integration of higher education and scientific research
into one academic institution determines the hybrid character of the universi-
ty. In the past, numerous studies have focused on different aspects of this most
influential type of institution in the academic world. Each year some 200 new
articles on universities get published in international top journals as covered
by the Science Citation Index or Social Sciences Citation Index.
     As science itself is undergoing rapid and far-reaching changes (UNESCO
2000), especially during the last two decades, these changes have a strong
impact upon the universities. After a period of dramatic quantitative expansion
until the mid-1970s, budget restrictions in many nations limited the growth
curves and led to a steady state (Ziman 1994) in the 1980s and 1990s. Now
there is no more additional funding to realize new developments; any new
initiative has to be paid through internal cutbacks.
     Whether or not the terms ‘mode 1’ vs. ‘mode 2’ characterize discrete forms
of knowledge production and, what is more, whether or not ‘mode 2’ will
eventually replace ‘mode 1,’ that is, the former thus charactizes a historical
change in the science system (cf. Gibbons et al. 1994, and pp. 13–14, 130 in this
volume) – this may be debated controversely (Weingart 1997). It is obvious,
however, that universities will undergo severe structural and organizational
transitions throughout the next decades. As Wilhelm Krull points out on the
following pages, a number of critical issues are affecting the future develop-
ment of the universities: there will be less state but more private funding; due
to the possibilities of the world wide web and multimedia technology there is a
significant trend towards virtual colleges; traditional disciplinary specialization
will decrease while inter- and transdisciplinarity will increase; funding will be
linked closely to assessments of performance, and indicators for ‘outputs’ of
research and teaching will get more and more attention (Weingart 1996); in the
era of globalized markets internationalization will be of growing importance.
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Universities will have to change themselves into learning organizations;
academic ‘self-mystification’ will be reduced while controlling and manage-
ment procedures will be introduced on all levels to enhance the productivity of
the organization and its members.
     With Germany as an example, Krull explains the most important dimensions
of change – in fact, the challenges – for universities today; his observations,
however, are of relevance far beyond the German case.
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German Universities on the Threshold of the
1, 2Twenty-First Century
Wilhelm Krull
Major changes in the calendar such as new millennia are also an occa-
sion for looking back and taking stock, engaging in a critical or fond
inspection of what has been achieved so far, but, above all – as a glance
at the world in 1900 or even in 1000 would show us –, an occasion for
speculations and visions, for promising utopian scenarios as well as
prophecies of catastrophe and doom. Things are no different at the
threshold to the 21st century or the third millennium.
     Nothing ages so rapidly as long-term predictions, and I take to
heart Peter Medawar’s comment that everybody cultivates expecta-
tions regarding the future but only fools allow themselves to make
predictions. Therefore, I fear that I shall have to disappoint all those
who finally wanted to know which catastrophes await us and what
German universities will look like in 50 or even 100 years time
(should they still exist). Whatever, there has been no shortage of
predictions of gloom and negative trends in the German higher
education policy debates of recent years.
     As far as German universities are concerned, critical reports and
visions of doom were on the agenda long before the appearance of the
current millennium. Diagnoses on their state of health have also long
been bad. Even 10 years ago, Jürgen Mittelstraß, a philosopher at
Constance, coined the metaphor of the “university as patient.” He
considered this patient to be suffering from “being overcrowded and
underfinanced,” to be struck down, and that neither science nor
politics would seem capable of developing convincing proposals for
treatment, let alone providing effective help: “The patient’s coma has
long since spread to the physicians as well” (Mittelstraß 1993: 27,
translated).
     Even a quick glance at the headlines on university policy in recent
months reveals little change, at least in the public perception of the
situation. Not only the unfortunate discussion on “lazybones profes-
sors,” but also headlines such as “Stupidity: Higher education policy
doesn’t know what to do,” “A desert in cultural policy?” “Universi-
ties: The major revival has failed to materialize,” “German univer-
sities: Not good enough for Nobel prizes?” or “Musty gowns: Profes-
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sors should be paid according to their productivity” have further
damaged the image of German universities. This has been particularly
encouraging to those powers that have long considered that the
critically ill patient needs drastic surgery, to some extent, to be put
under the knife, and thus ensure a return to health through interven-
tion and external regulation. Particularly critical observers, most of
whom prefer a shipping metaphor, are already seeing the approaching
death of many universities: The ship is sinking, the “university for the
masses” tanker is foundering, but what then? This is as far as the view
of the pessimists goes!
     Optimistic observers of the situation and policymakers, in contrast,
point out that the current state of German universities is, to a major
extent, the outcome of the administered university world of the 1970s
and 1980s, in other words, of a period in which the many self-ap-
pointed healers of the patient university had almost driven it to its
death. They argue that belief in the self-healing powers of the univer-
sities should not be abandoned. They do not deny that it will be very
difficult to create the preconditions for an effective growth of self-
healing powers in light of the continuing diverse ties to politics and
the accompanying lack of clarity in the allocation of responsibility.
However, this will be essential if the universities are to act as self-de-
termined institutions. Granting autonomy simultaneously implies a
clear assignment of responsibilities.
     The Volkswagen Foundation is one of those – along with other
private supporters of higher education and research – that have not
abandoned the hope that universities will have the power to heal
themselves. This is apparent already in the title of their program
‘Efficiency Through Autonomy.’ It is supporting a total of 10 univer-
sities with more than 23 million German Marks. Of course, this
support does not mean that the Foundation has shut its eyes to the
problems and risks associated with such a path toward greater action
scope and greater autonomy. I shall deal with this below (cf. the
sections on “New Goals and Tasks” and “Problems and Perspec-
tives”). However, I shall first sketch my assessment of the current
situation of universities and the challenges facing them, because I
think that this will clarify not only the difficulties but also the needs
for change.
     The conditions for successful university activity are changing de-
cisively in line with the rapid change in the international division of
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labor from hands, tools, and machines to brains, computers, and
laboratories. For a number of years, the transformation from the
traditional industrial to an information or knowledge society has not
just been evoked in politician’s speeches. In a world of ‘global sourc-
ing,’ scientific knowledge – it is maintained widely – becomes increas-
ingly more crucial in working out concrete problem solutions. At the
same time, many advanced countries are revealing an unmistakable
trend toward allocating less rather than more public funds to those
institutions whose central function lies precisely in the training of
future generations of researchers.
     I shall now concentrate on five particularly marked changes that
may be summarized under the following headings:
– Less state, more private sector.
– Less university attendance, more virtual college.
– Less specialization, more inter- and transdisciplinarity.
– Less input orientation, more assessment of performance.
– Less bilaterality, more globalization.
Less State, More Private Sector
The data on university funding are sufficiently well known. Even
when conditions differ from federal state to federal state, there is an
unmistakable trend toward declining or, at best, stagnating budgets.
What is particularly conspicuous here – in a European comparison as
well – is the dramatic cuts in spending per student since the mid-1970s
(by almost 50 percent). At the beginning of the 1990s, a student cost
the German public budget DM 6,318 per annum. The Netherlands
were spending DM 9,540 per student; Great Britain, DM 12,177. The
much promised ‘contingency of planning’ proves to be a mere certain-
ty of advance warning on how much less money will be available over
the next 3 to 4 years.
     As a result, German higher education and research policymakers
have recently also started considering the need for a new ‘public-
private partnership.’ Alongside improving the fit between publicly
funded and private sector research, this particularly means a need for
new funding models in order to maintain the efficiency of the training
and research domains funded traditionally by the public sector.
Simultaneously, this places completely new demands on management.
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It seems as if we are inexorably following a trend here that has become
increasingly dominant in English-speaking countries since the begin-
ning of the 1980s. There are now a number of initiatives and concrete
plans in which the interface between public and private areas of
responsibility has been shifted far into the field of commerce, and this
does not just apply to college building, the provision of high-power
computers, and so forth, but also in the joint establishment and
funding of research institutions. The demand that more attention
should be paid to foundation and innovation management in research
and teaching and also to use the university as a training ground for
entrepreneurs has gained – and this is a welcome trend – far more
acceptance than in the 1980s (cf. Krull 1999: 6–9).
     At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that we are still
finding it difficult to advance effectively along the path toward
privatization. Here, I only wish to recall the seemingly endless debate
on introducing student fees, in which rhetorical bouts were carried
out with almost religious zeal, but no final breakthrough could be
achieved. At present, I also doubt whether more can be achieved on
the path toward founding private colleges. There is now a welcome
variety of more than 10 private initiatives, and there is also talk about
offering approximately 2,000 new student places. However, if we
subtract the 1,200 places planned for the new International University
of Bremen, it soon becomes apparent that most plans are not for
universities but, at best, ‘mini-versities’ or even simple, one-course
colleges (mostly business schools). Despite this criticism, I am, none-
theless, convinced that the current private initiatives to set up univer-
sities are a necessary beginning, and, in the years to come, we shall
witness a much more dynamic development toward partial privatiza-
tions of previously publicly funded institutions and more large-scale
foundations of colleges offering a wider range of subjects. First steps
toward such partial privatizations can already be observed in some
technological universities, for example, at Karlsruhe and Hamburg-
Harburg, and no longer just for research but specifically for the
international ‘marketing’ of their courses as well.
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Less University Attendance, More Virtual College
Everybody is talking about the knowledge or information society.
The data highways seem to be becoming the traffic routes of the
future. Thanks to the Internet and e-mail, information is becoming
available in increasingly larger amounts and, simultaneously, at an
increasingly faster speed. However, it is not just the changes in the
transport of information and data affecting all areas of society that are
worthy of interest here, but also (or perhaps, above all) changes in the
scientific methods and questions that the ‘digital revolution’ has made
possible. The spectrum associated with the ‘informatization of knowl-
edge’ that is perhaps also leading to a new ‘order of knowledge’ ex-
tends from the mapping of the human genome, across the applica-
tion of methods of nonlinear dynamics in the natural and engineering
sciences, up to historical social research with mass data, to name only
three examples. One particular challenge facing universities is that the
production, processing, and distribution of new information occur
almost simultaneously. Lectures and papers by outstanding professors
at Harvard or Stanford, for example, become just as accessible for
students at German universities as the lectures of their own German
professors. An ever more perfect information network that perma-
nently confronts our scientific understanding with what we already
know or should have known is increasingly creating the impression
that the information networks have developed more quickly than the
research they were designed to serve.
     At the same time, more and more virtual colleges are being set up
and are moving into the education market with interactive courses.
Although the largest Internet college in the USA, the University of
Phoenix, has no real campus, it already has more than 200,000 stu-
dents or subscribers (it is hard to know how to categorize them
exactly). Up to now, Germany has followed this trend only hesitantly,
and mostly in the technological college domain. However, Bavaria’s
plan to set up a state-wide Internet college will probably soon be
followed by other states. This simultaneously raises the question of
what repercussions these electronic, interactive courses will have on
studies at a solid university building.
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Less Specialization, More Inter- and Transdisciplinarity
For a long time, the organization into subject fields was the pride and
joy of German universities. This was justified, because in many sub-
jects – not least the ‘classic natural sciences’ such as physics, chemis-
try, and biology – their researchers were among the best in the world.
Interdisciplinary research was already proposed repeatedly in the
1960s and 1970s and almost sounds old-fashioned today. Howev-
er, for some time now, it has been experiencing a renaissance under
new labels, because in many areas (not just in environmental research
in which it has been apparent for a long time) the emerging problems
can be solved only through cooperation between outstanding resear-
chers from various disciplines.
     Leading international science researchers like Michael Gibbons,
Camille Limoges, and Helga Nowotny et al. have tried to describe
these decisive changes in a book entitled ‘The New Production of
Knowledge’ (Gibbons / Limoges / Nowotny 1994). They have propos-
ed a heuristic discrimination between the traditional ‘Mode 1’ (disci-
plinary, primarily innerscientific context, homogeneous research
questions, etc.) and ‘Mode 2.’ Mode 2 is defined particularly by the
following elements: (a) The social and economic context is of great
importance for a wide-ranging, mostly transdisciplinary research. (b)
New research questions often originate outside of the science sector.
(c) A common basis for the ability to communicate scientifically first
has to be established between the experts involved, new methods have
to be worked out together, and, frequently, standards can be defined
only at the end of a project. (d) The relation to applied science and
practice is often in the foreground. The final concern is to link togeth-
er the previously all too often separated domains of theoretical knowl-
edge, applied knowledge, and practical knowledge in new ways. In
their new book, Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons
also ask how the increasing demand for ‘socially robust knowledge’
can be met in the future (cf. Nowotny / Scott / Gibbons 2001).
Less Input Orientation, More Assessment of Performance
Up until well into the 1980s, science policy was almost exclusively
input-oriented (and not just in Germany). The focus was on increas-
ing the number of student places (without doubt, a necessity since the
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number of enrollments had doubled). From the very outset, the in-
crease in the numbers of first-year students, which was also moti-
vated by labor market policy, was accompanied by an almost com-
plete neglect of the number of graduates and the other activities of the
university. Since the quantitative expansion of the education and
research system has come to a halt, and, in this ‘steady state’ situation,
new training courses and research institutions can be attained only
through discontinuing old or outmoded workfields and closing de-
partments, faculties, or institutes, the search for ‘objective evaluation
standards’ has been stepped up throughout the world.
     Numerous countries can offer a wide range of experiences with
different structures, procedures, and institutional forms for evaluating
university teaching and research. Terms such as evaluation, quality
assessment, and productivity-related fund allocation are on everyone’s
lips. Of course, previous experiences have also shown the importance
of a balance between quantitative and qualitative methods and how
urgently an effective framework for the external quality evaluation of
research and teaching needs to be established. If evaluations have no
consequences – either intentionally or not – and, as a result, no struc-
tural changes and relocations of resources can be made, they soon lose
their credibility and degenerate into frivolity (cf. Krull 1998: 151). In
Germany at present, the reverse would seem to be true, with, in many
cases, a fear of any kind of evaluation. It is repeatedly astonishing to
see what reservations are raised – and, in particular, how – with regard
to any assessment of performance.
     In the future, too, the function of the university will remain the
same, namely, to acquire, impart, and generate knowledge (as well as
the technologies that may be necessary for this). However, the follow-
ing aspects will become increasingly important for their efficiency: the
underlying ideal along with all its attendant goals and visions, the
culture of teaching and learning, the organizational structures and
control mechanisms, and, not least, the available financial and staff
resources.
     Recent studies (including those of the American science researchers
Rogers J. and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth 2000: 215–244) nonetheless
confirm impressively that the decisive breakthroughs that receive
Nobel prizes and comparable awards tend to occur at medium-sized
universities with a broad spectrum of interacting disciplines, a mini-
mum of hierarchies, and a high degree of horizontal communication
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offering a multitude of opportunities of interacting with the fields of
practice. They also have a strategically focused college management
with effective procedures of quality assurance that assign a particular-
ly high status in every sense to research achievements. In the United
States, this applies, for example, to Rockefeller University (where last
year’s Noble prize winner Günter Blobel is to be found) and the
University of California at San Francisco to a much higher extent
than, for example, to the University of California at Berkeley.
Less Bilaterality, More Globalization
“Internationality belongs to the essence of science.” This is the first
sentence of the Science Council’s recommendation for the interna-
tionalization of scientific relations (Wissenschaftsrat Köln 1992: 5).
This particularly means the, so to speak, constitutive international
character that cannot be held back for any length of time by historical-
ly given or politically ordained borders. However, in the context of a
world-wide market, not just for research- and technology-intensive
products, global networking, and multinational companies, the inter-
national dimension of science gains a new importance. As worthy as it
may have been in individual cases for German universities to have
supplied themselves well with partnerships and cooperation agree-
ments, this can scarcely distract from the fact that new efforts are
required (and have actually been implemented at many universities) if
they are to hold their own in the international competition between
colleges. These include, among others, basic improvements in study
conditions in numerous faculties, particularly in overcoming the lack
of communication between the natural and engineering sciences, and
recognizing internationally comparable qualifications. Through de-
signing study courses in modules up to a first university qualification
and setting up ‘international graduate schools’ together with leading
international universities in other countries, German universities have
gained completely new opportunities to demonstrate their efficiency
and recapture some of their earlier reputation. By the way, the partici-
pation of Rice University at Bremen or Purdue University at Hanover
is essentially due to the fact that it enables not only students but also
teaching staff at both universities to gain additional international expe-
rience and, hence, intercultural competence.
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Efficiency Through Autonomy
As already mentioned above, with its program ‘Efficiency Through
Autonomy,’ the Volkswagen Foundation is supporting 10 universities
to the tune of more than 23 million DM. The universities are the Free
University of Berlin, the Humboldt University at Berlin, the Univer-
sity of Bremen, the Technological University of Clausthal, the Uni-
versity of Dortmund, the University of Göttingen, the University of
Hamburg, the University of Heidelberg, the University of Kassel, and
the University of Mannheim. These institutions differ greatly in terms
of age, size, structure, and framing conditions. It is particularly
pleasing to see that, thanks to the Humboldt University, the program
does not just include universities from former West Germany.
     The central goal of the Volkswagen Foundation program is to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of universities by strengthen-
ing their autonomy. Hence, the concern is not with university reform
in a general and comprehensive sense, but to start off in a very con-
crete way, namely, with the university management and decision-
making structures, and target these for specific reforms. As a fund-
ing institution, the Volkswagen Foundation usually contributes to
strengthening research structures. In this case, it is concentrating
particularly on promoting the organizational and administrative
preconditions for successful research and teaching. The idea is to
support universities in their efforts to examine and improve their
structures, procedures, and processes on various levels; to reorganize
areas of competence and responsibility and allocate them more mean-
ingfully; to try out corresponding new rules and then implement them
effectively. However, this should not be an end in itself. Merely
focusing on technocratic and administrative measures would not go
far enough. The final concern is for universities to develop structures
and procedures that create the preconditions for carrying out their
genuine tasks as well as possible with a minimum of administration
and friction loss, namely, science in the form of research, teaching,
training, and knowledge transfer.
     To attain the goal of higher efficiency, it seems essential to follow
the path toward more autonomy. Some implications of this are:
1. Responsibility should no longer be socialized diffusely but be made
identifiable and attributable.
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2. It must be ensured that responsibility is not without consequence
for those bearing it.
3. Decision-making competencies and obligations must be allocated
to those who can and must take responsibility for the consequen-
ces.
4. It is necessary to promote an awareness among members of the
university that it is their university in which they are working.
Higher efficiency initially means that:
1. Resources are exploited and used better.
2. The available means are applied more effectively.
3. Procedures and processes are simplified and speeded up.
4. Communication and cooperation are intensified on the various
levels and between the individual units.
The reform plans supported by the Volkswagen Foundation reveal a
multitude of different concepts and approaches. This places them in
line with the Foundation’s goal of every university having to find the
best possible solution to fit its own framing conditions (rather than
making the often exaggerated claim in advance of developing models
for a German university reform in general). I shall now sketch three
reform approaches in more detail.
     The approach at the University of Bremen aims toward a compre-
hensive reorganization in the sense of a universal contract and quality
management. Under the heading “We are changing our university,”
some of the concerns are:
1. An achievement orientation based on agreements over goals and
contracts.
2. Quality development in teaching and research for the extension and
control of the faculties (drawing up contracts between the universi-
ty administration and faculties).
3. Development of new forms of participation in decision making and
autonomy (between the rector’s office and the faculties as well as
between faculty speaker, academic self-administration, and faculty
administration in the faculties themselves).
4. Achievement- and obligation-oriented allocation of funds.
5. Teaching contracts between staff and students.
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6. The establishment of a ‘learning organization’ (through, among
others, ‘staff-supervisor discussions’).
7. Development of guiding principles and a management concept for
the university (the university as an enterprise).
8. Development of a new contractual relationship between the univer-
sity and the city state of Bremen.
Following principles of process-oriented and systemic organization
development, the University of Hamburg is striving toward a design
and control of its administration and self-government focusing on
tasks and goals as well as an improvement of internal university
communication. On the basis of an agreement over the goals and
profile of the university, increases in efficiency and efficacy should be
achieved through more effective links between planning, decision-
making, and executive activities. Responsibilities for decision making
and action are being delegated from the central administration to
decentralized units while simultaneously strengthening the service
concept. Alongside the topics “Setting goals and forming profiles” and
“Team discussions,” work is being carried out on the following sub-
projects:
1. Developing and testing internal agreements on goals.
2. Strengthening the faculties.
3. Reorganizing central administration.
4. Developing a university report and controlling system.
The goal of the project at the University of Heidelberg is to improve
the deployment of available resources throughout the university and
to create a new awareness for costs and efficiency. The institutes are
being assigned a global budget with a large degree of freedom in
allocation (with corresponding accountability). The existing resource
allocation accounting processes are being developed into new funding
modes and supplemented by a business accounting system. This
makes it possible to set up an internal services and resources market in
the university. The university management will thus be enabled to pay
more attention to long-term strategic objectives and the necessary
structural decisions. This will be oriented toward cost and productivi-
ty data developed within the framework of an internal information
and reporting system that will also be made available to the institutes.
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New Goals and Tasks
In a paper on structural plans for the University of Constance, the
need to strengthen priority setting and profile formation is expressed
as follows:
Nowadays, no university can function as an institutional expression of all
branches of academic knowledge, especially when it comes to generating,
processing, and conveying this knowledge. In this sense, there are no longer
any complete universities in line with the ideal of the old university. This
process is due not only to modern developments in academia but also to
financial and organizational constraints, and it compels us to form more
specialized profiles from the perspective of a limited, ‘finite’ universality that
is now replacing the unlimited, ‘infinite’ universality claimed by the univer-
sities before. These have to be expressed not only from scientific but also from
structural and organizational perspectives. As a result, the special character of
the modern university of the future will be revealed less in its variety of
disciplines but far more in its special profile and corresponding specializations
(Strukturkommission Universität Konstanz 1998: 32).
However, the profile formation demanded here requires each univer-
sity to have a clear concept of its goals and tasks. It calls for
intensive deliberations, tests, negotiations, and decisions over what
should be the priorities – and all against the background of a reliable
quality assessment of respective strengths and weaknesses as well as a
prospectively based strategy. It is my belief that a structure and
development planning designed in this way cannot be worked out in
each institution by itself. It requires interaction with the external
world and can finally function only if it is based on an extended
concept of autonomy – in the sense of a responsibility of the scientific
community at large and no longer just the individual university.
     The development of a new concept has to be accompanied directly
by a strengthening of inter- and transdisciplinary research and teach-
ing. Nowadays, in terms of science policy, it is almost a truism to say
that research within each area moves increasingly more frequently at
the borders of the traditional subjects and disciplines, and that, outside
of academia, it is expected to contribute to solving problems in, for
example, the realms of energy, the environment, and health that
cannot help but stray over the borders of subjects and disciplines.
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One expression of the transdisciplinary orientations that are becoming effec-
tive wherever a solely disciplinary definition of problem states and problem
solutions no longer works, is the new scientific centers emerging, or already
working nowadays, like those at Harvard (Center for Imaging and Mesoscale
Structures) and Stanford (Bio-X) in the United States, but also at the Universi-
ty of Munich (Center for Nanoscience). These centers are no longer organized
along the traditional lines of physics, chemistry, and biology institutes, but
from a problem-oriented perspective that, in these cases, follows the current
trend in science. Transdisciplinarity proves to be a new and highly promising
principle of research. Where it works, the old institutional structures pale in
comparison (Mittelstraß 1999: 3).
To develop a specific, not just regional, but, above all, also interna-
tional profile, it is essential for each university to reconfigure its
previous efforts toward internationalization that were generally based
on cooperation agreements. Alongside a universal application of inter-
national standards for the recognition and comparability of student
credits and qualifications, not least in the ECTS (European Credit
Transfer System), this includes the formation of a network for
research and teaching that particularly emphasizes combinations of
competencies that may be used to supplement the resources of one’s
own university. As long as attention is paid to the criterion of scientif-
ic excellence and, for example, internationality is not promoted for its
own sake, such ‘strategic alliances’ and the resulting combinations of
competencies are exceptionally suitable for giving the specific profile
an additional productive focus.
     The rapid advances in new information and communication
technologies make new teaching and learning methods based on
multimedial forms of imparting knowledge enormously important. As
mentioned above, the ‘digitalization of knowledge’ implies that new
knowledge is generated, processed, made available, and imparted
almost simultaneously. This does not just mean an extension of the
traditional correspondence course model. Nowadays, it is far more the
case that each university has to ask itself how it intends to react to the
major relaxation of the constraint of teaching and learning to one time
and place (‘learning anytime, anywhere’). Future courses can be
carried out in a joint division-of-labor process by several faculties or
several universities on both a national as well as international level. As
mentioned above, the situation is similar for research: Here as well,
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multimedial information and communication technologies have long
played an important role and have led to the development of new
forms of work and organization.
     To the extent that the forms and paths by which new knowledge
is created are developing from a relatively homogeneously structur-
ed, institutionally anchored process shaped by the discourse within
the individual disciplines to a more open process shaped by a ser-
vice character and a firmly applied reference, the demands on colleges
and research institutions on the one hand and industry on the other
are also changing. Both need to work together more intensively
than before in training and research processes. This is why German
higher education policymaking has recently been talking more about
the need for a new public-private partnership. Alongside improved
coordination between publicly and privately funded research, this
particularly means the need for new funding models if the traditional-
ly publicly funded research and training institutions are to retain their
efficiency. German universities still find it difficult to cope with such
an idea. They particularly fear a loss of independence in research and
teaching. However, the need is to develop new forms of coexistence in
the sense of a “purposeful scientific cooperation between two equally
entitled partners with different abilities and goals” (Stock 1990: 10,
translated). The goal of a public-private partnership is not a reciprocal
transformation into the other but an optimal exploitation of the
different competencies and strengths of both partners. The main
concern is to improve knowledge networking through binding co-
operation schemes, in-service training, and the like. This means that
it is necessary to develop the ability not only to produce relevant
knowledge but also to register this knowledge. Whether this will
simultaneously lead to a ‘denationalization’ of tertiary education does
not need to be discussed further here. However, it can be antici-
pated already that these new forms of coexistence will also lead to
changes in the financial interfaces between the public and private
sector.
     The more strongly universities are controlled on the basis of
contracts, thus through productivity agreements, the more important
the quality evaluation of the entire performance spectrum of a univer-
sity will become as well. Internal and external evaluation need to be
coordinated better and developed further. Germany has a lot of
catching up to do, particularly in evaluating teaching and university
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services. Of course, the quality of appointments remains of decisive
importance. However, even in this context, reforms based on new
internal and external checks and balances would be desirable that
could be oriented toward the practices developed at leading non-Ger-
man universities.
     Promoting science and research with public funds is justified by the
crucial importance of producing new knowledge and passing it on to
society, above all, the young generation. It is a particular task of the
university to produce excellently qualified young persons who will be
able to take over leading roles in academia, business, and society. With
a view to future generations of university teachers, there is a need to
enable early scientific independence so that creative potential and
motivation can be exploited optimally. This requires a new personnel
structure and also discontinuation of Germany’s postdoctoral habili-
tation system. It should be replaced by demanding other proof of
special scientific aptitude for university posts that goes beyond an
excellent Ph. D. In my opinion, the quality assurance for high posts at
universities and research institutions is not a job for the institute of
origin but – with the involvement of external experts – for the institu-
tion with the post to fill.
     At the present time, more than 60 percent of the postdoctoral
graduates who transfer to English-speaking countries – predominantly
the United States – do not return to Germany. This is something that
needs to be thought about. From many personal conversations, I
know that the lack of assistant professorships and posts for junior
research group leaders is a particularly major handicap. At the Volks-
wagen Foundation, we have set up a special program for ‘junior
research groups at universities’ in order to provide an opportunity for
particularly highly qualified members of the next generation to run
their own research groups. It remains to be hoped that the current
Education Minister’s openness to reform will be crowned by the
successful introduction of a basically new personnel structure during
the further course of the present parliamentary term.
Problems and Perspectives
A spirit of optimism can be found in many German universities.
Dynamics of change have been set in motion that are also forcing
previously more reticent universities into action. However, this does
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not mean that the desired goals can be attained straightforwardly. I
should like to sketch some of the major problems that I consider to be
present in the various reform plans:
1. The tense relation between the top-down and bottom-up orienta-
tion in the development and implementation of new management
and decision-making structures; the strategic versus participative
approach in plans; the integrative function of the discussion on
ideals and the associated goal of strengthening corporate identity
(“We are changing our university”); the need for structural reform
versus much-loved habits or committee traditions; questioning the
legitimacy of reform plans outside traditional procedures and –
losely linked to this – the necessary gaining of trust through
intensive public relations work.
2. Potentials and limits of achievement-related allocation of funds as
an instrument for controlling resources; tendencies to self-block
reform plans through excessive adjustments to data and so forth;
premature restrictions of the breadth of funds to be included and
difficulties in obtaining acceptance for the new instrument; the
problems of implementation: Differentiation of achievement and
internal university integration seem to be hard to reconcile; the
necessary complementary function of negotiated goals and corre-
sponding forms of productivity-related allocation of funds.
3. The coordination of organization development and personnel
development; not only technological and administrative abilities
require further development; the willingness to take over responsi-
bility for resources does not grow by itself; in individual institu-
tions, the projects have to tackle staff problems – both in terms of
fluctuations in team members as well as intended transfers into
university management.
4. The decentralization of responsibility for resources and the accom-
panying administrative processes require rethinking the interface
between central administration and faculty or institute administra-
tions; the danger of extra work and over-organization is in no way
banished.
5. The relation between the university and the state, between universi-
ty administration and government ministries has yet to be clarified
satisfactorily; many contracts and new models for productivity and
obligation-related allocation of funds are a pretext for new modali-
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ties of fine control that tend to encourage more rather than less
state intervention.
Final Comment
Finally, I should like to reemphasize three points:
1. The ‘tertiary teaching and research institution’ of the university has
to change itself – in a comprehensive sense – into a learning organi-
zation, to stimulate its staff repeatedly to enhance productivity, and
convey a sense of membership to all.
2. The changes sketched at the beginning and the associated chal-
lenges have to be accepted. New concepts of strategic control and
everyday management also have to be developed as well as new
forms of imparting knowledge, curriculum organization, and
research itself.
3. For a long time, the academic world was engaged in a sort of
‘self-mystification’ (cf., also, the labyrinth as a metaphor for scien-
tific work). Although the goal is more success, ‘self-enlightenment,’
learning from mistakes, reorganization of procedures, and so forth
are essential milestones along the way.
It should also be borne in mind that not all therapeutic steps will
succeed, and that the patient will have to anticipate relapses. However,
in all, I am confident that the outcome will be reform of the more
efficient institutions, and that the end of the story will not be, to quote
Francis Bacon, “Cure the disease and kill the patient.”
Notes
1 I am grateful to Jonathan Harrow, Bielefeld, for translating the
manuscript from German to English.
2 This contribution is based on a talk the author held at the Univer-
sity of Ulm and the University of Marburg, Medical Faculty, on
occasion of the Dies Academicus.
141
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 125-143) T01_05 krull.p 286938514526
Wilhelm Krull
References
Gibbons, Michael / Limoges, Camille / Nowotny, Helga et al. (1994)
The New Production of Knowledge, London: Sage.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers / Hollingsworth, Ellen Jane (2000) “Major
Discoveries and Biomedical Research Organizations: Perspectives
on Interdisciplinarity, Nurturing Leadership, and Integrated Struc-
tures and Cultures”. In Peter Weingart / Nico Stehr (eds.) Practising
Interdisciplinarity, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.
215–244.
Krull, Wilhelm (1998) “Autonomie – Qualität – Evaluation. Zur
Bewertung universitärer Lehr- und Forschungsleistungen”. In
Michael Winkler (ed.) Festschrift für Ernst-Joachim Meusel, Ba-
den-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 149–157.
Krull, Wilhelm (1999) “Potentiale, Probleme und Perspektiven”. In
Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (ed.) Public Private
Partnership. Neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit von öffentlicher
Wissenschaft und privater Wissenschaft, Essen, pp. 6–9.
Mittelstraß, Jürgen (1993) “Am Krankenbett der Universität”.
Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft 2, pp. 27–31.
Mittelstraß, Jürgen (1999) “Transdisziplinarität – eine Chance für
Wissenschaft und Philosophie”. Physikalische Blätter 55 / 10, p. 3.
Nowotny, Helga / Scott, Peter / Gibbons, Michael (2001) Re-think-
ing Science: Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty,
Cambridge / UK: Polity Press.
Stock, Günther (1999) “Viele Fähigkeiten bündeln”. In Stifterverband
für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (ed.) Public Private Partnership.
Neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit von öffentlicher Wissenschaft
und privater Wissenschaft, Essen, pp. 10–15.
Strukturkommission Universität Konstanz (1998) Modell Konstanz.
Empfehlungen zur strukturellen Weiterentwicklung der Universi-
tät, Konstanz: Universitätsverlag.
Wissenschaftsrat Köln (1992) Empfehlungen zur Internationalisierung
der Wissenschaftsbeziehungen, Köln.
Author Information
Wilhelm Krull is the Secretary General of the Volkswagen Founda-
tion. He was born in 1952 at Doerpen (Lower Saxony), studied
142
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 125-143) T01_05 krull.p 286938514526
stGerman Universities on the Threshold of the 21  Century
German, Politics, Philosophy and Education at the Universities of
Bremen and Marburg; first degree (Staatsexamen) in 1977; Doctor of
Philosophy in 1980; DAAD-Lector at the University of Oxford
1980–1984; January 1985 – September 1987 Scientific Administrator at
the Wissenschaftsrat’s headquarters (Science Policy Advisory Coun-
cil) in Cologne; October 1987 – February 1993 Head of Research
Policy Unit at the Wissenschaftsrat’s headquarters; March 1993 –
December 1995 Head of Section I (which includes the Divisions for
International Affairs, Public Relations and Law) at the Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft’s headquarters in Munich. Dr. Krull has been a member
of various national and international committees, e. g., the OECD’s
Group on Scientific and University Research, and the 1995 Monitor-
ing Panel for the 4th Framework Programme. He also advised the
European Commission on the preparation of guidelines for the
evaluation of R&D programmes.
Affiliation: VolkswagenStiftung, Postfach 810509, D-30505 Hannover,
Germany
email: krull@volkswagenstiftung.de
http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/org_gram.html
143
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 125-143) T01_05 krull.p 286938514526
  
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 144    ) vakat 144.p 286938514534
 Evolutionary Theory and
the Social Sciences
Increasingly a Mutual Exchange
Ever since the constitution of sociality as a matter sui generis, social scientists
have, at best, ignored the biological sciences as irrelevant or, at worst, fought
against them for fear of reductionism and / or racist underpinnings. As a
consequence, social scientists avoided to meet the challenge of seriously
considering the biological aspects of culture. Repelled by the bold claims of
sociobiologists (instigated be E.O. Wilson in 1975), they failed to realize the
more substantive contributions among biologists as well as the usages made by
their fellow social scientists: Among these were Donald Campbell (psychol-
ogist), Napoleon Chagnon and William Irons (anthropologists), Richard
Nelson and Sydney Winter (economists). Notably in the last 15 years the
efforts have become ever-more intense and less exploratory (for overviews, cf.
Barkow / Cosmides / Tooby 1992, Smith / Winterhalder 1992; Weingart / Richer-
son / Mitchell / Maasen 1997).
     Basically, scholars pursue two different research strategies: either a homo-
logical or an analogical strategy. On the homological account, one argues that
culture does have a direct impact on genetic fitness and one appeals to the
theoretical resources developped in the biological investigation of nonhuman
behavior. As the genetical bases of human social behaviors are not (well)
known, two assumptions are required: first, the phenotypic gambit (Grafen
1991) according to which for each trait under study there is some mapping
onto the genetic level. Hence, one can ignore the latter and still presume that
fitness consequences will have evolutionary effects. The second assumption is
called the natural origin argument: It holds that even the most clearly cultural-
ly variable behavior that is not directly genetically controlled, can be treated as
if it were. According to this perspective, any cultural learning mechanism that
survived an initial selective competition will lead to behaviors that increase
genetic fitness. Another way to make use of biology is its theoretical structure
in order to build analogous models for cultural change. The analogical strategy
rests on the assumption that evolution is a historical process: Human cultures
are historical entities, changing over time, but they also carry with them ves-
tiges of their past. Analogous reasoning acknowledges that the relation between
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culture and evolution is one of similarity, and not identity, thus illuminating
both the similarities and differences between biological and cultural processes.
     Most prominent accounts along the line of dual inheritance or co-evolution-
ary models have been given by William Durham (1991) as well as Robert Boyd
and Peter Richerson (1985), respectively. In the following chapter Richerson
and Boyd will argue that cultural evolution can indeed create social institutions
that in the long run shape important aspects of even the innate components of
human biology. The long-cherished division between the biological and the
cultural (or nature / nurture) is seriously challenged by this type of evolution-
ary reasoning and so are the boundaries between the biological and the social
sciences.
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Culture is Part of Human Biology.
Why the Superorganic Concept Serves
the Human Sciences Badly
Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd
Introduction
Rates of violence in the American South have long been much greater
than in the North. Accounts of duels, feuds, bushwhackings, and
lynchings occur prominently in visitors’ accounts, newspaper articles,
and autobiography from the eighteenth century onward. According to
crime statistics these differences persist today. In their book, Culture
of Honor, Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen (1996) argue that the
South is more violent than the North because Southerners have differ-
ent, culturally acquired beliefs about personal honor than Northern-
ers. The South was disproportionately settled by Protestant Scotch-
Irish, people with an animal herding background, whereas Northern
settlers were English, German and Dutch peasant farmers. Most
herders live in thinly settled, lawless regions. Since livestock are easy
to steal, herders seek reputations for willingness to engage in violent
behavior as a deterrent to rustling and other predatory behavior. Of
course, bad men come to subscribe to the same code, the better to
intimidate their victims. As this arms race proceeds, arguments over
trivial acts can rapidly escalate if a man – less often a woman – thinks
his honor is at stake, and the resulting ‘culture of honor’ leads to high
rates of violence. Nisbett and Cohen support their hypothesis with an
impressive range of data including, laboratory data, attitude surveys,
field experiments, data on violence, and differences in legal codes.
     Their laboratory experiments are most relevant to our argument
here. Cohen and Nisbett recruited subjects with Northern and
Southern backgrounds from the University of Michigan student body,
ostensibly to work on an psychological task dealing with perception.
During the experiment, a confederate bumped some subjects and
muttered “asshole” at them. Cortisol (a stress hormone) and testos-
terone (rises in preparation for violence) were measured before and
after the insult. Insulted Southerners showed big jumps in both
cortisol and testosterone compared to uninsulted Southerners and
insulted Northerners. The difference in psychological and physiologi-
147
21.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 01e3287934080320|(S. 147-177) T01_06 richerson.p - Seite 147 287934080380
Peter J. Richerson / Robert Boyd
cal responses to insults was manifest in behavior. Nisbett and Cohen
recruited a 6’3" 250 lb (190 cm, 115 kg) American style football player
whose task was to walk down the middle of a narrow hall as subjects
came the other direction. The experimenters measured how close
subjects came to the football player before stepping aside. Northern-
ers stepped aside at around 6 feet regardless of whether they had been
insulted. Un-insulted Southerners stepped aside at an average distance
of 9 feet, whereas insulted Southerners approached to an average of
about 3 feet. Polite but prepared to be violent, un-insulted Southern-
ers take more care, presumably because they attribute a sense of honor
to the football player and are normally respectful of others’ honor.
When their honor is challenged, they are prepared and willing to
challenge someone at considerable risk to their own safety.
     Nisbett and Cohen’s study illustrates the two main points we want
to make in this essay.
– Culture is fundamental to understanding human behavior. The
high rates of violence in the American South are a product of a
social heritage. The Southern culture of honor arose and was for a
long time maintained by an environment that made it an efficacious
means of protecting a family’s livelihood. Nowadays, few Southern-
ers are pastoralists, and few Notherners are peasant farmers.
Nonetheless, these striking differences in behavior persist.
– Culture causes behavior by causing changes in our biology. An
insult that has trivial effects in a Northerner sets of a cascade of
physiological changes in a Southerner that prepare him do violent
harm to the insulter and to cope with the likelihood that the
insulter is prepared to do equal harm in return. We argue that this
example is merely a single strand in mass of connections that so
thoroughly web culture into other aspects of human biology that
any separation of them into distinct phenomena is impossible.
We can certainly make an analytical distinction between genetic and
cultural influences on our behavior, and the influences of non-cultural
forms of environmental influences. However useful, this analytical
distinction emphatically does not license is an ontological separation
of culture and biology separate levels of organization with only simple
biological ‘constraints’ on cultural evolution and diversity. Culture is
as much part of human biology as bipedal locomotion, and cultur-
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al and genetic influences on human behavior are thoroughly inter-
twined.
     Most of the important threads of twentieth-century social science
have rejected one of these two principles. Some traditions within the
social sciences, for example rational choice theorists, many psycholo-
gists, and human sociobiologists, place little emphasis on culture as a
cause of human behavior, and sometimes view cultural explanations as
limited to historical-descriptive accounts devoid of real explanatory
power. While we sympathize with critics of current culture studies,
this state of affairs is not inherent in the culture concept. The effects of
culture on human behavior can readily be addressed with the methods
of the so-called hard sciences (e. g., Cavalli-Sforza / Feldman 1973,
1981; Lumsden / Wilson 1981; Boyd / Richerson 1985; Richerson /
Boyd 1989). We want to convince you that a Darwinian science of
culture is a respectable and promising pursuit and that the easiest
way to see why is to place culture squarely in the middle of human
biology.
     Many social scientists have objected to moves of this ilk for fear
that the result would be to ‘reduce’ culture to biology. Many biolo-
gists interested in humans have encouraged such fears. E.O. Wilson
(1975, 1998) argues that disciplines stand in a reductionistic relation to
one another, and that the ultimate fate of the social sciences is to be
reduced to sociobiology. The project we champion differs significantly
from Wilson’s. Part of the payoff for locating culture in biology is that
we can model the influence that culture has on genes as well as the
‘reductionistic’ influence of genes on culture. If we imagine that genes
and culture are two inheritance systems that interact on the same level
to produce human behavior we can make ‘coevolutionary’ or ‘dual
inheritance’ models of the basic processes by which this interaction
takes place. These models have the virtue of reducing to more conven-
tional positions such as rational choice theory, various kinds of human
sociobiology, and, most interestingly, Sahlins’ (1976) cultural reason,
under different simplifying assumptions (Boyd /Richerson 1985: chap-
ter 8). Under a broad and reasonable range of assumptions, evolving
genes, evolving culture and environmental contingencies all conspire
to affect human behavior.
     For some students of culture, locating culture in biology may still
seem a risky strategy. The powerful theories and intimidating empiri-
cal methods of the natural sciences might overwhelm culture as if
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science is somehow inherently biased against cultural explanations.
We believe the opposite. Cultural explanations of human behavior are
likely to prove exceedingly robust. Human nature itself may be
substantially socially constructed by the processes of cultural evolu-
tion, not just our ideas about it. Culture, on this hypothesis, has the
fundamental role in human behavior long claimed for it by cultural
anthropologists and many other social scientists and humanists.
Cultural evolution can create social institutions that in the long run
shape important aspects of even the innate components human
biology. Innatists run a real risk that some of their genes will be
‘reduced’ to culture!
The Poverty of Superorganicism
Most social scientists treat culture as a “super-organic” phenomenon.
As A.L. Kroeber put it in trying to explicate the superorganic concept
“particular manifestations of culture find their primary significance in
other cultural manifestations, and can be most fully understood in
terms of these manifestations; whereas they cannot be specifically
explained from the generic endowment of the human personality, even
though cultural phenomena must always conform to the frame of this
endowment” (Kroeber 1948: 62). Theodosius Dobzhansky, an evo-
lutionary biologist very sympathetic to the twentieth-century social
sciences of culture, states it: “In producing the genetic basis of culture,
biological evolution has transcended itself – it has produced the
superorganic” (Dobzhansky 1962: 20). Social scientists have long used
rhetoric like this to dismiss the need to incorporate biology in any
serious way into their study of human behavior. Humans cannot fly
by flapping their arms or swim naked in polar seas, but outside of
obvious framing constraints of this type, things biological had no
explanatory role in explaining things cultural. On this view, biology is
important, of course, because we need bodies and brains to have
culture. But biology just furnishes the blank slate on which culture
and personal experience write. This idea goes back to the turn-of-the-
twentieth-century pioneers of the sociology and anthropology. For
example, the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde’s (1903) book The
Laws of Imitation prefigures in many ways the ideas in this essay, but
he rejected any considerations of biology as a practical matter of
disciplinary specialization. Dobzhansky’s usage was probably inspired
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Kroeber and kindred influential social scientists of his period. Dob-
zhansky was recognizing a fait accompli we believe. If biologists of his
day wanted harmonious relations with social scientists rather than
destructive nature-nurture disputes, they had to make obeisance to the
superorganic concept. Yet Dobzhansky went right on to say: “Yet the
super-organic has not annulled the organic” (1962: 20). He never
satisfactorily resolves the tension between these two statements.
Ingold provides a discussion of three different senses of “superorgan-
ic” used by social scientists over the years about which he summar-
izes “the superorganic has become a banner of convenience under
which have paraded anthropological and sociological philosophies of
the most diverse kinds” (Ingold 1986: 223ff.).
     In our view, superorganicism is wrong because it cannot deal with
the rich interconnections between culture and other aspects of our
phenotype, as exemplified by the Southern culture of honor. Superor-
ganicism may have served a useful function in helping the social
sciences get on their feet (after a couple of beers – you buy the first
round – we’ll be happy to dispute even that). Better to grasp the
nettle: Culture is a part of human biology, as much a part as bipedal
locomotion or thick enamel on our molars. Because of culture people
can do many weird and wonderful things. But in all cases the equip-
ment in human brains, the hormone producing glands, our hands, and
the rest of our bodies play a fundamental role in how we learn our
cultures and why we prefer some ideas to others. This is a minority,
even heretical, position among human scientists, albeit one with a long
pedigree. Freud was a defender of it (Sulloway 1979) as are many
modern psychologists, some of whom we discuss below.
     Suppose we define culture like this:
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ phenotypes which they
acquire from other conspecifics by teaching or imitation.
In the taxonomy of definitions of culture, ours is in a category that
emphasizes the psychological aspects of the phenomenon (Kroe-
ber / Kluckhohn 1952). Culture is taught by motivated human teachers,
acquired by motivated learners, and stored and manipulated in human
brains. Culture is an evolving product of populations of human brains.
Humans are adapted to learn and manage culture by the way natural
selection has arranged our brains. Human social learners in turn
151
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 147-177) T01_06 richerson.p 286938514550
Peter J. Richerson / Robert Boyd
arrange features of their brains as they learn from others and the
environment. Culture is a major aspect of what the human brain does,
just in the same way as smelling and breathing are what noses do.
Culture-making brains are the product of more than two million years
of more or less gradual increases in brain size and cultural complexity.
During this evolution, culture must have increased genetic fitness or
the psychological capacities for it would not have evolved. Indeed,
anthropologists long interpreted much of culture in adaptive terms
(e. g., Steward 1955). Rather than a neat, narrow boundary between
innate and cultural processes that can be characterize by a short list of
simple biological constraints on human behavior, we imagine a wide,
historically contingent, densely intertwined set of phenomena with
causal arrows operating in both directions. If we think of human
culture as a part of human biology in this way we simply don’t need
to try to unpack what ‘superorganic’ could possibly mean.
     We are a bit sensitive on this point because the style of analysis of
the cultural phenomenon we advocate has collected its share of
brickbats from both sides of the superorganic divide. From the
evolutionary biology side, Richard Alexander (1979: 79–81) and
others have supposed that the analysis of culture as an inheritance
system is an attempt to defend the superorganic concept against
evolutionary analyses of human behavior. On the other, some social
scientists have treated our work as yet another attempt to ‘reduce’
culture to biology (e. g., Ingold 1986: chapter 7). In our view, culture
and the rest of human biology interacted in complex ways in the
evolutionary past to produce an extraordinary ability to imitate.
Genes and culture continue to interact in the everyday world of
human behavior in most complex ways. Functional MRI and the other
brain scanning techniques are even beginning to give us a real-time
picture of how these interactions take place in the brain. In some ways
these processes resemble the claims of the conventional social sciences,
and in some ways the proposals of human sociobiologists and innatist
psychologists. Very often the processes don’t resemble the proposals
of either. There are some fascinating scientific puzzles to solve here.
We doubt there will ever be any use for the superorganic concept, but
if one is found we’ll take it in stride. In the meantime, we find it
liberating just to drop it from our vocabulary. If you’ll try it, we think
you’ll like it too!
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Culture is a Derived Human Trait
We as yet know precious little about exactly how genes, culture and
external environment play upon the brain to produce our behavior.
We do know that without a human brain, you can’t acquire human
culture. Recent comparative primatology is beginning to describe the
nature of our capacity for imitation relative to other apes in some
detail. Groups led by Andrew Whiten and Michael Tomasello have
studied the social learning of apes and human children in a tightly
comparative framework (Whiten / Custance 1996; Tomasello 1996).
For example Tomasello’s group used human demonstrators of a
raking technique to test the social learning of juvenile and adult
chimpanzees and 2-year-old children. The demonstrators used two
different techniques of raking to obtain otherwise unreachable, desir-
able objects. Control groups saw no demonstrator. The demonstrator
had a big effect on the use of the rake by both children and chimpan-
zees compared to control groups, but the interspecific difference was
also large. The children tended to imitate the exact technique used by
the demonstrator but the chimpanzees did not. In similar experiments
with older children Whiten and Custance report rapid increase in the
fidelity of imitation by children over the age range 2–4 years, with
adult chimpanzees generally not quite achieving the fidelity of 2 year
old humans. Human children already at quite young ages are far more
imitative than any other animal so far tested, although a very few
other animals, such as parrots, are also about as good as chimpanzees
at imitative tasks (Pepperberg 1999).
     What is the biological underpinning of our hypertrophied social
learning system? Tomasello (1999) gives an account based on a con-
siderable body of observational and experimental evidence. He argues
that the most important unique feature of human cognition is what is
called ‘joint attention.’ Human children, beginning at about nine
months of age, begin to pay attention to the attention of other people
and to call the attention of others to things of interest to themselves.
For example, in Western cultures, children interact with their caregiv-
ers in little word-games where both the child and the adult pay
attention to the same object, typically a toy. The child may hand the
toy to the adult and then look to the adult for some reaction or vice
versa. The adult often articulates the word for the toy – ‘ball,’ ‘dolly,’
‘truck.’ In this way children learn their first words and use the joint
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attention situation to try out their new words. Or the adult operates
the toy – throws the ball, dresses the doll, runs the truck on its wheels
– and the child learns these skills. Tomasello dissects joint attention
into nine separate skills emerging between nine and twelve months of
age. The early maturation of these skills and the apparent necessity of
having them before substantial imitation can occur argue for a large
element of innate specification of the joint attention system. All of
these skills are specific to normal humans and are sufficient to account
for the differences in imitative capacities of children and chimpanzees.
Autistic children seem to have specific deficits in joint attention and
are greatly handicapped in learning language and acquiring other
culturally transmitted skills. At the end of the normal developmental
sequence, children understand that other people are intentional agents
with motivations like their own. Thus, the actions of other are cues as
to how one can take advantage of the experiences and skills of others
to accomplish one’s own goals. From this age onward children are
efficient imitators, and begin to rapidly build their cultural repertoires.
According to Tomasello’s hypothesis, the same joint attention skills
underpin the learning of all aspects of culture from language to
subsistence skills. Many evolutionary psychologists prefer modular
hypotheses, imagining many separate mental ‘organs,’ most famously
for language learning (Pinker 1994). The evidence on these problems is
far from conclusive. The very existence of a seemingly rather unusual
and highly organized capacity (or capacities) for imitation does argue
that an understanding of it (them) is part of evolutionary psychology
correctly considered.
Evolved Human Nature Versus Gene-Culture Coevolution
Most evolutionary theories of human behavior inspired by Darwin
underestimate the importance of culture in the evolution of human
behavior, much as superorganicists underestimate the role of genes.
Typically, biological theorists assume that natural selection first built
human biology and then that this evolved biology controls human
behavior. In such theories, the ultimate determinants of human
behavior are the product of selection on genes. Any role for culture is
proximate and can be thought of as implementing structures built into
the genes. The distinction between proximate and ultimate causation
is Ernst Mayr’s (1961) borrowing from Aristotle. Mayr argues that in
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biology, proximate causes are typically physiological. Birds migrate
equatorward when day lengths shorten because the brain converts
short day length into hormonal signals that activate migratory behav-
ior. The ultimate cause of migratory behavior is natural selection.
Migration is an evolved strategy to exploit the favorable season at
higher latitude while passing the harsh winter in undemanding
habitats. Selection has shaped the reaction of the brain to daylength
and all the downstream physiological and behavioral machinery to
accomplish the migratory adaptation. Much of the dispute over the
role of culture in human behavior is understandable in terms of the
proximate / ultimate distinction.
Most Human Sociobiology Unduly Neglects Culture
Most students of human behavior inspired by evolutionary biology
prefer to keep things simple and neglect or deny the possibility that
culture has a fundamental role to play in human adaptation and
especially that it has any component of ultimate causality. The classic
paper by Richard Alexander in 1974 and the final chapter on humans
in Edward Wilson’s landmark treatise Sociobiology in 1975 caused
considerable interest in applying evolutionary ideas to human behav-
ior. Two traditions that grew up in the wake of Alexander’s and
Wilson’s work are human behavioral ecology and evolutionary
psychology. The bedrock of the evolutionary analysis conducted by
scholars in these traditions is the concept of natural selection acting on
genes. They argue that selection over the course of human evolution
would have favored decision-making capacities, including decisions
about what cultural behaviors to adopt, that increased genetic fitness.
How could our large, complex, expensive brain have evolved to
support human capacities for learning, including the learning of
culture, unless the resulting behaviors increased fitness? Natural
selection is the only process of design operating in the world, and the
complex capacities of the human brain must therefore have arisen by
its operation.
     We call this the ‘principle of natural origins.’ In our view, the
principle of natural origins is an exceedingly important idea. It has
been attacked vigorously by critics from Darwin’s time forward and
has proved quite robust (Dawkins 1985). Most Darwinians no longer
think detailed defense of it is necessary and just use natural origins
as a metatheoretical precept to use to discover adaptations. That is,
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Darwinians very frequently use the principle of natural origins to
formulate hypotheses about what would be adaptive if it is true, rather
than testing the dominant role of selection as a hypothesis. This usage
has famous critics among evolutionists not to mention anti-evolution-
ists (Gould / Lewontin 1979), but we are not among their number.
The alternative metatheory of the evolutionist critics has not enjoyed
much success (e. g., Carroll 1997) compared, say, to the universal
Darwinism of Campbell (1965), Dawkins (1976), Dennett (1995),
Cziko (1995), and Sober and Wilson (1998). Universal Darwinists see
selection as producing adaptations on diverse heritable substrates,
including culture, and at diverse levels ranging from individual genes
and memes to groups. Some of the most exciting recent work in popu-
lation genetics is that showing how wide a variety of Dawkins’ selfish
genes exist in the genome. Given selection falling at different levels or
on different sexes, intragenomic conflicts of various kinds arise, giving
adaptationism a neat, built-in theory of maladaptations (Rice 1994).
Selection at one level can produce maladaptations at another. The
creation of new levels on which selection might act occasionally lead
to breakthrough adaptations like multicellularity, when formerly in-
tensely competing individuals are welded into larger units (Maynard
Smith / Szathmáry 1995).
     Our problem is not with the principle of natural origins itself but
with its persistent misapplication in the human case. Human sociobiol-
ogists with otherwise diverse beliefs have taken certain contingent
generalizations from evolutionary biology on board as metatheoretical
presuppositions to guide hypothesis formation that we believe should
be left in the realm of hypothesis to be tested (cf. Miller 2000 for a
view something like ours). Among the most problematical are: (1) we
can deduce adaptations directly from what would maximize individual
or inclusive genetic fitness, (2) cultural causes are always proximate,
and (3) group selection plays no role in the evolution of human social
institutions. We think the proper use of the principle of natural origins
is methodological, not substantive. If culture itself has the attributes of
an inheritance system, then it makes sense to apply Darwinian analyti-
cal methods to that system of inheritance as well as to the genetic and
see where the exercise leads. Will cultural evolution generally lead to
genetic fitness maximization? Can cultural variation itself create
heritable variation on which selection can act? Can enough of this
variation be expressed at the group level for group selection to be an
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important force? These are among the most interesting hypotheses we
want to use the analysis to address and to imagine that the principle of
natural origins dictates certain answers to them is, in the human case,
to badly mis-locate the boundary of Darwinian metatheory and
hypothesis. The human / chimpanzee comparative data on imitation,
not to mention a mass other data indicating how important culture is
in humans, makes importing the unvarnished adaptationist metatheo-
ry from evolutionary biology a very risky proposition.
     Human behavioral ecologists start with the idea that natural
selection ensures that humans act, to a decent first approximation, as
general-purpose genetic fitness maximizers. Considerations of cultural
evolution and gene-culture coevolution have a strictly secondary role,
and for most practical purposes they can be neglected in the view of
most human behavioral ecologists. As Alexander puts it, “Cultural
novelties do not replicate or spread themselves, even indirectly. They
are replicated as a consequence of the behavior of vehicles of gene
replication” (Alexander 1979: 80). Or, as Betzig says in reaction to
claims for the importance of culture: “[E]verything we think, feel, and
do might be better understood as a means to the spread of our own –
or of our ancestors – genes”, and “I personally, find culture unneces-
sary” (Betzig 1997: 2, 17).
     Very often the strategy of asking what behavior would optimize
fitness leads to useful insights. For example, consider mating strat-
egies. When should females mate polygynously with a male that
already has a mate, and when should they seek an unmarried mate? In
the case of species where males defend territories with resources on
them, females should mate polygynously if the extra resources avail-
able on an already mated male’s territory exceed those available on the
best available unmated male’s territory. Such ‘polygyny threshold’
models were first applied to birds and non-human mammals, and they
often work quite well. Borgerhoff Mulder (1992) showed that one
human population, Kipsigis farmers of Kenya, also followed the
polygyny threshold model quite well. Women tend to select husbands
on the basis of the land they can offer a new wife to cultivate rather
than other criteria. The success of such models should not surprise us.
Humans are a successful species and much of our behavior must be
pretty adaptive most of the time to account for this success. At
minimum, fitness optimizing models provide a convenient benchmark
against which to judge competing hypotheses. But cultural evolution-
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ary competing hypotheses exist! For example, the basic subsistence
adaptations of humans have been evolving rapidly, relatively speaking
throughout the history of our species. Most of these adaptations seem
to have a large cultural component and how we get from one to
another, optimally or not, is certainly of interest. To ignore our most
dynamic system for achieving our adaptations on an ‘argument’ such
as Betzig’s is stubborn and willful ignorance!
     A second important branch of human sociobiology is evolutionary
psychology. The influential school of evolutionary psychology
represented by the authors in Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992)
argues that fitness optimizing arguments are directed at the wrong
target by human behavioral ecologists. The real adaptations to focus
upon are the attributes of the mind that optimally adapted us to live in
the Pleistocene environments of the past. Contemporary environ-
ments have changed so radically that it is vain to hope that behavior
will be fitness maximizing today. Evolution is too slow to readapt the
human mind significantly in the last few thousand years. The human
mind is best conceived of as a collection of adaptations designed to
solve specific adaptive problems of Pleistocene life, our ‘environments
of evolutionary adaptedness,’ not a general-purpose fitness maximiza-
tion system. (The fact that people are even more successful in the
Holocene than the Pleistocene is puzzling on this argument, but the
fact that we did evolve under Pleistocene conditions is likely impor-
tant.) These scholars model the mind as a large collection of rather
narrowly specialized content rich algorithms that solve a series of
narrow problems. For example, human adaptations to the Pleistocene
were social. To judge from contemporary hunter-gatherers and from
archaeology, small bands of people collaborated to gain subsistence,
with a great deal of sharing within and between the constituent
families of the band. Bands were linked into a larger social sphere, the
tribe among whom mates were sought and help elicited in emergen-
cies. The exchange economies of even the simplest human societies are
greatly expanded compared to ancestral primates. Among the adapta-
tions to life in such societies must have been the ability to detect
violators of complex social contracts.
     Evolutionary psychologists want to use this Pleistocene-limited
version of the natural origins principle to inspire hypotheses about
evolved cognitive architecture that can be tested experimentally
(Tooby / Cosmides 1989). As with the empirical program of human
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behavioral ecologists, the results of these experiments are often quite
convincing. For example, the classic work of Cosmides (1989, cf. also
Gigerenzer / Hug 1992) showed that humans are much better at solving
logical problems posed as violations of social rules than posed as
abstract logical problems, and better at solving the social rule prob-
lems than with other familiar, concrete content. Cosmides argues that
this data is consistent with the hypothesis that humans’ social adapta-
tion has equipped them with a powerful innate mental organ for detect-
ing cheaters.
     The main problem, from our point of view, with this form of
evolutionary psychology is again that the principle of natural origins
has been misapplied. Now it seems to be licensing as metatheoretical
assumptions the innateness of the important adaptations as well as
fitness optimization (in past but not present environments). Several of
the leading figures in evolutionary psychology are radical innatists
who believe that the role of culture is greatly exaggerated by most
social scientists. John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, for example, argue
that social scientists have failed to distinguish between what they call
evoked and transmitted culture (Thornhill et al. 1997: 230–234).
Transmitted culture is what we call culture here, the product of
human social learning. Evoked culture is the innate information that
resides in human heads and which is expressed contingently in
different environments. Tooby and Cosmides (1989) introduced the
term evoked culture to make the point that innate mental organs can
be environment-contingent rules, and hence can produce patterns of
variation in space that would be difficult to distinguish from transmitt-
ed culture. As a hypothesis to explain any given pattern of human
behavior, ‘evoked culture’ is a perfectly good candidate. No doubt,
adapted genes play a large role in human behavior much along the
lines such innatists suggest. For example the impressive rate at which
we can encode and decode speech is the product of specialized audito-
ry and motor pathways (Friederici 1996). In general, however, testing
ideas about less peripheral aspects of speech processing and language
learning, such as how grammar develops, has proven rather difficult,
and hypotheses like Tomasello’s (1999) giving a large role to transmitt-
ed culture are currently as viable as much more innatist views, such as
those of Pinker (1994). Given that humans live in intensely social
groups structured by culturally transmitted institutions, and given
that culture and individual learning generally lead to adaptive behav-
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ior, the bare finding that people are very good at social tasks does not
speak very loudly about the proximal causes of social behaviors. The
innatist interpretation of the results of Cosmides’ experiments seems
to based upon the assumption that at least in the ultimate sense, the
products of natural selection all reside in the genes on the principle of
natural origins. This application of the principle at the psychological
level makes no more sense than at the phenotypic. Experimental work
by psychologists such as Nisbett, Cohen, and Tomasello shows that
culture is an important part of human psychology and to attempt to
marginalize it a priori is just not a good bet as a research strategy,
much less a legitimate deduction from the principle of natural origins.
     We think that psychobiology brings plenty of evidence to the table
to rule out an extreme tabula rasa hypothesis but not nearly enough
to rule out an important role for culture. Cultural scientists bring
plenty of evidence to the table to rule out a strong version of the
evoked culture argument but not nearly enough to rule out a detailed
role for evolved innate mechanisms in the acquisition and manage-
ment of culture. For example, even if the diversity of human behavior
in space is explicable on the basis of only an innate human nature and
environment, its diversity in time is harder to account for in this way.
Over the last 10,000 years, human subsistence behavior and social
organization have changed quite radically even though neither genes
nor environments have not changed much at all. Even if almost all of
the middle ground where the failure of the extreme hypotheses shows
the real answers to lie is poorly understood, we know that they are not
very close to either extreme.
     In the remainder of this essay, the nettle of biology tightly in our
grasp, we illustrate the consequences of taking both the principle of
natural origins and the importance of culture seriously with two
example hypotheses. The classic claim of mid-twentieth-century
cultural ecologists (e. g., Steward 1955) was that the human adaptation
has two basic components, technology and social organization.
Humans adapt to environments by evolving elegant tools to exploit
the most diverse sorts of resources the earth has to offer. Human
adaptations are social. Human populations take advantage of the
principles of cooperation, coordination, and division of labor to a
degree otherwise only known among the social insects and a few other
lineages. Even by the Middle Pleistocene we were an unusually widely
distributed species and for the last 50,000 years or so we have been
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fairly abundant over most of our range. Let us imagine our nearly
acultural chimpanzee like ancestors. What sort of selective pressures
would have led to the evolution of accurate imitation of food-gather-
ing strategies? What sort of adaptation is technology? Why is it rare?
In this example, we stick to conventional sociobiological assumption
that culture is a proximal system of adaptation. Even so, to understand
how culture works as a genetic adaptation requires taking the proper-
ties of cultural evolution seriously. What of the evolution of the social
component of our adaptation? How might we come to cooperate in
groups composed of distantly related individuals? Evolutionary
theory makes strong predictions about cooperation and the standard
sociobiological theory well predicts all but a handful of cases. We are
perhaps the most glaring exception, cooperating in large groups of
distantly (genetically) related individuals. Our hypothesis is that
natural selection has a stronger purchase on cultural than genetic
variation and that the social component of our behavior is substantial-
ly the result of culture participating in evolution as an ultimate cause,
not just a proximate one.
How Technology Works
The principle of natural origins encourages us to ask why natural
selection might have favored our capacity for culture. The imitative
capacity psychologists have described, and the cultural traditions the
capacity it apparently supports, could only have evolved if they were
adaptive. The capacity to acquire, store, manage and use technological
practices is at least one of the functions of our large brain. Most
accounts of human origins take our current ecological dominance as
evidence of a qualitatively new and superior form of adaptation and
ask what evolutionary breakthrough led to this revolutionary new
adaptation. For example, Lumsden and Wilson (1981: 330) remark
that “[Homo] overcame the resistance to advanced cognitive evolution
by the cosmic good fortune of being in the right place at the right
time.” Our current ecological dominance is undeniable, although
perhaps precarious, but the principle of natural origins encourages to
ask quite detailed questions about just what selection pressures would
have operated leading up to any breakthroughs.
161
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 147-177) T01_06 richerson.p 286938514550
Peter J. Richerson / Robert Boyd
Cultural Evolution is Fast and Cumulative
The human brain is a serious adaptive puzzle. It is a very costly organ
(Aiello / Wheeler 1995). Human brains account for about 10 percent of
our total energy budget versus something like 1.5 percent for average
mammals. Aiello and Wheeler argue that one consequence of our
expensive brain is that to pay its overhead we evolved a smaller gut
(gut tissue is also costly per unit weight). A short gut means that we
have to eat more energy-intensive foods than our ancestors. A costly
brain and a short gut meant that humans had to hunt, gather, and
conduct their social life with some efficiency to support their brains
under quite hostile physical conditions in competition with other
predators, scavengers, and plant eaters with much more economical
brains and more efficient guts. At least during the last glaciation,
climates were not only colder, but drier and much more variable than
during the Holocene. We believe that culture is most likely an adapta-
tion to the Pleistocene climate variation (Richerson / Boyd 2000).
During the last glacial, and by inference during most of the rest of the
Pleistocene, climate did not vary only the 100,000 year time scale of
the classic ice ages. Climates were also spectacularly variable on time
scales ranging from a few years to a few thousand years. For example,
from 80,000 to 10,000 years ago was punctuated more than 20 abrupt
(~1˚ C per decade!) warmings to about half of interglacial tempera-
tures, not to mention considerable variation at both shorter and longer
time scales (Ditlevsen et al. 1996; Broecker 1995).
     Our mathematical modeling studies show that a likely adaptive
advantage of culture is the ability of this system of adaptation to
respond more rapidly to changing environments better than genes
(Boyd / Richerson 1985). This ability comes from coupling adaptive
decision-making systems to the transmission system made possible by
accurate, fast imitation. Take the two simplest kinds of models. One
feature of culture is that it is a system for the inheritance of acquired
variation. Individuals can imitate the behavior learned by others. If the
rules that guide learning tend to be adaptive, then two forces, natural
selection and learning, act together to favor the accumulation of
adaptations. In the world of models at least, this system is especially
suited to adapting to environments that vary a lot, but with an appre-
ciable, but not too large, resemblance between parents’ and offsprings’
environments. If environments vary too fast, then Mom’s and Dad’s
behavior may be out of date, and individuals should learn for them-
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selves. If the vary too slowly, selection on genes keeps up well
enough, and the costly overhead of brain tissue consumptive culture
weighs against it. The Pleistocene was rich in just the kind of variation
that favors the inheritance of acquired variation.
     A second trick we can do with culture is use pre-existing cultural
variants rather than our own random trials or inventions. Suppose we
observe not only how Mom gathers, but also the techniques of several
other gatherers. Suppose we observe two or three variants. As we
begin to practice gathering we can try each variant a few times and
retain the one that seems best. Further, throughout our life we may
continue to observe and try out any likely variant techniques that
seems promising. Depending upon how accurately people can dis-
criminate among different techniques and on how many varying
techniques one has an opportunity to observe, the biasing of imitation
can be a weak or powerful force.
     The neat result of the models is that even when decision-making
effects are weak at the level of individuals, they can be powerful at the
level of the population. This finding is closely related to the fact that
natural selection is a powerful force at the population level even when
so weak as to be impractical to measure at the individual level. When
any directional force acts in the same direction in an entire population
and consistently for more than a few generations, the evolutionary
response is swift. For selective forces to operate including both biased
imitation and natural selection, variation to select upon must exist.
However, coupling individual learning to social learning means that
trial and error learning can act as a source of new, generally partly
adaptive, variation.
     We believe (Boyd / Richerson 1996) that the evidence suggests that
our adaptive success also rests decisively on our ability to create cul-
tural adaptations that can accumulate complexity, eventually coming
to rival genetic adaptations in the sophistication of their ‘design.’ Even
relatively sophisticated social learners like chimpanzees get only a
very general idea of a behavior using social cues. Using this general
idea, they refine their actions to a functional behavior using individual
learning. This limits the complexity of the socially learned behavior to
that which can be supported by individual learning at the individual
level. The human ability to imitate accurately means that we can adopt
the precise variant of a previous innovator, perhaps tracing back to
some long-dead genius, and then add a new wrinkle of our own,
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which can in turn be imitated and improved by our successors. Even-
tually human populations heap innovation upon innovation until we
reach the limits of human minds to be taught the result. Even the
cultures of simple societies accumulate far more genius than even the
most brilliant individual innovator could muster. Most likely, the
invention of language increased the number and sophistication of
abstract concepts we could learn. In simple societies, memory places
limits on complexity that more recently have been relieved by the
invention of writing and numbers (Donald 1991). At the cutting edge,
we again push right up against human cognitive limitations. Most of
us now live by skills dearly won in classrooms by great mental exer-
tion on both our and our teachers’ parts. The relative rapidity with
which we could build up and adaptively modify complex technology
is one leg of the adaptation allowed us in the Pleistocene to chase the
ephemeral niches left under-exploited as other species lagged behind
the kaleidoscopic changes in resources caused by rapid climate change.
In the Holocene, the invention of agriculture gave us the tools to
deteriorate the environments of competing and pest species faster than
they could adapt to our modifications (Richerson et al. 2001).
     Thus, we suppose that the environmental deterioration of the
Pleistocene is the specific environmental factor that humans exploited
to support their large, costly brains (Richerson / Boyd 2000). Interest-
ingly, many mammalian lineages show increased brain size in the
Pleistocene. Other species may also have been using social learning to
adapt to variable environments. However, no other mammalian spe-
cies has developed the ability to use rapidly evolving complex tools to
exploit variable environments. Probably, our bipedal posture, by
freeing the hands to specialize in creating and using tools, was a deci-
sive preadaptation (Tobias 1981). Coupling the capacity to imitate to
the capacity to make tools allowed us to rapidly develop adaptations
that would otherwise have required slow anatomical modifications.
Lacking a flexible way to implement a diversity of cultural adapta-
tions, no other species came to support such a radically enlarged and
costly brain.
     The promise of explicitly modeling and measuring the processes of
cultural change is immense. For example, why has the Holocene
witnessed a 10,000 year long raggedly progressive trend to fancier
technology and larger societies? What currently regulates rates of
change in various components of various cultures? Are current an-
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thropogenic climate changes likely to stress our ability to adapt to
them? Ice age climates will presumably return. Can complex societies
adapt enough to cope with the very noisy climates that have prevailed
during the last couple of million years? The extraordinary dynamism
of human societies means that understanding our species using assump-
tions about equilibrium adaptations to given environments will be
less productive than in other cases (Nelson / Winter 1982).
Why Humans Are Ultra-Social
Many critics of the orthodox schools of human sociobiology have
argued that the problem is that these investigators leap to adaptation
without considering the complexities raised by development. Our
critique above is of this form if we take social learning to be a form of
developmental process linking the evolving genes to the adaptive
phenotypes. While true, this objection bites less sharply than it might
otherwise because adaptationists commonly, and commonly success-
fully, neglect the details of genes and development when studying the
evolution of adaptations. The tactic of taking genes and development
lightly in the hope that progress can be made without needing to
understand proximate causes is called the “phenotypic gambit”
(Grafen 1991). The phenotypic gambit is generally necessary when
one studies adaptations. Development is a complex and difficult topic
all its own, and usually the only practical way to proceed is to assume
that selection has managed the developmental processes well enough
that adaptations close to what we’d predict from gross functional
considerations. We endorse the judicious use of the phenotypic
gambit; if we can’t use it, we’d have to wait until developmental
psychologists have delivered a Mercedes model of the imitation
process rather than a pick-your-own collection of Amsterdam bicy-
cles. Related scientific programs typically have to cope with weak-
nesses in their partners and with the intimidatingcomplexity of even well
known phenomena. The phenotypic gambit and allied strategies are
necessary to finesse ignorance and complexity.
     A critique that bites deeper is that human sociobiologists have
generally neglected the ultimate role culture has played in human
evolution. The coevolutionary concept of an ultimate-cause role for
culture is very simple. Culture, like genes, creates patterns of heritable
variation. Natural selection will inevitably play upon any pattern of
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heritable variation that arises in the world as Richard Dawkins (1976)
noticed and Donald Campbell (e. g., 1965) had argued earlier. If
cultural variation can respond to selection it is just as ultimate a cause
as genes! Of course, culture does not stand in isolation; it lives in
brains and is no doubt heavily shaped by influences having their roots
in genes and selection on genes. But the proximal causal arrow runs
both ways, as we’ve already seen. Our psychology is shaped by our
culture. Culture acts as a selective environment to which our genes
will, in the long run, adapt. The term coevolution classically derives
from the interacting evolution of pairs of species like predators and
prey, diseases and hosts, and mutualists. In the present case we
imagine that our culture is something like a symbiont. It lives in the
same body as our genes, but has a different life cycle and thus re-
sponds somewhat differently to evolutionary forces. In our species,
culture and genes are obligate mutualists – an individual cannot even
survive without tolerably good genes and tolerably good culture.
     We hope that the gene-culture coevolutionary idea seems perfectly
intuitive to most of our readers. Be warned, however, that you are
being invited down what many evolutionary social scientists believe is
a garden path. The issue is whether or not gene-culture interactions in
humans are fully or only partially coevolutionary. The more promi-
nent hypothesis is that the gene-culture system is a degenerate exam-
ple of coevolution. Genes have no doubt evolved to constrain the
evolution of cultural variants in ways that favor the fitness of the
evolving gene. This dynamic is what Charles Lumsden and Edward
O. Wilson called the “full coevolutionary circuit” (Lumsden / Wilson
1981: 303). They emphasized evolution of evolved genetic ‘leashes’ on
cultural evolution. We think Lumsden and Wilson’s dynamic is
incomplete because selection also exists on the cultural variants and
thus evolved cultural institutions can cause changes in the genome that
favor cultural fitness. Culture is on a leash all right, but the dog on the
end is big, smart, and independent not a well-trained toy poodle. On
any given walk, who is leading whom is not a question with a simple
answer (cf. Durham 1991: 223–225 for a similar argument).
     Mechanisms by which culture might exert forces tugging in this
direction are not far to seek. Cultural norms affect mate choice and
people seeking mates are likely to discriminate against genotypes that
are incapable of conforming to cultural norms (Richerson / Boyd
1989). Men who cannot control their testosterone storms end up
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exiled to the wilderness in small-scale societies and to prison in
contemporary ones. Women who are an embarrassment in social
circumstances are unlikely to find or keep husbands. We believe that
with, at minimum, tens of thousands of years to work with, natural
section on cultural variation could easily have had dramatic effects on
the evolution human genes by this process. Some of these effects no
doubt just energize Lumsden and Wilson’s limb of the coevolutionary
circuit, favoring better genetic leashes. Humans are still in part a wild
animal; our cultural adaptations often still serve the ancient impera-
tives of genetic fitness. However, we think the evidence supports the
hypothesis that the coevolutionary circuit is ‘doubly full.’ The leash
works both ways. Humans, we might say, are a semi-domesticated
species. Cultural imperatives are built into our genes. Not only can
culture act proximally to constrain behavior via institutions, skills,
values, and so forth, but by constraining behavior in similar ways over
hundreds of millennia it is a major source of ultimate causes of human
‘nature.’
Group Selection on Cultural Variation Selected
New Social Instincts by Coevolution
The other major leg of the human adaptation is our complex social
organization and our form of social organization is potentially a result
for selection on cultural variation and coevolutionary adjustments on
the genetic side. The residential bands that most ethnographically
known hunter-gatherers lived in are only a little larger than those of
chimpanzees (Dunbar 1992), but human social organization includes a
tribal level that is unique to our species. In the simpler human socie-
ties, typically several residential units, numbering a few hundred to a
few thousand people, speak the same dialect, participate in a common
ceremonial system, maintain a level of internal peace and security
against hostile groups, and aid one another in subsistence emergencies.
     Other ultra-social animals, including to one other mammalian
example, the naked mole rats of Africa, are based upon creating large
societies by multiplying the number of close genetic relatives. The
creation of reproductive and sterile castes in the social insects offers
examples of several independent origins of this system. Humans have
taken a quite different route to ultra-sociality (Campbell 1983). As
Campbell observed, human societies have reproductive competition
among the cooperators, leading to societies that exhibit considerable
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self-sacrificial altruism (e. g., heroism in war) and considerable with-
in-group conflict (e. g., feuding). Some societies exhibit both extremes
of warrior self-sacrifice and of extremes internal conflict rooted in sub
tribal scale loyalties, a trick that seems to defy the evolutionary law of
gravity (Hamilton 1964) as it applies to all other species. The proximal
mechanisms by which cultural institutions can harness phenomena
like Southerners’ touchy sense of personal honor to functional large-
scale organizations, like the excellent armies of the Confederacy in the
American Civil War, are tolerably well understood (Boehm 1984;
Salter 1995).
     We have proposed what we call the “tribal social instincts hypothe-
sis” to account for our peculiar pattern of social organization (Richer-
son / Boyd 1998, 1999, 2001). The tribal social instincts hypothesis is
based on theoretical analyses suggesting that group selection plays a
more important role in shaping culturally transmitted variation than it
does in shaping genetic variation. In our simplest model of the pro-
cess, we imagine that humans come to use conformist biases in
acquiring culture (Boyd / Richerson 1985: chapter 7, cf. also Henrich /
Boyd 1998). Conformity is adaptive under a wide range of conditions
because the commonest thing people are doing in a given environment
is frequently a very good thing to do relative to most easy-to-discover
alternatives. When in Rome, do as the Romans do. As a byproduct,
conformity has the effect of preserving between group variation and
suppressing within group variation. Most evolutionists doubt that
group selection on genes is very often important because it is so hard
to maintain variation between groups, particularly variation for traits
such as altruism that are selected against within groups.
     Almost everyone agrees that human material culture was of
essentially modern levels of sophistication by the Upper Paleolithic,
50,000 years ago (Klein 1999). Even if the cultural group selection
process did not start until the Upper Paleolithic Transition 50,000
years ago, human minds have been selected for 2,000 generations in
social environments in which the innate willingness to recognize, aid,
and if necessary, punish fellow group members was favored by
co-evolution. That is, cultural group selection produced traditional
institutions that penalized genotypes that were hewed too tightly to
individual selfishness, Hamilton’s kin selection rules, or to reciprocity
strategies to deal with non-relatives. If cultural institutions can gener-
ate sufficiently costly punishments for deviations from their rules or
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provide the benefits of group cooperation mainly to cooperators, any
genetic variation underlying behavioral dispositions will fall under
selection favoring genotypes that avoid the punishments and earn the
rewards. We suppose that the resulting tribal instincts are something
like principles in the Chomskian linguists’ “principles and parame-
ters” view of language (Pinker 1994). The innate principles furnish
people with basic predispositions, emotional capacities, and social
skills – the principles – that are implemented in practice through
highly variable cultural institutions – the parameters. People are
innately prepared act as members of tribes but culture tells us how to
recognize who belongs to our tribes, what schedules of aid, praise, and
punishment are due to tribal fellows, and how the tribe is to deal with
other tribes – allies, enemies, and clients.
     Because the tribal instincts are of relatively recent origin and
because our genes still fall under selection pressures obeying Hamil-
ton’s rule, they are not the sole regulators of human social life. The
tribal instincts are laid on top of more ancient social instincts rooted in
kin selection and reciprocal altruism. These ancient social instincts
conflict with the tribal. We are simultaneously committed to tribes,
family, and self, even though the conflicting demands very often cause
us the great anguish as Freud (1930) described in Civilization and Its
Discontents or Graham Greene portrayed in novels such as The Hon-
orary Consul. So long as reproductive competition among the coope-
rators exists, people still have to look out for their personal fitness
interests even as they try to do their civic duty.
     We (Richerson / Boyd 2001) argue that a considerable mass of
evidence from a number of domains of knowledge supports that tribal
social instincts hypothesis and calls into question competing evolu-
tionary explanations. Nevertheless, much more work needs to be done
before any hypothesis regarding the evolutionary origins of human
sociality should be accepted as well verified. What we do claim on the
basis of the evidence we review is that the tribal social instincts
hypothesis, with its active, ultimate role for the process of group
selection on cultural variation, is at least as attractive as any current
competing hypothesis.
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Conclusion
The fast and cumulative hypothesis to explain the original adaptive
advantage of imitation in humans is a straightforward application of
adaptive analysis. It is a simple argument from the principle of natural
origins. However, if it or hypotheses like it are true, culture plays, and
has long played, a central role in human evolution and cannot be
marginalized. For example, the time scale of cultural evolution is
rapid, but not instantaneous. Indeed, 10,000 years after the end of the
last big shift in the earth’s environmental regime, the Pleistocene-
Holocene transition, human cultural change has apparently not equil-
ibrated. The processes of cultural evolution are fundamentally impor-
tant to understanding human behavior but are comparatively little
studied, especially with sophisticated quantitative methods.
     The coevolutionary tribal instincts hypothesis, if it or anything in
its genre are correct, means that coevolution with culture has driven
the evolution of genes in directions genes would never have gone, left
to their own devices. Cultural institutions achieved the tribal (and
now larger) scale of organization by partly domesticating genes. The
human achievement of ultrasociality seems to be one of those rare
evolutionary transitions where a new level of organization emerges
because some form of group selection, no doubt always tenuously in
the beginning, unites previously fiercely competing entities into a
larger scale cooperative system (Maynard Smith / Szathmáry 1995).
This hypothesis is also perfectly consistent with natural origins. Large
scale human societies are (so far) extraordinarily successful because
they, on average, increase the fitness of both genes and culture, quite
like other successful coevolved mutualisms.
     The principle of natural origins is the fundamental building block
of Darwinian metatheory. We have no competing metatheory that has
much promise of giving us a truly deep and synthetic theory of human
behavior. The trouble is not with the principle but its misapplication
in the human case. It especially does not imply what cultural scientists
have come to fear, a trivialization of the role of culture in human
behavior. Culture, its evolutionary processes and coevolutionary
effects are all straightforward topics for Darwinian investigation. A
mass of evidence argues that we cannot understand human behavior
without doing culture right. This same evidence argues that using
concepts like the superorganic to separate the study of culture from
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the rest of human biology is equally flawed. The superorganic concept
was a tribal ploy used by twentieth-century social scientists to create
and maintain disciplinary boundaries with biology (cf. Campbell 1978
on the functions and dysfunctions of disciplinary boundaries). If we
are correct, it never served a truly useful analytical role. Whatever
useful function the concept and its boundaries served in the twentieth
century, they are now utterly senescent. The task for twenty-first-
century human science is to put culture back into human biology.
     Culture operates through biological mechanisms – brains, hor-
mones, hands – and the causal pathways by which it acts are certain to
prove densely tangled with genetic causes. The difficulty we have in
following the threads of genetic and cultural influences on human
behavior is the best evidence we have on this point. If the relationship
between genes and culture were simple, the case would have been
cracked long ago. Scientists should not be faint-hearted in the face of
complexity if that is where the real problem lies. Darwinism is rich in
techniques for making progress in the face of intimidating complexity.
The last ‘tangled bank’ paragraph of the Origin of Species is a lyrical
passage that combines a downright mystical appreciation for the
complexity of nature with a scientist’s optimism that useful under-
standing is possible nonetheless. The extremes superorganicism and
innatism are useless simplifications that lead human scientists to avoid
the hard but central problem of the human species, the natural origin
of the cultural system of inheritance and all the things that people can
create because their biology includes the capacity for imitation.
     Cultural scientists should not be timid about being reunited with
biology. Culture is a brawny phenomenon in no danger of being
‘reduced’ to genes. Evolutionary biologists should not be timid about
welcoming cultural scientists either, as biologists command the
methods cultural scientists neglected because superorganicism espe-
cially stigmatized Darwinism. All sorts of borrowings and inter-
changes across the biology social science divide are likely to prove
fruitful (Weingart et al. 1997). The only people with legitimate reason
to fear a unified human biology with culture and genes playing their
appropriate roles are those who want easy answers to hard questions.
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 Climatology
Innovative Research Strategies
in a Dynamic Field
For a very long time meteorology has been a rather inconspicuous scientific
field. The development of theories, methods and findings did not show a
different pattern from most of the other fields of ‘normal science.’ Within the
last two decades, however, this situation changed very much. The discovery of
the ozone hole and of the global warming process were the two main topics
which caused an enormous public awareness on climate research. Top
scientific journals like Nature and Science published several relevant articles in
the field with strong impact, far beyond the community of meteorology. An
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been set up under
the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Since 1990, the panel
publishes every five years a report (IPCC 1990) to access the most up-to-date
research on global warming. The production of the report is organized as a
combined effort of some 45 scientists, reviewed by hundreds of other resear-
chers and 150 governments. The panel is “considered the most authoritative
voice on global warming” (NYT Editor 2000). The global warming forecasts
of climate scientists have been heavily debated, among scientists as well as
politicians and the general public. The topic arrived at the front pages of news
magazines. Especially the discussion about the anthropogenic factor in global
warming has become one of the major scientific controversies in the 1990s.
Thus, it is not astonishing that sociologists of science discovered climate
change as an interesting ‘object of study’ (cf. Weingart, Engels, Pansegrau
2000). Climate research, in a way, combines various aspects that are of par-
ticular interest for science studies, in general:
– it is a highly interdisciplinary field, sharing knowledge of meteorology,
(geo-) physics, atmospheric chemistry, biology, oceanography, environ-
mental science, computer simulation, geoscience, etc.
– it is a highly dynamic, rapidly developing field, attracting much public
funding
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– it is basic science with an evident potential of application to the needs of
mankind
– it stimulates a controversy in the arena between science, politics and the
mass media
The notes of Aant Elzinga as a participant observer on climate research in
Antartica offer insights into the complex dynamics of the research process in
this field. With his article – partly analytic, partly impressionist – he takes the
reader directly to the research front, right into the ice.
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Making Ice Talk: Notes from a Participant Observer
on Climate Research in Antarctica
Aant Elzinga
Champagne on Ice
     In the dark of the ice-cellar we opened the champagne bottles. The
faces of our party of ten light up as cameras flash, and the ceiling
becomes visible. The bottom-side of the plain plywood slabs above
us are laid out on a series of wooden ribs stretched across a two-
and-a-half meter deep chasm dug out in the snow. It is our ice
laboratory; makes a hardly noticeable local dent, an anthropogenic
singularity in the topography of the vast pristine expanse of a polar
snowfield extending in all directions to the blue canopy of the polar
horizon. Directly over our heads, over the plywood roof lies a
plastic sheet. On top of that a decimetre of hand-shovelled loose
snow provides insulation from the radiant sun which constantly
circles about in the sky above 24 hours a day.
     It is in the middle of January 1998. Outside at minus ten, with
the sun directly overhead, it is relatively comfortable, but here
inside the ice lab, our natural cooler, the temperature has to be kept
below minus 20 degrees centigrade. Otherwise the ice cores we
have been collecting will ‘forget’ their past (if they melt) or distort
their d 18-Oxygen information when analysts back home put them
to the isotope test in the refrigerated laboratories of climatological
research centres, be it in Stockholm, Copenhagen, Utrecht or
Grenoble.
So begin some notes made as a participant observer during the
Swedish Antarctic Research Programme (SWEDARP) in the austral
summer polar research season of 1997 / 98. The expedition landed on
the sea-ice off the west coast of East Antarctica by the Weddell Sea far
below the southern tip of Africa in mid-December 1997 and left again
from the ice shelf near the same spot towards the end of February
1998. By that time we had collected three-and-a-half tons of ice cores.
Since the thermostat and motor on our sledge-borne freezer container
had become unreliable this valuable cargo was moved and loaded
before anything else, ferried by helicopter over to the ship for imme-
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diate storage in a sturdier freezer. Then seven days sailing over stormy
seas northward back to Cape Town, whereafter we took a plane, while
the ice cores were transferred to another ship headed for Bremen, and
thence to Stockholm for re-distribution to a number of European
research centers. Considering the accumulating cost incurred it is no
exaggeration to say that upon reaching its destinations the ice cargo
was in fact worth half its price per gram in gold.
     In order to convey some of the problems and tensions arising in an
Antarctic expedition the present essay takes extracts (in written style)
of reports from the field sent to the homepage of the Swedish Polar
Research Secretariat, and interlaces these into the present account. The
purpose is to sketch a few local epistemological, historical and geopo-
litical co-ordinates pertinent to international research on global
climate change.
In Search of a Site for EPICA
The occasion for champagne in our natural ice chamber at the drilling
site on Amundsenisen’s high polar cap plateau January 1998 was to
celebrate the ice drill just having taken up a core from 100 meters
below the surface. One hundred meters here touches strata of annual-
ly accumulated snowfalls (precipitation) from 600 to 700 years ago.
This is the age of the ice with which we spiked our precious drink that
day. Before we were finished we would be breaking into the previous
millennium, in as far as we finally stopped at 135 metres (equivalent to
ca. 1,100 A. D.). Our location, baptised ‘Camp Victoria’ (after the
Swedish Crown Princess), was 76˚ 00’ S, 8˚ 03’ W, i. e., deep into the
interior of the territory called Dronning Maud Land (DML).
     Much of the rationale for the Swedish expedition 1997 / 98 is related
to the problem of global warming. The ice coring operation in particu-
lar is a contribution to a European project funded by the EC and
co-ordinated through the European Science Foundation, viz., the
European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA). EPICA is
one of the success stories when it comes to placing Europe on the
world scientific map (paleoclimatology) in competition with the US
and Japanese. Our own operation in DML was only one of several
pre-site surveys (Holmlund 1998: 37–45; Näslund 1998). A multina-
tional team of ten persons was despatched from the Swedish base
Wasa near the coast, through a broad string of jagged nunataks
(mountain peaks sticking up through the ice cap) to Amundsenisen. It
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included Swedes, a Dutchman and Norwegians. A separate Dutch
project with two other researchers and a technician stayed partway, at
the little Swedish summer station Svea in the Heimefrontfjella moun-
tain range, to study meteorological factors pertinent to climate change
(Bintanja 1995 and 1999).
     24 Dec: One of the Hägglund tracked vehicles broke down on the
way back from Svea to Wasa and had to be dragged / by the other /
on a sledge. It was a broken axle that caused the mishap out in the
field on Christmas Eve.
     26 Dec: The big question today is whether or not we can start
the EPICA traverse earlier. The warm weather has put a stop to
drilling / in the blue ice area / at Scharfenbergsbottnen.
     29 Dec: The work with organising the earlier departure for Svea
and then onto the traverse on Amundsenisen is progressing smoothly.
Today much of it has revolved around digging out and repairing
a sleigh, fixing the windows and interior of an old living module
that had filled with hard-packed snow, getting fuel needs sorted
out for different legs of the trip, etc. Different functions in an expe-
dition, scientific, logistical, medical, and finally, minimising the
immediate environmental impact of our own presence on this
continent – tend to pull in different directions. A clear-cut differ-
entiation and definition of tasks and responsibilities is essential in
this respect … Per Holmlund is continuing with the debugging of
the radio echo equipment … After the delays in ice coring due to
warm temperatures in the air / at Svea / now new problems have
cropped up; technical difficulties with the drill requiring contact
with Robert Mulvaney who is with the Halley (British Antarctic
Survey) group that will be doing coring slightly south of our own
EPICA-effort. Mulvaney has been involved with the redesign of
the drill that is being used, and hopefully he can provide some
advice on the current situation.
In addition our expedition included environmental impact studies
carried out by the Environmental Officer, who also remained at Svea,
together with a photographer. British and German-led expeditions
had further teams simultaneously working, respectively, at angles one
degree of latitude south and one degree north of us, carrying out
similar pre-site surveys. The eventual outcome of all these efforts were
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later subjected to scientific and logistical evaluations in order to
determine where to situate a second leg of EPICA with deep-drilling
down to 2 km starting in the year 2001.
     The first leg of EPICA, at Dome Concordia (Dome C) far into the
interior above the French station Dumont d’Urville is already into its
third year. The climatic conditions at the two sites, Dome C and the
future DML differ from each other. Dome C has less precipitation
while DML receives more snow and hopefully will reveal important
information about the ‘signal’ from changing past conditions over the
Southern Atlantic. The latter is significant in discussions on changing
ocean circulation regimes, coupling between northern and southern
hemispheres, and the recent re-constructions of rapid climate change
events at tail end of glacial periods (for a presentation of EPICA cf.
Elzinga / Krueck 1999).
Epistemology: The Life and Purpose of Ice Cores
in Shaping Climate Scenarios
Ice coring in Antarctica has had a dramatic impact on discussions
regarding an enhanced greenhouse effect and uncertainty in projec-
tions of human-caused climate warming (cf. Street-Perrot / Robert
1994: 47–68; Graedel / Crutzen 1993: 223–229). This was especially
after Claude Lorius and his French and Russian colleagues at the
former Soviet research station Vostok in a most inaccessible place
deep in the heart of Antarctica drilled a couple of kilometres into the
icecap to bring up part of a “natural archive” (Lorius et al. 1985).
Using ice of different ages, temperature trends can be built up. The
now famous Vostok core was used to reconstruct a 160,000-year
history of temperature variation, including a complete interglacial-gla-
cial cycle (Jouzel et al. 1987; Legrand et al. 1988).
     In their analysis the scientists claimed to ‘see’ warm temperatures
in the interglacial period, about 120–130,000 years ago, and in the
present interglacial of the past 10,000 years. Between these two
periods, it is claimed, temperatures were more than 6˚ C colder than
those experienced today. The analysis also points to temperature
fluctuations in tandem with changes in volumes of greenhouse gases,
CO and methane, in trapped air over a period of 160,000 years. CO2 2
content was found to be higher in interglacial periods, averaging
around 260–280 parts per million (ppm), and lower during glacial
184
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 181-211) T01_07 elzinga.p 286938514598
Making Ice Talk
times, averaging 190–200 ppm, and as low as 180 ppm. Note that it is
now over 350 ppm. The methane content was 0.35 ppm during the
glacial maximum, and about 0.65 ppm during the last 10,000 years
until the nineteenth century. Now it is 1.7 ppm. Lorius et al. also did a
climate sensitivity analysis and argued that the responsiveness of the
climate system to the heat-trapping character of the greenhouse gases
of the atmosphere is high (Lorius et al. 1990). They attributed about
5˚ C temperature difference between the last ice age and the intergla-
cial period to the heat-trapping of greenhouse gases, and the rest to
changes due to other causes. Furthermore they believe that the
switches between ice ages and interglacials may have been triggered by
the weak orbital variations (of the Earth around the Sun) and ampli-
fied by changes in greenhouse-gas concentrations.
     Ice cores were thus enrolled as witnesses to tell us why we humans
should be concerned about the enhanced greenhouse effect. In the late
1980s this spurred further deep drilling by several countries, and gave
other ice coring efforts in Antarctica, including EPICA, considerable
impetus.
     Important studies of the transition from firn to ice in Antarctica
were already made in the early 1950s by members of the Norwegian-
British-Swedish Expedition who were the pioneers in DML (cf.
below). At relatively shallow levels down to 60–80 m. the snow is
consolidated as ‘firn,’ which is still porous, so that younger air seeps in
from above. Below this, when the firn is further compressed and turns
to pure ice the pores close, finally trapping the air. Therefore the
trapped air to be analysed for greenhouse-gas and other telltale traces
is younger than the ice that encloses it. Traditionally it has been
assumed that in lengthy records the difference in age between the air
and the ice that encloses it is not significant in constructing trends.
     For mid- and high-latitude precipitation and mean annual tempera-
ture in polar regions there has thus been a simple formula according to
which d 18-O regularly decreases by 1 per mil every time the temper-
ature drops by 1.5˚ C when going across the ice-field, e. g.,
fromcoastal toCentral Greenland.This relation has been used as a paleo-
thermometer to translate information on changing 18-O isotope ratios
at different depths into variations of temperature over time. Now the
formula has been found to collapse for short periods of apparent rapid
climate change recorded in the ‘natural archive’ of the Greenland ice
sheet. As yet this has not affected interpretations of the Antarctic ice
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archive which appears to be less affected by seasonality, but it does
call for caution in conceptual reconstructions of key correlations.
     Recently, then, interpretative flexibility in the calibration of paleo-
thermometers used to probe the ice record has become the subject of
some discussion amongst leading scientists. This is in connection with
the new problems thrown up by the apparent rapid fluctuations
(so-called Dansgaard-Oerschger events after their ‘discoverers’) in
ancient climates at crucial times in transitions from ice age to warmer
interglacial periods. The last twenty years’ traditional assumptions of
fairly simple linear correlations between deuterium and oxygen-18
isotope ratios and atmospheric temperatures near polar plateaus at
times of past precipitation are in cases of abrupt climate change being
revised. To make sense of thermal anomalies, isotopic analysis of other
gases (in this case 15N / 14N and 40Ar / 36Ar ratios) are now brought
into play in much more sophisticated calculations that take into
account differences between the age of the trapped air bubbles and the
age of the surrounding ice matrix containing them.
     Jean Jouzel, who currently heads the overall organisation of
EPICA, summarises:
In using this / the aforementioned traditional / relation as a paleothermometer,
researchers have assumed that the present-day spatial relation does not change
with time; that is, spatial and temporal slopes are assumed to be similar. Simple
models show that this assumption holds only if such factors as the evaporative
origin and the seasonality of precipitation remain unchanged between different
climates, which is not at all guaranteed. These limitations have long been
recognised and examined through simple and complex isotopic models (Jou-
zel 1999: 910).
Surprisingly the more sophisticated analysis also seems to lend itself to
what may be rhetorical overtones in a debate regarding the relative
neglect of climatological studies that have a different geopolitical
frame of reference. In concluding his review of the revised analysis of
events punctuating the glacial period 14,650 years ago, and the rapid
onset of warming, Jouzel says, “this finding constitutes a break-
through which will be extremely useful for deciphering mechanisms
of abrupt climate changes and already suggests a North Atlantic rather
than a tropical trigger for the climate event” (Jouzel 1999: 911).
     There is much here to warrant a closer study of the social episte-
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mology of paleothermometry in European laboratories. However that
is not the purpose of the present account. Instead I want to home in
on the study of life in the (ice-)field, the stage before the laboratory
and gas analysis. It is the stage in which ice goes over from having
been a facet of nature in its own-right to becoming an object-for-us,
to be interrogated by humans, i. e. as ice-‘core.’ In as far as it is force-
fully pulled up in cylindrical lengths of a given diameter, the ‘recov-
ery’ as it is called – of the ice core – is essentially a human effort,
depending for its success on costly logistics. It is also constrained in
practice in the field by attention to factors both of human safety and
environmental protection.
Life in the (Ice-)Field
While our expedition was meant to facilitate a future probe of the
time-scale by which ice ages are measured, time-wise we ourselves
were also situated at the front end of a long chain of complicated
scientific events and processes (Sigg et al. 1994). The task of the team
was to bring up ice cores, to coax and transport the objects to be
interrogated to the laboratories back home. In this context ice is far
from being a passive or malleable entity; it is capricious and puts up
plenty of resistance. Lots of things ‘go wrong’ in the field; trial and
error is a prevalent factor in many different dimensions of an expedi-
tion.
     Other programmes inserted in an expedition also vie for due time
promised participants, sometimes in bilateral agreements with groups
of scientists in other countries, which may cut into time or create
haste for the coring operation. The constraints, both natural and
human are many.
     Work in the field precedes the complicated process whereby
chemical analysis of ice samples and air trapped in bubbles in the
Antarctic ice is used to reconstruct past climate trends on our planet.
Glaciological field-work is only one facet of climate-related research
that takes place in the world today. It is time consuming, sometimes
adventurous, and less visible than the more dramatic statements made
by the gas analysts or computer modelers. But the trend analysts for
their work need the materials that the humbler field workers make
available. It is the stuff from which ultimately are constructed proxy
accounts of parallel changes in atmospheric temperature and green-
house gases as represented in elegant graphs published by leading
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scientific periodicals. By itself ours was not the kind of laboratory
work that results in agenda-setting papers in Nature or Science; it only
linked into these via the more sophisticated analysis back home.
     On the other hand an expedition is no longer what it used to be in
the old days. High tech has also made its entry in the field, with the
domination of logistics now by sophisticated artificial life support
systems on which the Antarctic researcher must rely. For example,
there are no longer any dogs around, they are prohibited as an envi-
ronmental hazard factor on Antarctica because they may infect seals
with a contagious disease. Transportation instead involves light
snowmobiles that can draw sledges, but also much heavier track
vehicles than the old wartime weasels. Base stations are modern,
sometimes with solar panels to generate electricity. Helicopters are the
rule, and regular contact may be maintained with neighbouring sta-
tions by scheduled radio transmissions, and with persons and agencies
back home via both satellite telephone and e-mail. Some of the rugged
edge nevertheless remains, making fieldwork quite different from
laboratory life.
     In the history of southern polar science the development of new
technologies has always played a key role, as have economic and
political interests. These contingencies carry institutional motives
(Elzinga / Bohlin 1993). Today overt economic motives relating to
resource exploitation have been pressed back by monitoring of the
environment and efforts to tease out anthropogenic from natural
factors of climate change. At the same time national prestige and
politics as motive factors remain and receive considerable play in the
formation of Antarctic research agendas. To appreciate this and other
contextual aspects it becomes relevant to consider some historical
background.
Science as Politics and Politics as Science in the AT-Regime
The Antarctic continent is roughly the size of the US and Mexico
taken together. Extremely inhospitable for human habitation, the
continent has not witnessed the regular kind of colonisation whereby
Western nations gained a foothold elsewhere on the globe. As a rule a
group of humans wanting to spend some time there have to bring with
them their own artificial life support system. Except for certain coastal
regions where some explorers have managed to survive in primitive
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stone huts and used seals and penguins for meat, fire and lighting the
wicks of their oil lamps, everything needed to keep alive and move
about has to be brought in from afar.
     30 Dec: Packing is the big issue today, with departure on New
Years day creeping ever closer. Per’s scientific equipment in five or
six boxes of varying sizes does not take up as much room compared
to all the other stuff needed to support our presence and movement
on and across the vast rigorous icy stretches. Antarctica is a craving
continent. It levels out everything before it, reducing to a common
denominator of cold and sluggishness. Water freezes, metal cracks,
bodies and machines slow down and strain. Counteracting this
requires lots and lots of energy, in various forms. Ninety eight
percent of this has to be brought in from other continents: solar
electricity from our solar panels on the house and sledge-based
living modules is an important exception … Packing just now for
the three-week EPICA-effort in the interior has involved loading
and securing: heavy equipment, spare parts, 2 snowmobiles with
small sledges, 390 kg liquified petroleum gas for various heating
needs, 30 barrels of diesel fuel (200 kg / barrel) for the two Hägg-
lund vehicles (to be replenished by 10 further barrels during
stopover at the Svea station), and 10 gasoline drums for the snow-
mobiles. In addition to this go 8 barrels of diesel fuel for the Icelan-
dic jeeps / i. e., oversized Toyota Cruisers with huge deflatable tires
to increase traction in loose snow; this was the first time these were
tested these as terrain-going vehicles in Antarctica.
     Quality also counts in producing heat and converting energy
under extreme circumstances (jet A-1 fuel for -50 degrees C, Arctic
diesel for down to -35 or -40, and environmental diesel fuel when
the atmospheric temperature is above -20 degrees; all this has to be
planned to fit changing conditions during different legs of the
EPICA-effort).
During the optimistic 1950s there were visions of setting up mining
settlements inside the ice, lit by electricity coming from nuclear
reactors. However such scenarios never got beyond the free fantasies
of science fiction and popular mechanics magazines.
     Under the circumstances science became a surrogate for colonisa-
tion. The Antarctic Treaty (AT) statutes stipulate that in order to join
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in and have a right of presence a country has to display substantial
research in the region. This used to be interpreted as meaning that one
had to establish and maintain a research station. In recent times
however it has been enough to rent facilities (e. g., the Polish station
Arctowsky, after the collapse of the Cold War when hard currency
was needed) or conduct good quality marine research off ships in the
coastal waters. The Swedish station established in the late 1980s was
directly motivated by the desire to enter the Antarctic Club before
1991 when the Treaty was up for possible revision and – it was
anticipated – the door might be shut, thereby excluding potential new
members.
     Science is thus the vehicle whereby nations manifest their presence
and their right to participate in the management of Antarctic affairs at
a supra-national level. The AT is a viable regime outside the UN-sys-
1tem. Although it has been contested both by Third World countries
and NGOs, the Treaty has hitherto stood the test of time and periodic
turbulence especially in the wake of the oil crisis of the 1970s, when
several Third World nations were taken on board. This helped break
up the compact Western colonial configuration, while taking some of
the sting out of the opposition. Within the framework of the AT
science has a dual role; apart from importance in its own right in
advancing knowledge, science has symbolic clout in a geopolitical
arena, therewith serving a continuation of politics by other means
(Elzinga 1993).
     As already indicated, the accent during the past ten years has come
to lie on environment and environmental protection. Since 1991 there
is a special Environmental Protocol which is linked to the Antarctic
Treaty. It placed a moratorium on all minerals exploitation for fifty
years, and specific rules have been worked out to govern Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment procedures to which all activities – with science
and tourism as most prominent – in Antarctica have to be subjected.
Ultimate responsibility for living up to these rules remains with
national authorities in the countries from which expeditions originate,
and there is no supranational controlling body. Observance of the
principles laid down is voluntary; peer pressures and a system of
mutual inspection play an important role.
     One of the key concepts is ‘minor and transitory impact.’ This
draws a line of demarcation between projects that do not need further
ex ante impact assessment (i. e., projects that are expected to give less
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than minor or transitory impacts), and those (anticipating more than
minor or transitory impact) that do require more thorough or com-
prehensive evaluations before being approved. Here exists a lot of
interpretative flexibility – what is minor, and what is transitory
impact? Another question is, what about cumulative effects of human
activities in Antarctica? This is another domain where conflict and
tensions may emerge during the course of an expedition.
     30 Dec continued: Finally, security of life and limb of all individuals
plays in; therefore on top of it all we carry 8 barrels of helicopter
fuel – which we hope we don’t need to use – for possible emergency
medical and rescue operations. Foresight, indeed, has many dimen-
sions, all of which become amplified under Antarctic conditions.
     Our doctor, Krister Ekblad led the packing of food for people:
roughly 600 portions of 1 kg food and drink per person per day for
three weeks, plus an extra week thrown in ‘just in case.’ We have to
plan for an average intake, he says, of 4,000–5,000 calories / person /
day, which is about double the normal consumption even for a
hard working person back home. His explanation is that we must
make provisions to burn at least 2,000 / person / day extra to beat
the cold, which drains us of our heat.
     Some of what we are leaving in the glacier down the hill from
the base station, stached away in a crevasse provided by mother
Nature; the crevasse has now been recruited as an ‘actant.’
     For the participant observer such conflicts and tensions can also
be used to explore the dynamics of research in the field. Here four
aspects stand out in the identification and assessment of environ-
mental impacts, or risk calculation: (1) cultural variability due to
researchers’ affiliation with different scientific disciplines (variation
over disciplines like geology, glaciology, biology, atmospheric phys-
ics, etc.); (2) task differentiation within, say, an expedition (function-
al differentiation: researcher, construction worker, mechanic,
helicopter pilot, doctor, driver, logistics and environmental officers,
etc.); (3) generational differences, with younger researchers on the
average attributing relatively greater importance to environmental
ambitions; (4) what country a researcher comes from, in as far as
this may bring in differences in the entrenchment of environmental
consciousness in the cultures of different countries (cultural varia-
tion between countries) (Elzinga 1999 and 1998). The last point
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opens up for new tensions, also at the policy level between countries
that are party to the Antarctic Treaty.
     2 Jan: Good news was that the faulty bearing in the ice coring
drill was reparable. Tomas filed and polished it, and with Freyr’s
help got the expensive sophisticated machine back onto its legs. This
was crucial since the success of the EPICA-traverse hinges largely
on this piece of equipment which is Dutch-owned but shared for
mutual scientific benefit in a European context. The second day of
the year ended with a late (midnite chili con carne and pasta)
dinner for 14 hungry persons … Since meat was solidly frozen it
had to be hacked into small pieces. Here a large knife and a crow
bar were useful instruments.
Historical: Seven Pie-Like Sectors
Seven countries historically claim the right to have a special position
in that they at various times put forward and documented territorial
claims. That is why some maps of Antarctica show a series of pie-like
sectors, all but one of which meet at a common point at the geograph-
ic South Pole. (The Norwegian slice does not go all the way down to
the Pole, since this would give precedence to a sectoral definition that
other countries like the former USSR might have used to substantiate
their claim to Spitsbergen in the northern hemisphere). The text of the
AT neither recognises nor denies these national claims. Thus it
provides a modus vivendi where the use of the continent foregrounds
science and other peaceful activities.
     The Norwegians for their part base their claim to DML on Antarc-
tic exploration during their period of prowess as a whaling nation. In
the 1920s when the price of oil was rising, Britain was fearful of the
depletion of whales in her sector and refused to issue further permits
in the Falklands Dependency regions where most whales were hunted
1904–1914. Norwegians developed new technology, which allowed
them to process whale meat entirely offshore on ships at sea (so-called
2pelagic whaling). Thus they neither needed to pay tax to the British,
nor subject to controls. They also looked for and opened new hunting
grounds. The southern ends of the Atlantic and Indian oceans, just off
the Antarctic coastal ice, were found to be particularly rich regions. In
the course of these activities the dominant Norwegian firm, led by
Lars Christensen, also sponsored survey mapping of the coastline and
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inland (e. g., Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen 1929 / 30; Viggo Wideröe 1936 / 37;
cf. Bogen 1957).
     In all Christensen financed no less than nine Norwegian Antarctic
Expeditions from 1927 to 1937; in his own report he points to three
of these as yielding important scientific contributions (Christensen
1938). Using the newly available technique of airplanes and aerial
photography a lot of territory was covered, revealing interesting new
features. Christensen himself notes a feature that could fascinate any-
one interested in the coming and going of ice ages: on Ingrid Christen-
sen Land (named after his wife),
A curious phenomenon in the mountains on this part of the coast was a great
quantity of small fresh water lakes up in the mountains, quite open and with-
out a sign of ice on the water or around the edges of them (Christensen 1938:
9).
Oceanographic, meteorological and biological studies were also pro-
moted, mostly in the interest of the whaling industry, but also of
interest to scientists more generally. The Norwegian Whaler’s Insur-
ance Association used the material to produce comprehensive maps of
the coastline. As empirical benchmarks in historical time some of the
results of these studies are still of value today, including for computer
simulation modeling, when comparing changes in the annual extent of
sea ice in connection climate research.
     When it comes to the emphasis on climate research there are
further historical events that deserve attention in the present account.
It is interesting here to highlight an often forgotten historical line
from the situation sixty and fifty years ago to the efforts we see today,
at least in DML. Indeed, the question of climate change was already
being addressed the first time the interior of Dronning Maud Land
was mapped. This is something that has fallen into obscurity and is
worth recalling today when the term ‘global warming’ is on so many
lips.
From Neu-Schwabenland to Dronning Maud Land:
Norway Beats Germany
On many Antarctic maps one will find the name Neu-Schwabenland.
This is in honour of the catapult ship used by a German expedition to
Antarctica 1938 / 39. To this day the names of the the expedition leader
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Ritscher, the ship’s captain Kottas and the two Lufthansa pilots, their
flying boats, as well as a number of other older German names are still
attached to some prominent features of the map of the larger territory
called Dronning Maud Land.
     Presently the German Neuymayer research station is also located
on the coast in this area, while the former DDR station Georg Foster
is now dismantled. During the past couple of decades German re-
searchers have added a layer of new names to commemorate colleagues
and modern sponsors, although East Germans came to reject the older
names introduced by Ritscher’s expedition, preferring the later Nor-
wegian names. Naming in Antarctica can be a rather political business,
even out in the field. For example, even today names attached to new
sites are carefully chosen to signal honorific deference in scientific or
political credibility cycles, or simply in the hope of enhancing future
funding opportunities from research councils and enrolling private
sponsors.
     When German aviation ultimately returned to the area in the
1983 / 84 season with ski-equipped aircraft it was during the third
post-IGY (International Geophysical Year) expedition. Even then the
German pre-war expedition was a significant marker in geographical
space and time.
     The Schwabenland expedition in January / February 1939 carried
out what at that time was to be the most systematic and extensive
aerial photogrammetry yet undertaken anywhere. This expedition, led
by Captain Alfred Ritscher, made use of a catapult ship Schwabenland
which belonged to Deutsche Lufthansa. Previously it was stationed in
the Azores as a landing and servicing platform for flying boats of a
Dornier-Wal type on the German airmail route between Europe and
3South America. Two of these planes, together with their veteran
Lufthansa postal route pilots (who were used to landing in choppy
waters) were taken along – the planes could be catapulted off the ship
to reach flying speed in a matter of a few seconds, and after complet-
ing their mission they could be scooped up out of the sea with the
help of a crane. This technology, never tried in the Antarctic before,
was fairly successful, helped by the luck of good weather.
     The German Antarctic Expedition 1938 / 39 was not only or prima-
rily concerned with science. Its origins lay with Nazi-Germany’s Big
Power intent to participate in the continued division of Antarctica
into spheres of interest and to secure German whaler’s interests whose
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oil production was important for both industry and an expansive
military machine on the brink of starting a second world war. Thus it
was not only a matter of mapping the region, but also to lay the basis
for claims to sovereignty, which was not at all unusual – several other
countries, including the US, had been doing the same thing. In this
particular area however it was only Norway that was the contender.
     In order to substantiate possible sovereignty claims and annexation
the German planes on their reconnaissance missions were also given
the task of throwing out small javelins which stuck into the ice sheet
below – this trick had been tested in the Alps. The metal arrows had
small zwastikas in their tails, insignia to mark the nationality of the
claim. These were supposed to be hurled down every 30 km along
4lines criss-crossing in a broad grid to mark out the territory. There
was no time to waste because it was well known that Norway also
intended to lay claim to the same territory.
     As it turned out the Norwegians, through their own intelligence
sources in Berlin were already alerted to the secret German expedition
that left Hamburg late 1938. Consequently their monarch proclaimed
sovereignty over a still larger portion of this previously unclaimed
territory. It is eight times the size of Norway itself, stretched on both
sides of the zero meridian from 20˚ W to 45˚ E, and is named Dronn-
ing Maud Land in honour of the Norwegian queen at that time. The
date was 14 January 1939, just five days before the Schwabenland
reached the ice-edge of the Antarctic coast.
Glaciology from the Air: Oases in a Desert of Ice?
The scientific or technical content of the German effort using photo
mapping as a basis to lay a claim to a large slice of Antarctica was
more successful than the underlying political objective. In the span of
fifteen days seven sorties were made over the Antarctic ice sheet and
coastal mountain ranges to cover a large geometric grid. A vast
number of aerial photographs were taken, useful for stereoscopic
analysis and subsequent mapping, reaching into the interior as far as
5800 km south of the coast (to ca 74˚ S lat.) (Ritscher 1942).
     Scientists who were aware of this work during or shortly after the
Second World War were impressed. For example, the Swedish geolo-
gist J.G. Andersson who had been in Antarctica at the turn of the
century wrote in 1945:
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The cartographic result of these seven inland flights was simply unique. An
until then completely unknown sector of the Antarctic coastline between 11.5˚
W lat. and 20˚ E lat., as well as the interior terrain to a breadth of 300 km had
been mapped in a way that signified a great advance for knowledge of the
6South Pole continent (Andersson 1945: 416).
The only trouble was that this airborne mapping was unconnected
to ground surveys that could have provided astronomical positioning
as triangular points, so-called ‘ground truth.’ Thus the maps hung in
the air as it were. Estimates of elevation above sea-level of nunatak
peaks had been grossly exaggerated, usually being out by 1,000 m.,
and the elevation (above sea level) ascribed to the polar plateau was
1,500 m. too high. Excepting a few features, later ground expeditions
found it impossible to connect landmarks they saw to the photo-
7grammetric maps. Consequently a lot of the German names were
later rejected by the Norwegians when they produced new maps over
the region in the 1950s. It was not until 1986 that some understanding
was gained of the German maps. This was in a Ph. D. thesis whose
author used maps from the Maudheim expedition and recent satellite
images to reset the aircraft position from which each of the German
photographs was taken (Brunk 1986; cf. Swithenbank 1999: 233, note
4).
     3–4 Jan: After a late awakening to recoup our energies, the wagon
train took off at 1 PM, preceded by Lars and Mart on snowmobiles
to reconnaissance the leads; they were followed by the two Icelan-
dic jeeps. The SANAE people / from the South African station / indi-
cated they would come by, so Pelle stayed behind waiting to be
picked up by helicopter to guide our guests to the field – this would
also give him a chance to check the tricky Kibergdalen pass from
the air … The German Schwabenland aerial surveys in the late
thirties apparently did not reach south of Kirwangweggen (which
had been called Neumayer Steilwand). Heimefrontfjella became an
important discovery for the Norwegians, who attached the names
of their freedom fighters and leaders of the anti-nazi resistance and
clandestine guerilla operations (‘Heimefront’) to mountain peaks,
nunataks and valleys here. Geography and cartography can be
very political. Now even the maps compiled by the Institut für
Angewandte Geodäsie in Frankfurt / Main uses names like XU-fjella,
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KK-dalen (wartime code names of the resistance), Pionerflaket, or
Mathiesenskaget just to our left in Sivorgsfjella.
     … Tomorrow comes the struggle up to it, up the slope and past
the crevasses (50–100 metres deep) which close in from both sides
leaving only a small safe passage (ca 100 metres broad) between
Sivorgsfjella and Tottanfjella. Getting stuck in a crevasse is not
only dangerous, it would also probably delay us a whole day with
unloading, salvaging, reloading and rerouting through a new lead.
The Ritscher-report nevertheless had repercussions that were to be
8significant for post-war climatologists.
     One who perused the Ritscher-report in detail was Hans W:son
Ahlman, the Swedish glaciologist, professor at Stockholm University
until 1950 and thereafter Swedish ambassador to Norway. Ahlman
was particularly interested in the small snow and ice free areas he saw,
like islands in an alpine type mountain landscape 300–400 km from
the coast. Much of his life he had studied glacier retreat in the Arctic.
The question now was whether these ‘oases’, as he called them,
represented a similar trend in the southern hemisphere, in which case
one had to do with a ‘global’ climate change, past or present. He wrote:
As far as I am aware, these conditions are the first more certain indications in
interior Antarctica of a relatively late warm period, even if one does not know
the chronology. However there is nothing that tells against the assumption
that it constitutes something similar to the post-glacial warm period on other
parts of the globe (Ahlman 1944: 651).
In a later paper on the subject he wrote:
As far as I know, there is no other area on the earth where one can find, as one
does here / in the Schwabenland photographic data / local glaciers in the domain
of inland ice, sensitive and reacting to the climatic factors that determine their
destiny (Ahlman 1948: 247).
[And,] it is possible here to get an answer to the question whether or not the
recent history of glaciers and climate, and therewith climate fluctuations, also
include the Antarctic (Ahlman 1948: 249);
in other words, whether or not the ‘fluctuations’ are global.
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NBSX and the Issue of Global Climate Change as Perceived 1948
The pictures taken by the Schwabenland expedition and its accompa-
nying report inspired Ahlman to work towards organising an Antarc-
tic expedition in hopes of gaining first hand knowledge of the area and
to determine whether or not the glaciers there were waning. He was
interested in making the ice talk at close range.
     The ultimate outcome of his efforts was the Norwegian-British-
Swedish Expedition of 1949–1951, also called the Maudheim expedi-
tion, and sometimes NBSX. He worked intensively and lobbied
leading scientists and politicians for four years to get it launched. It
was his last great project, predicated on the belief that there might be
global characteristics of the climate warming problem (at the time it
was referred to as climate improvement) (Kirwan et al. 1949: 11–13;
Ahlman 1948). It was largely Norwegian financed but included
fourteen men from five nations in the overwintering party. At the time
it was recognized as “representing an entirely new venture in interna-
tional scientific co-operation” (Cambridge News 14 Feb 1949; Illing-
worth 1949). Later it was referred to as a precursor and exemplar for
the International Geophysical Year 1957 / 58 (Crary 1962, cited in
Swithenbank 1999: 227), which in turn lay the groundwork for a
viable vehicle for a supra-national regime, the AT, in which science
makes up much of the glue (cf. above).
     The speculation regarding snow and ice-free oases with lakes in a
desert of ice was used to interest a wider public and in fund raising for
the NBSX. This led to amplification in the daily press, where there
was talk of a long lost civilisation in the Antarctic (Stockholms
Tidning 6 Dec 1948). Some papers referred to an ‘Antarctic Shangri
La’, and the ‘oasis mystery’. A Minnesota newspaper is reported to
have picked up a Times of London interview with a member of the
organizing committee L.P. Kirwan and credited him with the discov-
9ery of Beduin encampments, date palms and camels at the South Pole.
     6 Jan: The interesting thing with the landscape under the ice in this
region is that it tells us something about the origins of the ice many
millions of years ago … What we see on the radar screen is a land-
scape that has lain there deep-frozen and undisturbed for more
than 10 million years … When we turn back to where the wagon-
train is we find that it has come to halt – one of the Hägglund
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track-vehicles has a gearbox ceased up … After much discussion
two of party of ten were sent back to Wasa to fetch spare parts, 600
km altogether, there and back again by snowmobile … An ad-
vance party of five was sent on with the jeeps to the drill site at 76˚
S, 8˚ W to start getting up smaller cores of firn, so as not to lose too
much time.
     7 Jan: Work with replacing the gearbox in the axle done and the
train got on its way again by 7 PM.
     15 Jan: Different tasks proceeded largely according to plan. An
attempt to obtain a 20 metre firn core however almost cost us the
smaller drill when it got stuck at the infamous risk zone at 16
metres. Antifreeze sloshed in the hole and a strong crane on the
track vehicle saved the day … The larger drill reached down to
111 metres, but the big event was passing the 100 m. mark on the
14th, which was celebrated with champagne.
The theory of a retreating polar ice cap due to global warming was
picked up by many writers at the time, and seems to have influenced
others with an Antarctic science ambition. Finn Ronne, for example,
the leader of a privately sponsored expedition to Graham Land
1947–1948, in his book Antarctic Conquest (1949) states boldly:
The retreat of the ice that they / Darlington and Latady flying over George VI
Sound 1947 /, and which I already observed in our local glacier, we found
characteristic wherever we went. A similar shrinkage of glaciers and ice barri-
ers has been noticed in the Arctic, which points to a gradual warming of the
earth’s climate. If this process ever gets to the point of melting the Green-
land and Antarctic icecaps completely, the water thus released will so raise the
sea level that all the world’s seaports will have to move miles inland. However,
since such changes would take hundreds of thousands of years, it’s nothing for
us to worry about (Ronne 1949: 67).
It should be added here that Graham Land is the British name for part
of the Antarctic Peninsula facing South America. It is a region in the
close vicinity of oceans and therefore more sensitive to recent climatic
fluctuations than are regions in the continental interior. Retreating
glaciers and collapse of parts of ice-shelves around the Peninsula are
an issue of considerable concern today.
     Meteorologists and oceanographers were also taking an interest in
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theories of climatic fluctuations (Wallén 1950). At a scientific meeting
in Copenhagen in Oct 1948, the following resolution was taken:
Having considered a number of lectures on climatic fluctuations the Interna-
tional Council for the Exploration of the Sea recommends that these impor-
tant and far-reaching problems ought to be more closely investigated and that
these investigations might be adequately supported by Governments in dif-
ferent countries (Ahlman 1948: 241).
Not everyone accepted Ahlman’s speculations. One’s disciplinary
affiliation might make a difference. The geologist J.G. Andersson,
already cited, vented his scepticism early on regarding the ‘oasis’-
theory of a polar icecap thaw, or fossil lakes from a past climatic
period. Having studied the same pictures from the Schwabenland
expedition he wrote, in 1945, how the alpine lakes around certain
nunataks like the dramatic Wolhthat-massif can also be interpreted in
a different way.
… the situation tallies well with the notion developed by some southpole
explorers, that in the vicinity of dark cliffs local snow melts and therewith
follows the creation of melt water lakes, which quite naturally often appear to
be ice-covered, perhaps with some holes where the water finds its way under
the ice. Thus I do not think one needs to regard these lakes as fossil lakes as
professor Ahlman has sought to interpret them (Andersson 1945: 436).
Some Results of the Maudheim Expedition 1949 / 52
Ahlman’s original plan had been to have the Maudheim expedition
land near the zero meridian to set up a station on the coast from which
glaciologists and geologists could make their way inland to the dra-
matic areas photographed by the Germans, especially the Wolhthat-
massif. Sea-ice conditions and currents however made this impossible,
and the party ended up quite a bit westerly, at Kap Norvegia on a bay
known to Norwegian whalers. This was early February 1950: The
wintering party were quickly unloaded with all their gear; they were
to spend two full years a ways up on the ice-shelf which was about
200 metres thick, floating on the water, and moving up and down with
the tide like on a hinge.
     The expedition members included meteorologists, glaciologists, a
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dog-handler and a cook, a medical officer, plus the expedition leader
10John Giaever. Inland transportation over the ice sheet was by
Weasels (war-surplus tracked vehicles), and two teams of dogs to pull
sledges, the latter being the mode used for travel furthest into the
interior. It was a challenging time, a multinational group doing re-
search where none had set a foot before them. It was also adventur-
ous, with crevasses, terrible winds and whiteouts. Three members in a
group of four drowned when they got disoriented during a whiteout
near the base-camp Maudheim and inadvertently drove one of the
weasels over the ice-shelf into the cold sea; the fourth was rescued
after spending 11 hours alone on an ice-floe. Another person got a
stone splinter in his eye during geological field work and eventually
had to have his eye removed by amateur surgery in an improvised
operating theatre set up in the base-camp hut, instructed from afar
over the wireless by a medical authority back in Sweden.
     Carbon monoxide poisoning from the exhaust fumes of the engine
on the Canadian Longyear ‘Straitline’ rock drill used for ice coring in
a separate shanty, as well as poor ventilation in the main house almost
got to some of the others. Still at the end of the two years the group
were able to bring out some important results. It was the first time
anyone had drilled and recovered a 100-metre ice core in Antarctica (it
was from the ice-shelf by the wintering base, where most of the time
was spent in core drilling and in examining the cores obtained). As the
senior glaciologist of the expedition, Valter Schytt wrote: “Here was
an opportunity to study for the first time the processes by which snow
is altered to ice in a climatic region where melt water plays no part in
the metamorphosis” (Schytt 1953). Snow density studies, together
with the surveyor’s leveling work and some other parameters were
also used to calculate fairly accurately the depth of the ice in the ice
shelf. The result agreed with the outcome of seismic soundings, which
were used to verify it (the value found was 180–190 metres – cf. also
Robin 1953).
     A profile of the bedrock underneath the ice sheet was made on the
basis of seismic soundings along a 600 km traverse from the coast into
the interior, showing a maximum depth of the ice field in some places
2,600 metres; this was another first (Robin 1956). Finally, Valter
Schytt lay to rest his mentor’s (Ahlman’s) notion of possible glacier
retreat in Antarctica. Charles Swithenbank (1999) discusses what they
saw in the field just after New Year 1951. This was after they had
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reached the nunatak they recognised from the German maps, named
after one of the flying boats.
Passat was made of diorite sill material and it too had a big wind-scoop, but
here the moat held water. There was one lake 20 by 150 metres and it appeared
to be about half a metre deep … clinging to the bedrock surfaces … luxuriant
mats of green, long-haired moss in sheltered spots. Here, we realised was an
Antarctic oasis (Swithenbank 1999: 148).
The lichens clung to the rock right down to the snow-level. Schytt
knew that even in warmer climates lichens might take many decades
to migrate. If the ice surface were retreating then a band of lichen-free
rock would be found an appreciable distance above the snow-level.
Since this was not the case one could infer that there was no glacial
retreat in the region.
     16 Jan: Jon, Aant and Freyr continued to drill small firn cores and
Lars Karlöf began analysing them. Lars is measuring the snow’s
electrical conductivity which varies with the snow’s density and the
origins of the airmass. The seasonal variation in these parameters
can be used to distinguish different years and also the yearly pre-
cipitation. The results he is getting are very interesting. They can
be interpreted in a way that makes ‘our’ site an excellent one for
future deep core drilling since the precipitation is relatively high
and therefore it gives the high time resolution needed to be able to
make good comparative studies with the ice core results from the
inland ice of Greenland.
The next day they went to explore Boreas, named after the other
German flying boat. There it was the same story: lichens and moss in
abundance.
On that morning, in other words, we established the fact that the general
recession of the glaciers in the north had no direct counterpart in the inland ice
of Dronning Maud Land … Not until much later could we also state that the
inland ice itself was not increasing (Swithenbank 1999: 150).
The ice had told its story, and it was a falsification of a hypothesis that
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had already started to get entrenched in some circles and – through
the media – in popular imagination.
     Before the wintering party was taken home by the Norsel in Febru-
ary 1952, some Swedish planes the ship had brought along were used
to do extensive reconnaissance flights into the interior. Thanks to clear
weather they were able to photograph almost half the area previously
covered by the German expedition 12 years earlier. This new aerial
photo-survey, together with ground information and maps made by
the wintering party during their two years of field-work laid the basis
for a revision of maps of the region. The later Norwegian maps threw
out a number of German names since the features of the landmarks to
which they attached could not be identified. This was also the case for
the range of nunataks where the Swedish station Wasa was established
in 1989. The German name Kraul Berge (after the name of the Schwa-
benland’s ice navigator, Otto Kraul) still appears on certain countries’
maps (e. g., a French one), but on the Norwegian map it is called
Vestfjella (Westerly Range), and the Swedes call the nunatak on which
their station is placed, Basen in Vestfjella.
     Coming to DML almost fifty years later in search of a site for
EPICA, our expedition found the same rugged landscape the mem-
bers of the Maudheim expedition had reported. Physical conditions
and landmarks reminded us of their stories. On the other hand we
came with an entirely different artificial life support system, which
meant that some of our logistical and other problems also were differ-
ent.
     16 Jan ctd.: The radar programme has not gone as well so we have
had to make some changes in three respects in hopes of solving our
dilemma – one of these is a huge excavation shaft 2.5 metres deep
near the drill site in order to study the annual snow layers in more
detail.
     18 Jan: (Temperatures by this time were reaching -39˚ C at
night). Packing and ready to get back … Temperature measure-
ments in the drill holes appear to be more complicated than we had
expected … Maybe they reflect irregularities in the snow’s accumu-
lation pattern upstream from the drilling site. This would disqualify
the region for a future deep drilling operation and complicate
interpretation of our own 136 metre long core.
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Concluding Remarks: Constraints and Negotiations
Around Research in the Field
From the field notes one can see that some things have changed and
others remain the same; ‘the ice’ is still a capricious and demanding
partner in the act of research in Antarctica. One has to make constant
improvisations to overcome difficulties put in the way by Nature and
the wear and tear of an expedition.
     Our major setback was the failure of the radar. This triggered a
controversy over responsibility: Was it those in charge of logistics who
should have seen to it that a power generator unit did not produce
disruptive ‘peaks’ in the electrical current serving the radar unit, or lay
the fault with the scientists for not testing the equipment sufficiently
back home, or for failing to define more specific parameters for oper-
ating conditions? The problem was never resolved. It was compensat-
ed in part by falling back on more traditional methods of snow strati-
fication analysis in the field.
     We see here how research in Antarctica is not constrained by
Nature alone. Certainly, if it is too warm during a given period, and
ice core drilling fails because of this, or if instruments break down,
one may have to reschedule / re-negotiate scientific work plans. This
brings into play at least three sides of a triangle of action and reaction
where research activities are constrained by what may be called the
human dimension, played out in logistics, concern for protecting the
environment, as well as health and safety (Elzinga 1998 and 1999).
Within this framework for science in action, strong components of
negotiation reduce degrees of freedom in research work.
     Apart from logistics and human safety, in recent years more and
more emphasis has also been placed on EIA and monitoring. Primary
considerations in the triangle constraining the free play of the re-
searcher in field-work thus pertain to personal safety, the material and
technical conditions of logistical support systems, and today also the
obligation to take into account the impact of what one does to the
environment. Social studies of science here can contribute to deeper
insights into the complex dynamics of the research process. This is
particularly significant when it comes to environmental impact analy-
sis.
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Notes
1 To date 44 nations have agreed to the AT, but only 27 are Con-
sultative Parties (full members), i. e., the ones who actually control
the decision-making process.
2 It has been estimated that from 1905 to 1937 Norway caught
430,935 whales in Antarctic waters (Burke 1994; 30, note 7 to Ch
7).
3 The airline advertised a 4-day Berlin-to-Rio airmail service;
pictures of the catapult system can be found in Burke (1994:
150–156; also see Grieson 1964: 493–498).
4 On the map that was produced, spots with arrows are specially
marked. American, British, South African and German scientists
on later expeditions have used metal detectors to try and find the
arrows, but without success. One story has it that the navigator or
photographer in the plane simply threw out all the arrows in one
spot to get it done with (Robert Headland, Scott Polar Research
Institute, Cambridge – private communication).
5 Ritscher’s entire report consists of two parts, a report of the
expedition and its results, and a selection of illustrations with
commentary in a separate folder; some of the pictures are colour
tainted and paper spectacles with blue and rose tinted mica are
included in the inside cover of the second report, providing the
reader with a stereoscopic gaze. In all 11,600 photographs were
taken, and the ones developed were 18x18 cm. For an early review
see Andersson (1945: 403–420); Fagerholm (1944) also reprints
some of the photographs. Fagerholm notes how aerial photo-
grammetry was spurred by military interests, and very advanced in
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the reconnaisance by Italy prior to the bombing of Abbysinia in
the mid-1930s.
6 Andersson was so impressed by the German effort that he gave a
detailed account of the Schwabenland expedition, both in the first
edition of his book (1945), and again in the second edition (Syd-
polens Hjältar 1954), which is expanded to include a brief account of
the Maudheim expedition. A Norwegian in the early 1940s recog-
nizes the German contributions, but points out that Norwegian
aerial photography had already mapped quite a bit of territory
earlier, and that Norway occupied Dronning Maud Land since
1939 (Aagaard 1944).
7 Moreover they only had the published photographs at their
disposal. Ahlman apparently met with Ritscher after the war, only
to learn that the bulk of the photographic material had been lost,
buried during the war in the ruins of the Deutsche Seewartes
House (National Hydrological Office) in Hamburg (cf. Ahlman
1948: 216).
8 A second volume (Ritscher 1958) was published during the Inter-
national Geophysical Year (IGY) 1957 / 58 with hydrographical,
oceanographic and biological papers, and a substantial intro-
duction by H.P. Kosack who used material from the BNSX
expedition 1949 / 52 to correct several errors and reinterpret some
of the German maps. Kosack later wrote a comprehensive ency-
clopaedic work (Kosack 1967). The Norwegian Bogen criticizes
Kosack from a politico-ideological perspective (Bogen 1957).
9 Reported in New York Herald Tribune 21 April 1949; Christian
Science Monitor in its earlier account 4 April 1949 notes that
Kirwan also envisioned prospects of industry and possible extrac-
tion of mineral resources, including uranium deposits. A later
report by Kirwan appears in Times of London 19 Nov 1949.
10 Giaever’s expedition report is in Norwegian, in book form
(Giaever 1952). It was translated immediately translated into
Swedish (Giaever / Schytt 1952), and then English (Giaever 1954).
Note that the Swedish edition carries the glaciologist Valter
Schytt’s name as co-author. Charles Swithenbank’s recent book
(1999) gives a detailed personal account of the NBSX. He was the
youngest member of the expedition, going as Schytt’s assistant.
Swithenbank’s book, published fifty years after the expedition’s
commencement, has a full list of the scientific publications, and it
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is a mine of much other information concerning the state of the art
research at the time. A broader historical perspective, all too brief
though, may be found in Fogg (1992). It covers early history of
glaciology (pp. 269–274), seismic survey (pp. 264–266), with a
picture of the bottom profile made over Dronning Maud Land,
and it discusses the ice coring to derive climate historic records
(pp. 274–279).
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 Metaphors
Moving Targets in the
(Social) Sciences
Ever since scholarly discourse has concerned itself with metaphors the latter
have been said to toy around with correct meanings and conventionalized
usages. At best, one holds that they have no relation to true knowledge at all
and lets them pass because of their merely decorous role. More often, howev-
er, suspecting the worst, one is afraid of their outright deceptive effects. Thus,
it comes as no surprise that metaphors have been regarded with suspicion and
can be found in the midst of various dualistically structured debates: To
mention but a few, they have been seen as ornamental, yet inessential; educa-
tional, yet lacking genuine insight; as economical carriers of complex meaning,
yet easily misleading. Their structure, their usage, and their function have been
subject to ongoing criticism. Only Max Black’s seminal paper on “Metaphors”
in 1962 endowed the topic with new attraction for both philosophers (of
language) and linguists. Although scholars such as Richards (1936) and Burke
(1941) had liberated metaphors from being a deviant unit of speech and
thought three decades before, it occurred only within a decidedly antipositivist
climate that one took an unbiased stance toward metaphors and investigated
their semantic and pragmatic particularities. From the sixties onward scholars
increasingly were of the opinion that metaphors indeed served important
discursive ends: While explanations and evaluations still vary enormously, ever
few scholars doubt the considerable, if not constitutive power of metaphors.
     Today, the scholarly discourse scrutinizes an impressive amount of struc-
tural and functional issues (cf. the bibliographies by Noppen 1985, Noppen
and Holst 1990), engaging a huge array of disciplines, instigating a bewildering
amount of new questions and theories. This multidimensional discourse on
metaphors does not stop short of science studies. In particular, metaphors
have become interesting for studies in the area of ideological critique; see, for
example, Harrington’s study of holistic science in the Third Reich (Harrington
1995) or Lakoff’s study of conceptual metaphors guiding political attitudes
(Lakoff 1995). The guiding notion is that metaphors, being powerful concep-
tual tools of producing knowledge and world-views, shape (social) scientific
notions as well. This is exactly why most authors are still suspicious of
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metaphors: Ideological effects of metaphors and cognitive operations based on
them just cannot be fully controlled. Only a few authors, however, regard
metaphors as ordinary, yet unfamiliar terms or phrases to which various
discourses connect, and, by using them, shape and reshape meanings of both
the metaphors and themselves. Therefore, a metaphor-view on knowledge
dynamics may highlight the fate of invidual terms and phrases as they meander
through heteregenous discourses, producing locally specific meanings, yet at
times converging on overarching issues, paradigms, or ‘cultural matrices’ (see
Maasen / Weingart 2000). Hence, on this view, they are tools for understanding
interdisplinary communication as well as communication between different
parts of society, such as science, politics, media, economy. Jim Bono will
emphasize their performative function: Metaphors are instruments of thought
and action.
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Why Metaphor? Toward a Metaphorics
of Scientific Practice
James J. Bono
Why metaphor? Despite vigorous attempts in recent years to recuper-
ate metaphor as a subject of or tool for science studies, the question
why one should pay serious attention to metaphor remains a live issue
for many students of science as cultural and social practice. Reasons
for this resistance to metaphor are undoubtedly complex and numer-
ous. Among them, two especially stand out for us. First, metaphor as a
linguistic category seems to pose problems for revisionist historians
and sociologists of science. Wishing to move beyond traditional
positivistic accounts of science, many Anglo-American historians and
sociologists of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s – invoking Kuhn, Feyer-
abend, and Rorty – turned away from preoccupation with scientific
theories as formal propositions, rejecting language-centered models of
science in favor of local analyses of the production of scientific objects
and knowledge. Often they rejected as well views of science as a
‘mirror of nature,’ of language as mere representation, and hence of
words as ‘mimetic’ and ‘corresponding’ to things. Ignoring the degree
to which serious attention to metaphor engages the crisis of represen-
tation and complicates such theories of correspondence, some revi-
sionist practitioners simply brand metaphor as too tainted by the
‘literary’ and ‘abstract’ to touch what really matters about science as a
social and cultural activity. In this view, metaphor is dismissed from
serious deployment as an analytic tool by virtue of its presumed
associations with a rejected past and outmoded methodology (for
background on science studies since Kuhn, cf. Golinski 1998; Hess
1997; Nersessian 1998).
     Second, the turn toward ‘practice’ in science studies has often
meant the exclusion of the metaphoric and most linguistic dimensions
of science from serious consideration as part of the dynamics of
knowledge production and change in science (on the turn toward
‘practice,’ cf. Golinski 1990, 1998; Lenoir 1988; Pickering 1992; Rouse
1996). Despite Foucault’s insistence on language and discourse as
1practices, and on the materiality of such practices , much of Anglo-
American science studies resists any significant role for the metaphor-
ical in science. Rather, metaphor may, at most, find a role as part of
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strategically motivated ‘literary technologies’ aimed at the dissemina-
tion of socially produced scientific knowledge and recruitment of
2networks of loyal disciples.
     What follows is an attempt to outline an emerging metaphorics of
science, one that, I would suggest, confronts the sources of resistance
to metaphor noted above and finds them wanting. Contributing to
this new insistence on the value of metaphor to the social and cultural
analysis of science, is the work of Peter Weingart and Sabine Maasen.
Together, they have much to teach their Anglo-American counter-
parts about overcoming ‘fear’ of metaphor (cf. Maasen 1995). One
response to the resistance to metaphor is disarmingly simple: meta-
phor is everywhere, and cannot be dissociated from the activities
constituting science. As Weingart puts it:
Debates over the permissability of the use of metaphors in science are futile,
since the flow of concepts from everyday language to scientific language, or
generally between different contexts is inevitable. The problem is primarily
which functions and dysfunctions certain metaphors have in a concrete case
(Weingart 1995: 128).
Much as postpositivist history and sociology of science would want to
draw attention away from science as a linguistic activity, Weingart’s
perspective suggests an abundance of empirical example for other,
routine, and indeed ‘everyday’ uses of language in science that do not
threaten to resurrect the positivist ghost of the disembodied scientist
and a purely abstract, intellectual science. Quite to the contrary,
Weingart and Maasen find in metaphors an analytical tool for a robust
sociological account of science as a situated social activity. Central to
their analysis is the function of metaphors as “messengers of meaning”
(Maasen / Weingart 1995), which they have amply and effectively
shown to account for the dissemination of key concepts, and the
reorientation of research programs, across disciplinary and discursive
boundaries (Weingart / Maasen 1997).
     In certain respects, Weingart and Maasen’s insistence on metaphor
as an essential part of science studies’ analytic toolkit complements
other recent academic developments. Nowhere has the sea-change
affecting metaphor been more dramatic than in the field of cognitive
science, especially cognitive linguistics. Moving beyond philosophical-
ly freighted, abstract accounts of knowledge and knowing, cognitive
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studies have unearthed a rich and homely lode of empirical examples
drawn from everyday life suggesting the ubiquity of analogy, schemas,
models, and, most centrally, metaphors to basic cognitive processes
such as categorization, pattern recognition, invention, ‘mental leaps,’
and various aspects of reasoning. For cognitive sciences, metaphor and
language are not abstract symbolic systems laid over experientially
derived knowledge like a thin decorative veneer. Quite to the con-
trary, language – and especially metaphor – are themselves rooted in
experience and in turn provide fundamental schemas – basic meta-
phorical structures – for organizing, comprehending, and navigating
our experience and then translating it into the cognitive rudiments of
knowledge and action.
     Most visible, in this regard, is the work of George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson. Indeed, the very first paragraph of their first book, Meta-
phors We Live By, suggests the changes that have swept over cognitive
approaches to metaphor in the last twenty years:
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the
rhetorical flourish – a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language.
Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a
matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people
think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on
the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language
but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which
we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (Lakoff / John-
son 1980: 3).
More than a linguistic trope, metaphor turns out to be a fundamental
cognitive operation and, as such, central to thinking and to acting in
the world. Indeed, we make contact with our world, we engage – and
hence ‘experience’ – it through the very metaphoric operations that
inform our ‘conceptual system.’ This movement away from a view of
metaphor as ‘literary’ and as sharply distinguished from, while subor-
dinate to, the ‘literal’ has opened up vast domains of both ordinary
and specialized practices to careful scrutiny as cognitive systems
3through examination of their metaphoric structures and operations.
     Citing a wealth of empirical detail, Lakoff and Johnson and other
advocates of a cognitive approach to metaphor – for example, Mark
Turner and Gilles Fauconnier (cf. Turner 1987, 1991; Lakoff / Turner
217
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 215-234) T01_08 bono.p 286938514622
James J. Bono
1989; Fauconnier 1997; Turner / Fauconnier 1999) – have sought no
less than a systematic reformulation of our understanding of cognition
itself. For Lakoff and Johnson, this has meant pushing a very specific
argument about the sources of metaphor and of metaphorically based
cognitive processes. While using as evidence the empirical data of
linguistics and analysis of metaphorical expressions, Lakoff and
Johnson argue that the latter are but linguistic instances of larger,
overarching conceptual structures that they call ‘conceptual meta-
phors.’ The conceptual metaphor, ‘Argument is War,’ for example,
structures the way in which we think about a whole range of experi-
ence. It defines, in other words, a fundamental conceptual structure
that gives rise to particular linguistic forms within everyday speech as
captured in actual metaphoric expressions such as claims about
‘winning an argument’ or ‘successfully defending one’s position.’
Metaphors, in this view, are common everyday expressions that
depend upon, and reveal, the existence of ‘deeper’ conceptual struc-
tures that are part of our basic cognitive apparatus, and which are
themselves metaphorical in nature. Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson
frequently point to the conceptual metaphor, ‘Love is a Journey,’ as
structuring a whole range of experiences and discourse concerning
human relationships: “I don’t think this relationship is going any-
where”; “This relationship is a dead-end street” (Lakoff / Johnson
1980: 44–45). Conceptual metaphors, then, are fundamental constitu-
ents of our underlying ‘conceptual system’ providing us with catego-
4ries and schemas to organize our world. Conceptual metaphors are
meaning-generating products of our cognitive apparatus that, in turn,
produce and authorize a vast array of detailed metaphorical expres-
sions that link together the tissue of our experience.
     Where do such conceptual metaphors come from? According to
Lakoff and Johnson, the more fundamental and basic of our conceptu-
al metaphors have their roots in our experience of the physical world.
This is especially clear in the case of what they term ‘orientational’
and ‘ontological’ metaphors, which, they argue, provide us with
powerful conceptual tools for organizing “a whole system of con-
cepts” (Lakoff / Johnson 1980: 14) and for distinguishing the relation-
ships (such as spatial boundaries, or actions / agencies) that define and
distinguish one thing from another with which it nonetheless stands in
some relation. Like orientational metaphors (“Happy is up; sad is
down,” Lakoff / Johnson 1980: 15), ontological metaphors depend
218
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 215-234) T01_08 bono.p 286938514622
Why Metaphor?
upon the primacy of bodily experience of the physical world. Three of
the most powerful such metaphors, for Lakoff and Johnson, are to be
found in the schemas of ‘containment,’ ‘force,’ and ‘balance.’ Each of
these metaphors represent fundamental conceptual structures that
pervade virtually the entirety of our experience, structure our rational,
or logical, thinking about the world, and ultimately derive from our
embodied experience of the world. Even though Lakoff and Johnson
open the door to the role of cultural experience in shaping our meta-
phorical conceptual system, the clear priority placed on the body, and
embodiment, as source of basic cognitive operations, especially
metaphoric processes, is indisputable in their work. Theirs is a Philos-
ophy in the Flesh (Lakoff / Johnson 1999)!
     Redefining metaphor as an important, if not fundamental, cognitive
process, rather than simply as a rhetorical category and linguistic
phenomenon, and insisting upon an embodied dimension to meta-
phor, are two crucial moves that I wish to affirm as genuine contribu-
tions to the kinds of account of metaphor that are needed, I believe, in
science studies. Moreover, both these dimensions of the new cognitive
model of metaphor can be adapted to complement and support a
performative model of scientific metaphors that insists that the
metaphorics of science operates on the level of both scientific dis-
course and practice. Valuable as cognitive linguistics has proven,
certain missteps and suspect assumptions – at least, in Lakoff and
Johnson’s views – must not go unremarked. Two difficulties are
especially worth noting: the universalizing tendencies of Lakoff and
Johnson’s account of metaphor; and the peculiarly abstract, founda-
tionalist, and unsituated view of embodiment they embrace.
     Universalizing tendencies may be the shibboleth of much theoriz-
ing in the humanities, and rightly suspect in analyses of social and
historical phenomena, but nonetheless retain a certain legitimacy in
the scientific study of natural phenomena. Few would deny the power
and utility of well-supported scientific explanations that, in fact, do
extend their reach to all phenomena of a given kind. Hence, in ques-
tioning the universalizing tendencies of Lakoff and Johnson’s account
of metaphor, it is not my purpose simply to give voice to a fashionable
mantra. Seen as a contribution to cognitive sciences, Lakoff and
Johnson inevitably seek those aspects of language and cognitive
processes that indeed are as close to being ‘universal’ phenomena in
human cognition and communication as possible. My criticism of
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their work should not be construed as a rejection of this aspiration.
On the contrary, the question of what linguistic and cognitive proc-
esses and phenomena may rightly be considered ‘universal’ is well
worth asking, and the answers inherently significant.
     The ubiquity of metaphor and its central role in higher order
cognitive processes may well constitute such empirically grounded
universal phenomena. Beyond such very general conclusions, Lakoff
and Johnson’s tendency to impute universalistic status to specific
metaphorically configured cognitive schemas, and then to regard such
schemas as the basis for producing their cognitive-linguistic maps of
all kinds of social and cultural interactions and artifacts, is suspect.
Indeed, Nickles suggests that “schemas” do their work “in a local,
instance-by-instance manner – something closer to a Baconian, prag-
matic-experimental demonstration than to projection in the form of a
universally valid law or rule” (Nickles 1998: 80). Take the meta-
phorical schemas of containment, force, and balance that are so
fundamental to their argument and putatively universal. There is no
question that these schemas are widespread and the basis for further
metaphoric extensions. But are they universal in any meaningful
sense? For Lakoff and Johnson the implications seems to be that they
are. Containment, force, and balance are “image schemas” and, as
such, “are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our
everyday bodily experience” (Lakoff 1987: 267). Further, “these
structures are directly meaningful, first, because they are directly and
repeatedly experienced because of the nature of the body and its mode
of functioning in our environment” (Lakoff 1987: 268). As if this were
not enough to make the point, Lakoff goes on to suggest that “since
image schemas are common to all human beings, as are the principles
that determine basic-level concepts, total relativism is ruled out,
though limited relativism is permitted” (Lakoff 1987: 268).
     Lakoff’s ‘limited relativism’ undoubtedly opens the door wide
enough to permit a role for ‘cultural influences and differences.’ If so,
it nonetheless leaves intact the universalism and foundational nature of
schemas like containment, force, and balance as such. The persistent
claim is that such schemas are shared by all human beings and subject
only to minor subsequent variations or, put differently, different
subsequent metaphorical extensions. Sufficient evidence exists, I
would claim, to suggest that what is ‘universal’ about such schemas is
of such a general nature as to be devoid of any meaningful content. Is
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there, for instance, anything in common between, let us say, Western
and ancient Chinese ‘containment’ schemas other than the unspecified
duality, ‘in-out’? Once we examine in any detail the specificity of this
in-out duality, we find precious little in common, precisely because
‘containment’ as a schema implies different sets of relationships in the
conceptual and experiential worlds of the two cultures. This is not to
say that there are not ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ in both cultures, nor that
they are not both linguistically marked as such; it is to claim, however,
that the boundaries between what is inside and what is outside are
differently drawn and, at its most extreme, that the very notion of a
‘boundary’ itself is differently constituted in the two cultures. These
differences are fundamental, for example, to acupuncture, to the very
idea of ‘organs’ and their anatomical and physiological relationships to
one another, and to the understanding of the body in relation to its
‘external’ environment in classical Chinese as opposed to both ancient
and modern Western medicine. In all of these instances, attempts to
understand Chinese medical schemas in terms of Western contain-
ment schemas in which there is an expectation of sharp boundaries
between ‘things’ and in which agency is solely granted to such sharply
distinguished entities leads to misunderstanding and outright confu-
sion. Such energetic principles as ch’i and yin and yang operate ex-
clusively in a world in which cosmos and body, concrete organs and
their ‘surrounding’ environments, do not stand in any simple sense in
relations of exclusive interiority versus exteriority to one another.
Similar arguments and distinctions can easily be made regarding the
schemas of ‘force’ and ‘balance,’ again using classical Chinese culture,
and such examples as medicine, Buddhism, and definitions of ‘person-
5hood’ as a foil for Western schemas of force and balance.
     As the above discussion suggests, Lakoff and Johnson’s question-
able assertions of universalistic claims for their metaphoric schemas
direct attention to their assertions about embodiment and the bodily
basis of metaphors and schemas. For these authors, cognition is a
relentlessly ‘bottom-up’ process, with the fundamental schemas,
metaphors, and categories driving cognition arising from our condi-
tion as embodied creatures. Again, let me be clear in stating that my
objection is not to the notion of cognition as an embodied process,
nor to attempts to understand ‘mind’ as necessarily embodied. On the
contrary, I would insist that any account of the embodied nature of
cognition must pay exquisite attention to the variegated ways in
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which embodiment is produced, achieved, and experienced. This, it
seems to me, is precisely the step that Lakoff and Johnson elide.
Instead of attending to concrete, situated, forms of embodiment and
embodied cognition, they offer us a generalized, abstract, homogene-
ous body: one that gives rise to ‘image schemas’ and foundational
metaphors that are universal. One might go so far as to say that, in
avoiding the Cartesian conundrum of mind-body dualism, Lakoff and
Johnson reenact an intransigent nature-culture dichotomy. They do
this, it seems to me, by insisting on the origins of schemas and meta-
phors in the body’s physical experience of itself and its environment.
     Instead of giving priority to some pristine physical experience and
consequently drawing the lines of ‘influence’ or ‘causality’ from the
body / physical to the metaphoric / cultural, we should look instead to
the body and embodiment as itself a hybrid, mixed ‘thing,’ as a site
where the natural and the cultural are produced, or, better yet, as the
place where the ‘physical’ and the ‘discursive’ become inseparably
entwined in complex feedback loops. Put more concretely, how we
come as bodies to experience the physical constraints of our world has
much to do with how we, as embodied cognitive subjects, are situated
in our world. Rather than a single, universal form of embodiment in
the world attributable to a single, universal physical body that, for all
practical purposes, does not vary from individual to individual, or
from culture to culture, gender to gender (and so forth), embodiment
takes multiple forms. While all bodies share certain physical character-
istics, embodiment – and embodied experience of self and the world –
varies in all kinds of ways. Some differences in embodied experience
arise from patent differences among physical bodies themselves;
bodies, for example, that have been marked as ‘abnormal’ by the
standards of a medicalized bureaucracy. Others, while marked as
‘normal,’ nonetheless experience embodiment in multiple and varying
ways due to subtle physical variations attributable to a range of factors
from anatomical and developmental variations, to hormonal and
biochemical variation, to variations produced by disease and immuno-
logical factors, to – in the world of postmodern medicine – the emer-
gence of prosthetically transformed bodies. Such differences, and
their relations to lived, embodied experience of self and the world,
have only begun to be articulated in the burgeoning literatures of
patient autobiographies, ‘pathographies,’ medical humanities, disabili-
ty studies (including literature and disability studies), intersex and
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transsexual studies, and a range of related literatures and scholarly
studies (Davis 1997; Dreger 1998; Hawkins 1993; Hunter 1991;
Lykke / Braidotti 1996; Mitchell / Snyder 1997; Price / Shildrick 1999;
Price 1995; Thompson 1996; among his many patients and cases cf.
that of Virgil in Sacks 1995: 108–152).
     Moreover, such variations in physical bodies are enormously
difficult to separate from other factors – whether we label them
‘cultural,’ ‘discursive,’ or otherwise – that contribute to the way in
which individuals regard their physical bodies and hence experience
themselves as embodied. Indeed, it is precisely because of this difficul-
ty that it makes little sense to speak of a dichotomy between nature
and culture or the physical and the discursive / metaphorical. We
experience our bodies – we experience ourselves as embodied – as
simultaneously physical and redolent with meaning. This is why
changes in our physical bodies have such unpredictable consequences:
whether the changes are major or minor, abrupt or gradual, traumatic
or ‘natural,’ the effects of such changes vary tremendously from
person to person, and, among other factors, may be affected by
cultural and gender differences. What seems to matter is the meaning
such changes come to have for individuals and for the groups to which
they belong: how physical changes come to ‘fit’ into the stories we
inherit and subsequent (re-)tell of ourselves. While embodiment
depends upon the existence of a living, physical body, embodiment
itself is the product of the particularities and specificities of inhabiting
a body in a certain way. Put differently, embodiment is neither ‘physic-
al’ nor ‘discursive,’ neither ‘natural’ nor ‘cultural,’ but rather the
primary (if learned) and concrete way in which we relate. Indeed, we
are, in a sense, not embodied until we relate – to others and, through
the ‘other,’ to self and the world. Embodiment attaches us to our
world, to our ‘self, ‘ and to ‘others.’ How we inhabit our bodies –
whether ‘able’ or ‘disabled’, however ‘enhanced,’ ‘altered,’ ‘prosthet-
icized,’ ‘gendered,’ or otherwise marked – produces an embodied,
cognitive self that orients itself within, relates to, and operates in the
world in specific ways. Just as such an embodied, cognitive self shares
a physical world with others, it also shares a cultural and discursive
world. Yet, precisely because of the particularities and specificities of
its embodied relationship to self and world, its experience of the
physical world is both shared and multiple and heterogeneous with
6respect to others. Similarly, it both shares schemas and metaphoric
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structures with others, and also inhabits the world differently, in-
vesting its schemas and metaphors with particular variations of meaning,
leading to subtle variations in relating to self, other, and the world.
     Recognizing the complexities and rich variations of embodiment
leads us away from an account of metaphor that stresses its universal
features and foundations. Instead, it leads us to acknowledge that
schemas, metaphors, and metaphoric systems of meaning are them-
selves subject to and situated in the particularities and specificities of
history, culture, discourse, and all sorts of webs of relations. Return-
ing to Lakoff and Johnson’s schemas of containment, force, and
balance and their cognitive analysis of metaphor, one is struck by their
desire to find a single Archimedean point in a unmarked and abstract
physical body as not so much empirical as, following Richard Coyne,
metaphysical (Coyne 1995: 249–301; for discussion of Lakoff and
Johnson 1987: 264–276). In particular Coyne invokes a Heideggerean
perspective to critique Lakoff and Johnson:
For Heidegger, the spatial ‘in’ of containment is subservient to a primordial
notion of ‘in’ as involvement. There is the nonspatial ‘in’ of being-in-the-
world, being in a good mood, being in love. Seen in this light, Lakoff and
Johnson’s notion of containment is subservient to the more primordial notion
of involvement. Prior to our bodily experience of containment is our being-
in-the-world, an altogether more primary and important concept. Similarly,
Heidegger offers a revision of notions of causality, which for Lakoff and
Johnson is related to the bodily experience of force. For Heidegger, causality
is subservient to care. From our being-in-the-world, we direct our attention
within a region of concern. Notions that we may cause something to happen
and that we may exercise control over a situation are derivative of this
more-basic understanding of our place as exhibiting care … These arguments
are obviously counter to those proffered by Lakoff and Johnson. Heideg-
ger argues that there is a more basic experience than embodiment … Whereas
Heidegger’s identification of preembodied experience could be construed as
yet another instance of discovering a foundation (not in the body, as for
Lakoff and Johnson, but experience prior to the body), the preembodied has
the appearance at every turn of being undecided. It is a fluxional involvement
that defies pinning down. Heidegger’s primordial concepts are not founda-
tions but excursions into Pre-Socratic concepts of contradiction, flux, and
play. How else could we characterize being-in-the-world? (Coyne 1995:
274–275).
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Rather than grounding metaphoricity in such a metaphysical concep-
tion of a singular and stable form of physical embodiment, the posi-
tion I have suggested is precisely to regard metaphor as a contingent,
historical ‘tool’ which we use (and which ‘uses’ us) to approach,
ultimately to inhabit, the unstable flux of things from which our world
7must emerge (Bono 1999). Through metaphor we ‘turn’ toward the
world and establish complex webs of relations with it. Take, for
example, the metaphors of ‘balance’ and of ‘warfare’ that have charac-
terized different epochs of medical thought in the West. The Hippo-
cratic and Galenic ideals of health as a balance of humors, or active
bodily fluids, authorized a particular set of relationships between
individual bodies, and their external environment, and led to the culti-
vation of certain regimes of bodily care and control. By contrast, the
‘embattled’ body of modern germ theory adopts a quite different set
of relations to its hostile external environment and enforces on itself –
and on society more generally – a stringent medicalized, socio-politi-
cal regime. Through metaphors we thus define ourselves as embodied
cognitive selves in relation to what ‘involves’ us, or not (containment
schemas), or what ‘concerns’ or moves us, or not (force schemas).
     Schemas, metaphors, and metaphoric systems of meaning are not
stable and universal, but respond to contingencies of history and
environment. Whether arising from the body and embodied experi-
ence, or from other domains, metaphors do and must vary, as Sabine
Maasen has insisted, “culturally, historically, situationally, individual-
ly” (Maasen 2000). Like Maasen, I reject the “analytical priority”
Lakoff and Johnson give “to bodily experience” (as they define it) and
insist upon the important tasks “performed” by metaphors at the
discursive level (Maasen 2000: 210). At the level of discourses, meta-
phors serve as “messengers of meaning” as Weingart and Maasen have
argued, and also as “mediums of exchange” among different discipli-
nary discourses, among different disciplines and cultural domains, and
within different discursive ecologies (Bono 1990; Rosenberg 1999).
Yet, if metaphor is to provide a significant analytical tool for the new
science studies, I believe that we must also insist upon an embodied
dimension to metaphor.
     The relation between metaphor and embodiment is, I think, crucial
to overcoming the resistance often expressed by proponents of science
as practice to metaphor and literary dimensions of science. As I
suggested at the beginning of this essay, one source of resistance to
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metaphor has been the persistent tendency to oppose practice to
discourse. The rejoinder, of course, is to claim, following Foucault and
others, that discourses are practices and, indeed, to insist upon the
8materiality of discourses and practices. Within science studies, the
drift has been strongly toward understanding scientific practices as
intimately engaged with the materialities of experimental protocols, of
instruments and the machinic dimension, and of natural and scientific
9objects. Despite this convergence of science studies, and the discur-
sive analysis of science, upon ‘practice’ and materiality, a gap remains.
This gap can perhaps be characterized as one forcibly separating
‘textual’ practices and laboratory or instrumental practices. My claim
is that an understanding of metaphor as embodied and performative
can help us bridge this gap, indeed, can help us reimagine the gap as a
kind of optical illusion. In so doing, the textual comes to be recuperat-
ed, not as a site of mere transcription – an archive for dead knowl-
edge and information, but as a site of action and invention.
     Here I must gesture toward a much longer argument. That argu-
ment begins by tracing the shift from a synchronic analysis of practi-
ces in the science studies literature to a fertile notion of ‘practice’ as
temporally emergent in the recent work of Andy Pickering (Pickering
1995). Pickering wishes to see science as concerned with encountering
(and then acting with and upon) agencies in nature. “The world is
filled,” for Pickering, “with agency”: it “is continually doing things”
(Pickering 1995: 6). He goes so far as to contrast science as practice –
seeking to uncover the “dance of agency” (Pickering 1995: 22) – with
traditional conceptions of scientists as “disembodied intellects” (Pi-
ckering 1995: 6) seeking mirror-like representations of things. Picker-
ing’s move doesn’t just reproduce the concerns with material practi-
ces, objects, and instruments found in the turn toward practice in
science studies. By emphasizing the temporal emergence of agencies
and practice through the scientist’s ‘accommodations’ of machines,
instruments, experimental protocols, and models to the resistances of
material agencies, he underscores the central importance of the scien-
tist as a situated, embodied actor and, with it, the embodied and
temporally emergent nature of scientific practice and knowledge.
Interestingly, though Pickering exhibits an appreciation for the role of
“models” in this emergent process, he explicitly demurs from granting
any role to metaphors, precisely because, in the accepted view, meta-
phors are simply ‘textual’ (Pickering 1995: 19).
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     But metaphor, as Lakoff and Johnson insist, is a cognitive opera-
tion. More to the point, within the new cognitive regime metaphorical
processes are basic to cognition itself, and therefore to extending
human thought and action to new – or, as we might recast it, emergent
– terrain. The cognitive model of metaphor, despite the shortcomings
noted earlier, provides valuable empirical support for a shift that I
have insisted upon elsewhere: from metaphor as representational to
metaphor as performative. The work of metaphor, I argue, is not so
much to represent features of the world, as to invite us to act upon the
world as if it were configured in a specific way like that of some
already known entity or process. It is this capacity of metaphor to, for
example, make us act upon Nature as if it were a Book (as in early
modern natural philosophy and natural history), or to act upon
biological organisms as though they were the product of complex
informational codes, that makes it so central to science and scientific
practice. Without the metaphoric construction of heredity – especially
DNA – as an informatic code, the mobilization of molecular biology
and affiliated disciplines in the late twentieth century to produce an
entire array of instruments, recording devices, and protocols to ‘read’
the molecular alphabet in which the book of life is written could not
10be imagined.
     With this notion of metaphor in mind, we can reimagine Picker-
ing’s temporally emergent ‘practice’ as a process whereby the ‘models’
embedded in the material practices, machines, and instruments of
science and projected onto the material objects and agencies in nature
are themselves instantiations of metaphors. They are, in effect, meta-
phors put into – or translated into – material actions and things. Put
differently, we can say that the materialities of scientific practice –
machines, instruments, experimental designs and protocols, and
objects – are discursively configured and deployed through the
metaphors embedded in and operating through them. A good example
of scientific instruments and protocols embedding metaphoric models
is the now ubiquitous Flourescent Activated Cell Sorter (FACS),
which embeds in its design the informational metaphorics of molecu-
lar biology, thus tending to favor the skill-set and interpretive modali-
ties of the molecular over the morphological approach to immunolo-
11gy.
     In effect, what I am suggesting here is a way to think about the
limits, indeed the liabilities, of the discourse vs. practice, or the text vs.
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12action, dichotomies. As Elizabeth Grosz powerfully suggests, “A
text is not the repository of knowledges or truths, but also passage or
point of transition from one (social) stratum or space to another. A
text is not the repository of knowledges or truths, the site for the
storage of information (and thus in danger of imminent obsolescence
from the ‘revolution’ in storage and retrieval that information tech-
nology has provided as its provocation to the late twentieth century)
so much as a process of scattering thought, scrambling terms, con-
cepts, and practices, forging linkages, becoming a form of action. A
text is not simply a tool or instrument; this makes it too utilitarian,
too amenable to intention, too much designed for a subject. Rather, it
is explosive, dangerous, labile, with unpredictable consequences …
Texts, like concepts, do things, make things, perform actions, create
connections, bring about new alignments. They are events – situated
in social, institutional, and conceptual space” (Grosz 1995: 125–126).
The world as we know it and operate upon it is one in which we
continually conjoin discourse and practice, text and action: where we
simultaneously learn and act by embodying intentions and projecting
our metaphorically constructed models onto matter which we shape
and use to our ends as instruments of thought and action. The world
as we know it and study it is filled with material-textual, or material-
discursive, hybrids – instruments; machines; illustrations; diagrams;
maps; charts; physical models; computer simulations – that are simul-
taneously part of the material world and instruments for our knowing
13and manipulating it. They are all, in their own way, what I like to
14call material metaphors: embodied metaphors-in-action!
Notes
1 For example, “Discursive practices are not purely and simply
ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical
processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms
for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at
once, impose and maintain them” (Foucault 1977: 200).
2 On the notion of literary technologies in science studies, cf. the
seminal work by Shapin / Schaffer 1985.
3 For an indication of the expansive reach of metaphorical analysis
and of metaphor theory generated by the cognitive paradigm, cf.
the recent Special Issue by Fludernik / Freeman / Freeman 1999.
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For an example of the application of cognitive analysis of meta-
phor to a specialized field, cf. van Rijn-van Tongeren 1997.
4 The notion of schemas has received much attention in psycholo-
gy and cognitive sciences. More recently, it has been applied to the
sciences by philosophers inspired by the cognitive revolution.
Thomas Nickles, e. g., regards schemas as “cognitive mechanisms”
that can help us understand how “a complex situation or set of
inputs” can be structured “into an organized whole” (Nickles
1998: 78–79). For Nickles, quoting Ulric Neisser (Neisser 1976:
22), “schemata are anticipations” in which specific exemplars or
frameworks are transferred or projected onto new situations, thus
illustrating how “the past affects the future” (Nickles 1998: 80,
quoting Neisser 1996: 22). I would suggest that the cognitive
mechanism of metaphor is closely related to the generation of such
schemas.
5 For a rich source of examples, and for careful analyses of con-
trasting Western and Chinese schemas, cf. the brilliant book by
Kuriyama 1999.
6 On issues of nature vs. culture, the body, and cognition, cf. Grosz
1994; Kirby 1997; Wilson 1998.
7 I argue for this perspective as well in an unpublished paper, Bono
1997; in expanded form the latter constitutes a chapter of Bono, in
progress.
8 On the relations between discourse and practice, cf. also Certeau
1984; Bono 1995.
9 For the turn to practice, cf. Lenoir 1988; Golinski 1990; Pickering
1992; Rouse 1996.
10 Cf. the essential new book by Kay 2000.
11 Thus, a very detailed example of the metaphoric configuration of
the materialities of scientific practice can be read into the very
careful study by Cambrosio / Keating 2000. I plan to provide such
a reading in my book, Figuring Science.
12 For views of texts as action, cf. the fundamental work of Paul
Ricœur 1991; for example, “the models of actions elaborated by
narrative fiction are models for redescribing the practical field in
accordance with the narrative typology resulting from the work of
the productive imagination. Because it is a world, the world of the
text necessarily collides with the real world in order to ‘remake’ it,
either by confirming it or by denying it. However, even the most
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ironic relation between art and reality would be incomprehensible
if art did not both disturb and rearrange our relation to reality. If
the world of the text were without any assignable relation to the
real world, language would not be ‘dangerous’” (p. 6).
13 For a stimulating discussion of diagrams and mathematics that
complements this view, cf. Knoespel 2000 and Châtelet 2000.
14 Cf. my unpublished essay, Bono 2000; an expanded version will
be included in my book Figuring Science.
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Pushing PUS with Science Studies
“Do you feel that science and technology will eventually solve most problems
such as pollution, disease, drug abuse, and crime, some of these problems, or
few, if any of these problems?” In 1972, the answer for 30 percent of the total
adult US population was “most problems” (National Science Board 1973, 98).
Some 25 years later, public attitudes towards science are still positive: “Science
can eventually explain everything” – 53 percent of the general public agreed
with this statement in a 1998 survey (National Science Board 2000: 8–14).
     Surveys with questions like these have been done since the early seventies.
From its first volume onward, the biannual US National Science Indicators
have included a regular chapter on Public Attitudes Toward Science and
Technology. In recent years, the title of the chapter has been changed to
Science and Technology: Public Attitudes and Public Understanding. In fact,
this change reflects a shift of interest: Although public attitudes are still a major
issue, they are framed differently, namely as a complex dynamic between
science and society. Notably, the nuclear accidents of Three Mile Island near
Harrisburg, PA (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), and the controversial debate on
nuclear energy stimulated a new public discussion on various aspects of science
and technology. The institutionalization of technology assessment (TA) as a
scientific discipline has been one of the results of this discussion. Moreover, the
role of scientific experts in society has become heavily debated in the 1970s and
1980s, and, at the same time, scientists “discovered the media” (Weingart
1998). The “visible scientists” (Goodell 1977) appeared and “selling science”
(Nelkin 1987) became a major issue. At the end of the 1980s, climate change
and the ozone hole stimulated a new discourse in the arena between science,
policy and the mass media (Weingart et al. 2000).
     However, only with the beginning of the 1990s, the new field ‘Public
Communication of Science & Technology’ began to intitutionalize. The PCST
network was formed as a “loose international organization of individuals
interested in all aspects of the relationship between science and the public”
(http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/bvl1/pcst-net.html ). In 1992, the journal
Public Understanding of Science was launched in cooperation with the Science
Museum, London, and international conferences of the community are now
held every second year.
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     The editor of Public Understanding of Science, Bruce Lewenstein, will in-
troduce into the complex interaction of science, politics and the media. He
argues that there is a fundamental contradiction between democratic ideas of
equal participation and the meritocratic ideal that produces scientific elites.
PUS programs produced by elite scientists who do not understand the public’s
perception and use of science will not serve the public well. In his view, PUS
should not be about more information, but about a better understanding of the
scientific process. Hence, one more reason to consider the insights of science
studies.
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What Kind of ‘Public Understanding of Science’ …
What Kind of ‘Public Understanding of Science’
Programs Best Serve a Democracy?
Bruce V. Lewenstein
Most justifications for government support of ‘public understanding
of science’ (PUS) programs rely on the argument that responsible
citizens in democratic societies need to make social decisions that
involve science and technology. Yet there is a fundamental contradic-
tion between democratic ideas of equal participation and the merito-
cratic ideal that produces scientific elites. One of the outcomes of this
contradiction is a series of PUS programs that do not serve the public
well, because they are produced by elite scientists who do not under-
stand the public’s perception and use of science. PUS programs are
usually based on providing more and better information to appropri-
ate publics. Data from various studies shows, however, that what
people need is not more information, but better understanding of the
scientific process. Not the mythological, ‘hypothetico-deductive
scientific method,’ but the real, socially-mediated, patronage influ-
enced, experimentally-underdetermined, theoretically-guided – in
short, MESSY – scientific method. Natural scientists who attack the
historians and sociologists who have described this method as ‘anti-
science’ are shooting the messenger. The enemy are those members of
society who deny the power of rational inquiry, not those who
promote a more nuanced, contextualized understanding of how
scientific knowledge is produced. PUS programs should rely more,
not less, on the findings of historians and sociologists of science.
     Twenty-five years ago, the astronomer Benjamin Shen offered
three definitions for science literacy (Shen 1975). The first, he called
practical science literacy. By that, he meant the knowledge of science
that we need for living in modern society: that antibiotics are useful if
you have bacterial disease, that automobiles work by converting
fossilized potential energy into kinetic energy, that computers can do
only what their programmers have instructed them to do.
     The second type, he called civic science literacy. This kind of
knowledge is what we need as citizens in Western democracies: the
power of public health initiatives, the relative risks and benefits of coal
and nuclear and solar power plants, the economic and political value
of environmental regulations, and so on. Civic science literacy is not
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something you need on an everyday basis, but it is what you need to
judge the decisions that your representatives in government and
industry must make in their everyday activities.
     Finally, Shen identified cultural science literacy. This is knowledge
of science as the product of the human mind, something akin to music
or art. We care about the Higgs boson, not because it helps us every-
day or because it matters to our civic life; we care about it because to
understand the Higgs boson is to understand something about Na-
ture. To understand the helical structure of DNA and the amazing
symmetry of As and Ts and Gs and Cs (adenine, thymine, guanine,
and cytosine) is not needed to help yourself heal, or even to pass
judgment on genetically-engineered foods; the DNA helix is simply
an amazingly beautiful object. The ability to grasp the inherent beauty
of DNA is what makes us human – both our own understanding of it,
and our appreciation of the intellectual effort that went into elucidat-
ing its structure.
     While other definitions of science literacy have been proposed or
elaborated in the years since Shen’s paper, none of them has the value
of simple distinctions that Shen’s definitions offer. All can be sub-
sumed under Shen’s definitions without doing terrible injustice to their
meaning (Thomas / Durant 1987; Laetsch 1987).
     When people talk about improving public understanding of science
and technology, or supplying resources to the public communication
of science and technology, they sometimes justify their remarks by
calling on the need for better practical science literacy. This is espe-
cially true in developing countries, where problems of health, nutri-
tion, water supplies, agriculture, and so on clearly can be addressed
with specific scientific and technological knowledge (Schiele 1994).
Sometimes, calls for more public understanding of science draw on the
cultural science literacy justification; this happens most often, of
course, in the developed countries, and most often in the writings of
intellectuals concerned about human nature and the value of rational
inquiry (cf., e. g., Holton 1965; Holton 1974; Snow 1959).
     But by far the greatest support for public understanding of science
activities relies on the civic science literacy argument. “Better public
understanding of science can be a major element in promoting nation-
al prosperity [and] in raising the quality of public and private deci-
sion-making …,” said a British Royal Society report in 1985 (Royal
Society 1985: 9). “There are few, if any, public issues … that do not
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have a scientific or technical component. Conversely, issues that
appear to be largely scientific or technical in nature mostly have major
social and political implications.” As one result, the Royal Society’s
report argued, “there is clearly a strong case for Parliamentarians, in
particular, to have a much better understanding of science and its
relevance to their responsibilities than they now have.”
     Similarly, when various provincial and federal branches of the
Canadian government sponsored a major symposium on “When
Science Becomes Culture” in 1994, the president of the Conseil de la
science et de la technologie du Québec asked “Is the public able, or
does it even desire to influence the political powers with regard to
problems involving technology or science? Regrettably, science and
technology belong all too exclusively to those who work in these
fields.” The general public must understand science, the minister
argued, in order to guide the politicians (Berlinguet 1994).
     In the United States, when the American Association for the
Advancement of Science sponsored a major science education reform
program, its definition of science literacy also focused on the impor-
tance of science for citizens, not individuals with immediate practical
concerns or deep intellectual interests; the program (called “Project
2061”)
promotes literacy in science, mathematics, and technology in order to help
people live interesting, responsible, and productive lives. In a culture increas-
ingly pervaded by science, mathematics, and technology, science literacy
requires understandings and habits of mind that enable citizens [n.b.] to grasp
what those enterprises are up to, to make some sense of how the natural and
designed worlds work, to think critically and independently, to recognize and
weigh alternative explanations of events and design trade-offs, and to deal
sensibly with problems that involve evidence, numbers, patterns, logical
arguments, and uncertainties (AAAS 1993: xi).
Traditionally, promoters of public understanding of science – who
almost always come from or have strong ties to the scientific commu-
nity – have argued that improving the “quantity and quality” of
scientific information available to the public would be the best way to
help meet the civic needs of citizens (Lewenstein 1992).
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The Fundamental Contradiction
Yet there is a fundamental contradiction between this pronouncement
of the scientific elite and the simultaneous commitment to democracy,
which specifies that individual citizens acting together should deter-
mine what best suits their needs and interests. Taken to an extreme,
some attempts to resolve the contradiction lead to the various ‘demo-
cratic science’ movements that advocate citizen control over science
and question the authority of science to govern itself (cf., e. g., Fayard
1988; Sclove 1995). Scientists recognize the contradiction, but deny
that citizen control is the answer. Instead, they argue, better ‘public
understanding of science’ will lead to better public support of scientif-
ic independence.
     Why ‘better’? While the broad public does, in general, have a good
attitude towards science (though perhaps not towards technolo-
gy), it also recognizes that scientists do not always have the answers –
even though (and this may be the critical point for understanding
complex public attitudes) scientists are often unwilling to acknowl-
edge when they do not know the answer. That tension is the crucial
issue. Given a commitment to public understanding of science that
depends largely on the ‘civic science literacy’ idea, and given a sup-
posed mismatch between the need for public support of science and
the public’s actual support of science, what kind of public understand-
ing of science programs are needed in a democracy?
     To answer that question, I want to call attention to the word
‘supposed’ in the previous paragraph. In the rest of this paper, I will
argue (1) that public support of science (as shown by attitudes and
images) is good; (2) that when we take seriously the idea that we must
listen to citizens in a democracy, we learn something about science
from them; and (3) that, therefore, our public understanding of science
programs must address the issues of uncertainty and context that
worry the public at large.
Public Attidudes Toward Science and Public Images of Science
Consider first the evidence on attitudes (Figure 1). Americans over-
whelmingly believe that science and technology make their lives better
(NSB 1993; NSB 1998). More than 80 percent say that science and
technology make our lives “healthier, easier, and more comfortable.”
(A comparable number of Europeans say the same thing.) Looked at
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from the other direction, less than 40 percent of Americans say that
science and technology “make our way of life change too fast.” (Here,
some international differences do appear: 55 percent of Europeans and
57 percent of Japanese think science and technology are changing life
too fast.) When asked about specific issues in the quality of life (such
as public health, working conditions, and standard of living), generally
less than 10 percent of Americans think science and technology have a
negative impact. (The one exception is “world peace,” where the
positive impact outweighs the negative impact by only about 10 per-
cent.)
Figure 1: Public assessments of scientific research.
Data from NSB 1998, Appendix table 7–20
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Equally important, science comes off well when compared with other
institutions in American society. In a series of questions asked since
the early 1970s, Americans consistently rank science near the top of
institutions they trust, putting lower such options as the US Su-
preme Court, organized religion, and the media (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Public confidence in leadership of selected institutions.
Data from NSB 1998, Appendis table 7–19. (Percentage of respond-
ents expressing confidence in leadership of selected institutions)
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Another way to look at the public’s attitude toward science is to
consider the public image of science. Images cannot be quantified in
the same way that social scientists measure formal attitudes, but we
can get some suggestive information from both impressionistic and
formal content analyses of media images. A number of studies have
shown that the public image of science splits into two groups – heroes
and horrors. The heroes are the scientists who provide benefits – cures
for disease, new computer technologies, answers to the energy crisis
(Lewenstein 1989). The horrors, of course, are the demons and mad
scientists who would destroy life with science and technology. Fran-
kenstein’s monster – or is it Frankenstein himself? – represent the
horror image of science.
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     Another way to think about the dichotomy between hero and
horror is to describe the image of scientists as an image of wizards.
Wizards and the power they wield can be either good or bad – or
both. Any fan of Tolkien or viewer of the “Sorcerer’s Apprentice” in
Disney’s Fantasia knows this. But in a recent survey of children’s
science shows on American television, Marilee Long and Jocelyn
Steinke showed that the evil images of wizards are rare, whereas the
good images, the images of scientists as truth-seekers, are prevalent
(Nelkin 1995; Long / Steinke 1996).
     Missing from most of these images is the everyday, humdrum,
ordinary image of the scientist and engineer as a human problem
solver, doing the best he or she can to solve the problems that face the
world. (These images are appearing in the children’s TV shows,
probably as a direct result of the producers’ realizing that the images
do not appear anywhere else. But they’re absent in most other places
in popular culture.) Nonetheless, despite the presence of horror
images and the lack of humdrum images, the hero image remains a
powerful icon in our society. Science has provided us with prosperity.
     But, as Marcel LaFollette (1990) suggested in an analysis of media
images in American magazines throughout this century, prosperity
can be oversold. Science has claimed credit for nuclear power, im-
proved plastics and pesticides, and outer space. Science cannot sud-
denly disclaim its contributions to modern life after Three Mile Island,
Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Challenger explosion. The public is not
stupid. When it sees the scientific community saying that ‘public
understanding of science’ is equivalent to ‘public appreciation of the
benefits that science provides to society’ – but also sees that
science brings us things that are not necessarily good – there’s a clear
disjunction between the image and the reality. That disjunction,
LaFollette argued, rather than the problems themselves, makes the
public distrust science. (The same problem affects politicians who do
not keep their promises.)
     How people respond to the images of science in their minds is
perhaps the crucial point. In the United States, many physicists and
chemists in the mid-1990s complained about an exhibition at the
Smithsonian Institution called “Science in American Life.” They said
it presents a negative, anti-science message, though the curators
responded that their goal was simply to show the changing attitudes
of Americans toward science. After visiting the exhibit hall, however,
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one of the sharpest critics of the exhibition had to moderate his
remarks. “The kids thought it was terrific, they did not pick up any of
the negative stuff,” he said (MacIlwaine 1995). Moreover, a study of
visitors showed overwhelmingly positive reactions to the exhibit
(Pekarik et al. 1995).
     Those of us who care about science can easily highlight the images
we do not like and complain about them – but we do so at our peril,
ignoring our colleagues doing careful studies of how people actually
respond. We know, for example, that individuals make risk decisions
for very complex reasons that often go far beyond simple calculations
of hazard probabilities (Kasperson et al. 1988; Slovic 1987; Hornig
1992; Hornig 1993; Priest 1995). Instead, they factor in the degree to
which they dread the risk and the ‘signal’ effect of recent news about
the risk. Perhaps most important, individuals make many risk deci-
sions based on how much they can control the risk.
Understanding the Tensions: Control and Uncertainty
The issue of control – which is, of course, often central to political
issues – is crucial if we are to understand public attitudes toward
science and science literacy. Three case studies provide the data.
     In 1986, after the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the Cumbrian hills
of England were contaminated by fallout (Wynne 1989). Scientists at
the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF)
ordered sheepfarmers not to bring their sheep to market, except under
certain conditions. The restrictions, they said, would be lifted shortly,
after the fallout had been safely absorbed by the soil. The MAFF
scientists, however, made a series of mistakes. First, they did not
recognize the limits of their own knowledge. Their estimates of how
long the restrictions would apply were based on soil models from a
different part of England, models that had little relevance in the fells
of Cumbria. The restrictions, originally imposed for three weeks, were
still in place a decade later. Second, the scientists refused to acknowl-
edge their own uncertainties. They continually asked the farmers just
‘to trust’ the scientists, even after the scientists had lost the trust by
demonstrating how wrong their science could be. Contributing to this
loss of credibility was that the scientists imposed their restrictions
without considering the expert knowledge that sheepfarmers had
about grazing habits, water runoff, and other issues relevant to the
restrictions.
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     Also in England, indeed also in Cumbria, researchers were puzzled
to find that workers at the nuclear reprocessing plant in Sellafield
actively resisted acquiring knowledge about nuclear contamination
(Wynne 1991). Surely if anyone needed to be ‘scientifically literate,’ it
was people who work with extremely dangerous, very high technolo-
gy on an everyday basis. Exploring the issue, however, researchers
discovered that the workers did not want knowledge that they could
not use. They functioned best when they stayed ignorant. Then, and
only then, could they work efficiently by simply trusting their super-
visors to design safe procedures. If the workers had developed
independent knowledge – especially knowledge about the uncertain-
ties of the scientific knowledge of the dangers they faced – they would
have found themselves paralyzed. Without the authority to control or
change their actions, but with the knowledge of the uncertain dangers
they faced, their workplace would have become far more ‘risky’ than
when they trusted their supervisors without the burden of knowledge.
     Finally, across the Atlantic, a case in Canada shows what happens
when you put these questions of control and scientific uncertainty
into direct practice. While designing exhibits and community pro-
grams about mining to be used throughout the province of Alberta,
program developers realized that members of the communities they
visited were extremely aware of the uncertainties of scientific knowl-
edge – and of the impacts these uncertainties would have on their
communities (Bradburne and Wake 1993; Wake and Bradburne 1995).
What the citizens wanted was not more ‘knowledge,’ but rather to
learn ways of combining the knowledge they either had or could
acquire with the uncertainties in that knowledge. They wanted
guidance in action, not simple facts.
     All three of these cases show us that public attitudes toward sci-
ence, even if good in the aggregate, ultimately depend on the ways in
which the public perceives that it can control science. In particular,
when the public believes that scientists are making claims of certainty
and authority that the public recognizes as untenable – then the
scientific community loses its credibility. When the public sees science
and technology that neither it nor the scientific community seems to
have completely under control (including intellectual control), then it
begins to fear science and give it the horror image, not the hero one.
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Knowledge is Needed, But What Kind?
I want to make clear that I am not denying the problem of lack of
knowledge. My late colleague Carl Sagan, the well-known astronomer
and fantastically successful popularizer, once told a story about
meeting a young man who was obviously enthusiastic about science.
The man bubbled over with his excitement about the curiosity and
cleverness of scientists. Then he began asking Sagan more specific
questions, inquiring about the power of pyramids, UFO sightings,
extrasensory perception, and a host of other pseudo-scientific ‘find-
ings.’ Sagan was appalled. Here was someone clearly enamored of
science – and absolutely missing all understanding of what constituted
reliable scientific evidence, useful scientific method, and well-estab-
lished knowledge about the natural world.
     Like Sagan, I desperately want members of the public to learn to
use their rational faculties more effectively. We must help more people
learn to be skeptical, to question statements that are unsupported by
facts. We need to improve education throughout our system, not just
in science – in history, in language, in geography, in literature. Even in
politics!
     But when we consider public understanding in the context of
democracy, we must recognize the conflict between the elite visions of
science as a crucial component of progress in addressing national and
international problems, and the democratic or popular visions of
science that are much more nuanced and – sometimes – critical. When
we accept that the democratic side of the contradiction as a deeply
rooted, reasonable response to the what the public experiences, we are
ready to see the conflict, not as an irrational uninformed barrier to
understanding, but as a fundamental aspect of the organization of our
society. Then we are ready to ask, how can we best serve the citizens
of our democracies? What kinds of public understanding of science
programs will help us move forward?
     To some scientists, including some prominent ones, we improve
science literacy by focusing on specific scientific knowledge. For
example, ten years ago Robert Hazen and James Trefil, two physicists
with very successful records as popularizers, put together 20 princi-
ples of science which they believed that everyone should know (things
like “one set of laws describes all motion” and “everything is made of
atoms”) (Pool 1991). But many scientists disagreed with them (Culotta
1991). The absence of math and biology from their list drew wide-
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spread criticism. So did the attempt to create any such simple list. “I
would object to the absolute and simple-minded terms in which [the
ideas] are expressed …,” wrote Elwyh Loh, a medical professor at the
University of Pennsylvania. The compilation “is baby-talk that re-
duces Science with a capital ‘S’ into Saturday morning cartoons.”
     Perhaps even more telling is the conclusion of the AAAS’s Project
2061. Based on extensive work with psychologists and curriculum
evaluators, Project 2061 has rejected the model of cramming more and
more facts into students.
If we want students to learn science, mathematics, and technology well, [the
project’s staff wrote,] we must radically reduce the sheer amount of material
now being covered. The overstuffed curriculum places a premium on …
short-term memory and impedes the acquisition of understanding (AAAS
1993: xi–xii).
What, then, is the alternative?
     Clearly, if we move away from science as bits of knowledge, we
must look at science as a process. But – and here is where I part
company with many scientists – we need to focus on the real process,
not the mythical one of developing hypotheses, gathering data, testing
the hypotheses, revising and repeating the process. Many “well-
intentioned calls to combat scientific or technological illiteracy” fall into
the trap of advocating facts rather than context, according to LaFol-
lette (1995). Trying to maintain the cultural authority of science, scien-
tists use the myth of the single, clear, all-powerful scientific method to
defend themselves against charges that science is a tool of corporate
capitalism, or a hegemonic opinion produced by cultural elites, or
other attacks from postmodern critics (Gross and Levitt 1994; Levitt
1999). As LaFollette (1995) said,
Describing scientific knowledge as if it emanated fully realized from a ‘black
box’ does preserve scientists’ cultural sanctity … It also neatly circumvents
explanations of research values and goals. Effective modern citizenship [n.b.]
demands a higher level of ‘knowing about’ science, however. It is enhanced
by fuller explanation of why scientists recommend one thing or another, and
of what underlies their standing as experts.
Like LaFollette, I believe that we need to teach something about the
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context and process of science. But what do I mean by process? Not
the so-called ‘scientific method.’ Historians, philosophers, and socio-
logists of science over the last generation have convincingly demons-
trated that while scientists often call upon a standardized method
(especially the ‘hypothesis, test, conclusion’ model) for rhetorical
purposes, the actual processes by which scientists acquire knowledge
are much messier and more complex. In Scientific Literacy and the
Myth of the Scientific Method, chemist Henry H. Bauer (1992) argued
that we should be focusing on the social processes of communication,
collaboration, and communal judgment to understand how random
hunches, observations, and ideas about nature become transformed
into reliable understanding of the world around us. The physicist John
Ziman (2000) has recently made a similar argument.
     The problem is that the messy reality of scientific life, including
especially the degree of social interaction among scientists, govern-
ment agencies, industrial sponsors, audiences, and publics that leads to
reliable knowledge, is anathema to scientists who believe that science
is fundamentally a search for Truth and Nature. It is very difficult to
accept that scientific consensus is shaped by power relations, political
contingencies, interpretive flexibility, rhetorical constructions, and
other elements of social behavior that together go by the label ‘social
construction.’ But a careful reading of historical and sociological
records clearly shows that scientists use social activities to achieve
their understanding (Jasanoff et al. 1995).
     Robert Smith’s prize-winning history of the Hubble Space Tele-
scope (Smith 1989), for example, follows in exquisite detail the process
of committees, reports, personal persuasion, political manipulation,
and other fundamentally social processes by which astronomers
reached consensus on what was worth studying and how – in the very
technical sense of which instruments, built with which capabilities, to
which tolerances, with what specifications – the astronomical com-
munity should go about studying space. The decisions made by this
complex process directly affect what we know about the natural
world.
     Or consider a much earlier time: in 1610, as Galileo learned to use
his new telescopes for observing the planets, his decisions about what
he had found were shaped by his campaign to get, and then keep, a
patronage position at the court of Grand Duke Cosimo de’ Medici
(Westfall 1985). He first observed three moons of Jupiter; but the
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Grand Duke was one of four brothers. Not until he found a fourth
moon could he announce his discovery of the “Medicean Stars.”
Similarly, his decision to engage in a systematic survey of the planets
was shaped by his promise to the Grand Duke to provide “many
discoveries and such as perhaps no other prince can match, for of
these I have a great many and am certain I can find more as occasion
presents itself.” If he failed to meet his promise, his salary and support
would disappear.
Implications of the Social Model of Science
What are the implications of this belief in the fundamentally social
nature of the scientific process for the general effort to create greater
public understanding of science? Most immediately, when we decide
to focus on the ‘process’ of science, we must mean the real process by
which science achieves its powerful status in society, not an idealized
and abstract ‘scientific method.’ We cannot present scientific authority
as somehow beyond the criticism we make of arguments based in
1religion or myths. For, like each of these ‘nonscientific’ fields, sci-
ence achieves its power only through the socially-constructed consen-
sus among its practitioners that is then used as a rhetorical tool to
fashion a broad social consensus that it provides answers unobtain-
able through other means. Religion and myth play continuing roles in
modern life not because people are ignorant, but because the insights
and satisfactions that come from these fields satisfy deep human
needs. We need to understand that science achieves authority because
we have agreed to give it authority – agreed based on the evidence
supplied and defended through a complex social process.
     To conclude, consider again the notion of civic science literacy. We
do need citizens who know something about science. But we need to
go beyond simple declarations of that need. For the kinds of decisions
we want people to make as citizens, we want them to know something
more than simple facts about Nature. We want citizens to know how
science produces reliable knowledge about Nature – and especially
how social forces at both the individual and societal levels help shape
the production of that reliable knowledge. Only then will citizens be
in a position to tell their democratically-elected representatives how to
proceed on political issues that involve science and democracy.
     Notice that I am not advocating the kind of ‘democratic science’ in
which citizens make the decisions themselves, a sort of ‘science by
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majority vote.’ People who advocate this kind of citizen participation
are deeply skeptical of scientific and technological expertise. I do not
share that skepticism. The natural world imposes powerful constraints
on what we can do, as individuals and as citizens. We need scientific
and technological experts who use their professional skills, including
their professional judgment, to tell us about those constraints. But I
recognize, as many scientists who defend the so-called “scientific
method” in knee-jerk fashion are apparently unwilling to recognize,
that our knowledge of the natural world is deeply shaped by social
factors. As citizens, we must understand the contexts in which knowl-
edge of Nature is produced, and how different social forces might
produce different sets of knowledge – which, in turn, might lead to
different social decisions about how to move ahead on difficult public
policy issues that have scientific and technological components.
     Some of the scientists who I am criticizing believe there is a war
between critics of science and science itself (cf., e. g., Holton 1993;
Park 1994; Wolpert 1992; Gross and Levitt 1994; for more nuanced
views, cf. Labinger 1995; Labinger 1997; and Labinger / Collins 2001).
Most of these scientists have focused on the historians and sociologists
who have produced what I believe are honest and faithful portraits of
how scientific knowledge is produced by a social process. The scien-
tists are, I think, shooting the messenger. There is an enemy, and it is
those who deny the power of rational discourse (fed by evidence
evaluated by a social process of testing and consensus-building and
trust) to teach us something about the natural world. But the way to
deal with the enemy is not to insist on the primacy of technical
expertise before we even begin the discussion. That leads to war. The
answer, as in any diplomatic negotiation, is to begin by talking, by
listening, by hearing the other side. What is it about science that feeds
and promotes the horror image? Why do people actively choose to be
ignorant about science? What kind of information do people – nonsci-
entist citizens of our democracies – want to know?
     Once we have begun talking, we can build the trust and respect on
which mutual understanding can build. That understanding probably
will not be a commitment to cultural science literacy – because, for
most of the public, science as culture will never have the appeal of rap
music and earrings and the political sex scandals. Nor will mutual
understanding end up focusing on practical science literacy, because
the public will come to understand – I hope and believe – that devel-
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oping scientific knowledge requires a level and breadth of curiosity
that cannot be tied to practical concerns.
     In the end, mutual understanding will focus on civic science
literacy – because that is the place where the social context of science
brings together the real process of science (the one I’ve described
above) with the real interests and needs of the public.
     In this paper, I have not tied my comments to theories of political
systems or democracy. We still need people to do that. But, like a
good scientist, I think I’ve mucked about in the data of public atti-
tudes towards science, public images of science, and the nature of
science itself to show that prevailing approaches that treat the public
as ignorant, passive couch potatoes cannot be justified. Instead, an
alternative interpretation treats the public as active members of a
democracy and respects their perspective on science as one produced
by realistic encounters with the products of scientific and technologi-
cal inquiries.
     And also, like a good scientist, I’m left with many more questions
about whether the approach I’m suggesting will work. To answer
those questions, we need more data.
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 Knowledge Politics
The Paradox of Regulating
Knowledge Dynamics
Science has not only led to the mass production of knowledge but also has it
invaded society with multifarious effects: Consequently, today one talks about
knowledge in the plural, for whereever knowlege is produced counter-
knowledges occur. Therefore science studies has put a novel issue called
knowledge society on the agenda: Scholars inquire into its texture (Böhme,
Stehr 1986; Stehr 1994) as well as into its type of knowledge production
(Gibbons et al. 1994; Willke 1998, 1999). While it is not as yet decided what a
society based on knowledge will eventually look like it seems to be certain that
we face up to some fundamental dilemmata of knowledge: Implementing
knowledge inevitably means to adapt it to local conditions, thereby changing
it. What is more, knowledge may prove not only useful and profitable but also
risky. While societies promote systematic production of knowledge so as to
improve individual well-being and collective standards of prosperity, health,
and freedom, neither the quality of knowledge thus produced nor its effects
once it has become implemented can be adequately foreseen. At issue is
nothing less but the control of the unforeseeable.
     Since technology and science, far more than economy, have become the real
motor of societal change, institutions became established that debate and
assess their potential or real effects before or while implementing them.
So-called technology assessments, mediations, hearings or round-tables are
designed to control or police knowledge, the main strategies being to mini-
mize dangerous effects and to maximize public acceptance. Whereas two
decades before nuclear energy or military research has been the primary
concern of such interventions, today the attention has shifted to the biological
and environmental research: Medicine, food, and nature are conceived as key
issues deeply affecting individual lifes and societies at large. In the light of
‘genetic engineering,’ for instance, the issue is about making individual
choices, privatize knowledge, and legislate its accessability. Thus, what is at
stake today is the intricate relationship between the individual, economy, and
the state: If anything, they share a common interest in regulating knowledge
so as to keep the ideological, cultural, and moral effect of science and technol-
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ogy under control. While Merton’s norms are still part of the game named
quality-control of knowledge, its regulation from within science does no
longer seem sufficient. External regulation are sought to highten the efficacy
of policing it: Drug regulation, intellectual property, and copyright protection
are examples of the ways in which the distribution and implementation of
knowledge becomes a domain of explicit legislation and a target of political
and economic decisions. To be sure, regulating knowledge is not about
‘reducing’ it (though shortage of availability and accessability are forms of
policing knowledge). On the contrary: Regulating knowledge will enforce the
significance of knowledge, thereby disseminating the places where knowledge
becomes implemented, disputed and adapted. Policing knowledge, thus Stehr
as well as Weingart (2001), inevitably increases the dynamics of a knowledge-
based society.
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Early one morning in late July of 1999, Lord Melchett, the head of
Greenpeace in Britain, was detained for questioning by the police after
he and about 30 Greenpeace members raided a field of genetically
modified maize near Norfolk. The protest came to an abrupt end after
the farmer called the police and they arrested the protesters. Accord-
ing to The Times (July 27, 1999) the raid left government trials of seed
crops that had been genetically modified in disarray. The farm on
which the protest took place was one of seven test sites damaged or
destroyed within months. The protest by Greenpeace followed a
recommendation by the Association of Local Governments to its 170
members in England and Wales to phase out genetically manipulated
foods (or GM food) until they are proven safe. A number of councils
followed the recommendation. Major food manufacturers and super-
market chains as well as fast-food chains in Britain had already
announced that they will not carry any products that contain geneti-
cally modified ingredients. A poll in the summer of 1999 found that 79
percent of the British public agrees that GM crop testing should be
stopped. In Canada and the United States, genetic modification of
foodstuff has hardly been questioned by the public. A major political
battle on this front between North America and Europe is likely.
     In January of 1999, the Daily Telegraph (January 22, 1999: 9)
reported that the British Medical Association warns, in a report
entitled Biotechnology Weapons and Humanity, that rapid advances in
genetics will “soon transform biological weapons into potent tools
of ethnic cleansing and terrorism.” The British Medical Association
urged that the regulations of the 1972 International Biological and
Toxic Weapons Convention should be tightened and improved,
anticipating the possibility of genetic warfare which is a practical
possibility today.
     The so-called ‘genetic protection initiative’ (the petition for a
referendum ‘for the protection of life and environment from genetic
manipulation’) in Switzerland was clearly rejected in June 1998 in a
plebiscite in all the cantons, to the great ‘relief of the pharmaceutical
industry’ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 8, 1998). With a voter turnout
of 40.6 percent, 66.6 percent of voters opposed the petition, which
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according to its advocates would have declared Switzerland to be a
great, unified ‘genetic protection area’. The petition demanded, among
other things, changes to the Swiss constitution forbidding the produc-
tion, purchase and sale of genetically modified animals, the release of
genetically modified organisms into the environment and the granting
of patents for genetically modified animals and plants.
     The fact that all of my examples of recent attempts to regulate the
application of knowledge deal with genetic research – and the list
could easily be extended – is, of course, a result of the fears and / or
nightmares which have lately been prompted by just this area of
research.
Knowledge Politics
In this contribution I plan to discuss what may well become one of
the most significant and contentious issues for intellectual, legal,
public, scientific and political discourse in the coming century: the
growing pressure to police novel knowledge – or in other words, the
emergence of a new field of political activity, namely knowledge
1politics. In democratically organized societies, it is a legitimate role
of political discourse and action to contribute to and take part in
decisions that effect the ways in which scientific knowledge and
possible technological artifacts are deployed in society or not.
     During the early post-war decades of rapid economic growth, the
application of scientific and technical knowledge in developed socie-
ties was not necessarily unanimously and uncritically advocated, to be
sure, but there was a considerable degree of silent assent.
     Such headlines of recent times as ‘We know too much’ and ‘How
much genetic self-knowledge is good for us?’, or keywords from ever
more vehement disputes, such as ‘We dare not make use of everything
we know’, are part of the background and the environment of the
current increasingly urgent demands for the regulation of knowledge
2in modern societies. These science and technology controversies
open a window on modern struggles over meaning and morality,
economic benefits and damages, as well as the emerging and shifting
3locations of social power and control in knowledge societies.
     More specifically, it is the shift from regulating and policing nor-
mality or identity (Foucault) to the growing concern in knowledge
societies with efforts to police novelty and differences. As I have
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indicated, the examples that come to mind, and that have captured the
attention of the media and the public recently, are numerous and
4growing. For example, the United Nations, provoked by advances
in ocean exploration, is drafting a treaty that attempts to regulate
marine archeology and commercial efforts to hunt for and reclaim lost
cultural treasures – and therefore the knowledge about ancient civili-
zations, such as the empire of the Phoenicians, that may come with
their discovery (cf. New York Times, October 12, 1998).
     It is perhaps self-evident and comes as no surprise to anticipate that
‘knowing’ will be seen in knowledge societies as a domain in urgent
need of policing and as a site to study the functioning of power in
5modern society. Inasmuch as the widespread dissemination of
knowledge increases the fragility of modern societies (cf. Stehr 2000)
efforts designed to control knowledge may be interpreted as strategic
attempts to reduce or manage their fragility. Whether such attempts
are likely to be successful is therefore an important issue.
     But the issue of the control of knowledge becomes significant for
another reason as well. Insofar as knowledge, especially ‘additional’
knowledge, assumes growing importance within the economic system
and becomes subject to economic interests, efforts to control, restrict
or privatize its use will grow as well. A prominent example comes
from genetic research and the Human Genome Project in particular.
In light of the intensive competition among hundreds of researchers
worldwide in the Human Genome Project, the concern intensifies that
findings that might ‘alter the world economy’ will be monopolized, at
last temporarily, if they can be protected by patents or other forms of
intervention by the state. And since it is not only knowledge about
genes that may turn into a valuable raw material, the fear of a progres-
sive privatization of science grows.
     Finally, demands to cope with the growth of knowledge refer to
the attendant extension in capacities to act. Actors increasingly find
themselves in situations in which the need for novel decisions
emerges; and with it, of course, new apprehended dangers and risks. The
potential openness, and not the self-evident traditional closure, of
situations calls for, it seems, regulation and policing of knowledge
now that knowledge is seen as the motor of new possibilities to
‘manipulate’ elements of a situation that in the past had been appre-
hended as beyond the control of all participants. The role and the
prominence of references to fate, nature or the design of some higher
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being that symbolized the closure of conditions of action lose their
relevance. What was seen as forever beyond the control of everyone
now becomes – initially in the thought experiments of a few individu-
als, at least – subject to control and manipulation. And what was in
the past seen as an exceptional moral dilemma, or the need to arrive at
a decision in an extreme situation or under rare circumstances, now
becomes increasingly common.
Regulating Knowledge
Efforts to police knowledge are not new. The notorious and ongoing
struggle in some parts of the United States, for example, to ban the
teaching of evolution in schools is therefore a relevant case in point.
The vote of the Kansas Board of Education to delete virtually any
6mention of evolution from the state’s science curriculum is one of
the more recent examples of successful efforts of creationists to ban
mention not only of biological evolution but also of the big bang
theory from the curricular guidelines of schools in the United States.
But most of the efforts to regulate and police the possible ideological
and cultural effects of science that have been and continue to be
undertaken from time to time in different societies have not been
7overly successful. In addition, there is a distinctive shift in the kinds
of concerns and consequences that may prompt efforts directed
toward the regulation of knowledge. In the last couple of decades,
there is a noticeable shift from concerns that revolve around security,
to concerns with risk and now more and more to questions of uncer-
8tainty (cf. Bechmann / Stehr 2000).
     A transformation in public sentiment in favor of policing knowl-
9edge signals a basic change in the legitimacy of science, in particular
a shift away from a preoccupation with the ‘ideological’ or cultural
implications of basic knowledge claims generated by science and
possible conflicts with established world views, and toward an in-
creasing preoccupation with its practical application and consequen-
ces. What I have in mind is perhaps best described as an attempt to
directly control or regulate the immediate use or anticipated conse-
quences of incremental knowledge but not the ‘secondary’ implica-
10tions of knowledge. Attempts to police the secondary consequences
of knowledge claims could refer, for instance, to action in the form of
regulations prompted by the claim that passive smoking increases
blood pressure. Efforts to curtail smoking in certain spaces or by
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certain individuals may be based on and justified by this claim. But in
such a context the claim itself is not the subject of any regulation.
     The now widely discussed public demystification of experts may be
seen not only as a prime example of a fundamental change in the
nature of the relations between knowledge-based occupations and
clients, consumers, patients, students, trainees, customers, etc., but
also as a profound transformation in the public image of scientific
knowledge. This change considerably enlarges the number and range
of individuals who relinquish their traditional subordinate role in such
expert / client relations as recipients of advice that rests on an a priori
suspension of doubt. Helen Lopata has described the process I have in
mind as the ‘sophistication and the rebelliousness of the client’ in
contexts in which expert knowledge is dispensed (Lopata 1976: 437).
Lopata notes that several social changes are responsible for the diffi-
culty in monopolizing knowledge, by the professions for instance, and
for the refusal of consumers and clients to remain passive and conform-
ing recipients of expert advice. There is, first of all, the very increase
in the volume of knowledge-based occupations, which reduces the
ability to strictly enforce and control the boundaries and the nature of
discourse and increases the fragmentation of fields of expertise. The
fragmentation of expertise becomes public knowledge. Secondly, the
astuteness and cognitive skills of the public increases. New organi-
zations and pressure groups emerge, reinforcing the decline in the
authority of experts.
     Efforts to regulate and police knowledge are typically undertaken
and / or initiated as well as legitimated outside the boundaries of the
scientific community (naturally with repercussions for the production
of knowledge within the science system). For the purposes at hand,
‘regulating’ refers, in the most general sense, to the conscious, strategic
use of political and legal power, as well as economic resources and
cultural authority, to shape – whatever the specific objective – the
11utilization of scientific-technical knowledge. It involves a complex
set of mainly formal ventures designed to encourage, restrict, shape, or
banish knowledge claims and set standards for their use through
pressure, the creation of institutions, and the deployment of norms
and beliefs to make certain that knowledge evolves along a desired
path and has only sanctioned consequences.
     The source of the standards chosen to police knowledge, the reg-
ulatory procedures put in place, and the intellectual systems legitimi-
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zing the cultural dismissal of certain uses of knowledge typically also
do not originate in science and technology itself. For example, in the
face of demands to preserve and defend the nature of human nature in
response to developments in scientific and technical capacities to alter
the status quo of human reproduction, scientific ‘notions of nature do
not provide us with unambiguous standards of naturalness to which
we can appeal for normative orientation’ (van den Daele 1992: 549).
Since scientific notions of naturalness allow for the construction of a
range of possible natures, regulation efforts advancing the cause of
abstaining from practical steps intervening into human nature have to
appeal to moral claims and political action that may or may not
succeed in arresting human nature. The anchoring of standards and
justifications outside of science does not mean that individuals who
are scientists may not be found among those who vigorously support
attempts to regulate knowledge.
     My list of the available measures to control knowledge may at first
leave the impression that I include science and technology policies as
primary examples of such efforts. Strategies designed to regulate
knowledge are mostly responses to changed and novel knowledge, not
vice versa. Science and technology policies aim to encourage the
development of knowledge, but they generally do so in highly ambiv-
alent and open-ended fashion. Many decades of experience demon-
strate, furthermore, that it is difficult or even impossible to steer and
control the dynamics of developments in science and technology by
way of political standards (cf. van den Daele 1992: 553–555). In
contrast to strategic efforts designed to plan and encourage future
knowledge, attempts to ‘police’ knowledge cover a much wider social
field than science and technology policies, including more informal
control processes. The controls knowledge politics may impose could
extend to the ways in which knowledge is disseminated and travels, is
dispensed, made accessible, employed and interpreted.
     The ideal-typical concepts of research and knowledge policies and
their separate strategic functions for the development of knowledge
and its societal deployment may increasingly be blurred in knowledge
societies as the boundaries of science and society become more fluid
and porous. Efforts to regulate knowledge will influence science
policies and sciences policies will have an impact on attempts to police
knowledge.
     Shifting boundaries between science and politics for example may
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be manifest with respect to the process of the fabrication of knowl-
edge; in particular, the emergence of cognitive closure, consensus
formation or the evolution of uncontested facts in scientific fields
increasingly may incorporate non-scientific actors and non-systemic
groups. The more or less direct intervention into cognitive processes
in science perhaps is most evident in the case of problem-oriented
research such as environmental research, risk and technology assess-
ment. Some fields of medical research may serve as another example.
In France, the involvement and support of patient groups for the
treatment of muscular dystrophy has lead to considerable investments
by their organisation into molecular biology and the human genome
(cf. Latour 1998: 208).
The Social Control of Knowledge Claims in Science
In yet another sense, the social control of knowledge claims in knowl-
edge-rich and knowledge-based social systems is not a novel phe-
nomenon. What makes science unique among social systems, for
example, is the way in which and the extent to which the social task of
maintaining the ‘quality of the products’ of science is accomplished
‘with so little difficulty that the problem of quality control has
received no more than passing mention in any systematic discussion of
science’ (Ravetz 1971: 273). Assessment of ‘quality’ is constitutive of
much of the work done in science.
     For Karl Popper, as is well known, the willingness to submit ideas
to critical scrutiny and commitment, and not to accept knowledge
claims at face value, constitutes the demarcation criterion between
science and other social systems, including systems driven by ideas.
Whether or not such a demarcation criterion linked to the motives of
individual scientists and the institutional norms allows us to distin-
guish in an unambivalent manner between science and other increas-
ingly knowledge-based social institutions is not at issue in this con-
text. Nor do I intend to inquire into the functions of quality control,
how the standards of the quality control may be elaborated, the
precise mechanisms and enforcement of the social control of knowl-
edge in science, whether these processes are effective in weeding out
‘shoddy science’, and how science may be stratified with respect to the
policing of knowledge. Much has been written about these matters in
recent years. Quality control in present-day science is clearly no
longer as invisible and taken-for-granted as in the past. However, a
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more extensive discussion of the internal control mechanisms of
science is accompanied by skepticism about the efficacy of self-polic-
ing, and therefore by demands that control within the scientific
community must become a strictly formalized undertaking. In a
society that is itself knowledge-based, the problem of the social
control of knowledge both within and outside of science inevitably
becomes a central social and political problem
     The social regulation of science-in-progress is a highly difficult and
perhaps impossible undertaking that, furthermore, has the unintended
consequence of reducing the authority of science as an asset to poli-
tics. Perhaps the most significant barrier in the way of extensive
external social control mechanisms on science-in-progress is the size
and organization of the scientific enterprise today, as well as its
12competitive and its international texture. The politics of science
must not be conflated with the politics of society. The politics of
knowledge cannot simply be reduced to political power, and science
generates many kinds of knowledge, not only knowledge that is
essentially political and therefore of immediate practical use.
The Societal Regulation of Knowledge
It seems highly likely that not only the state and major social institu-
tions, but also social movements and groups of affected ‘laypersons’,
will demand and organize to implement measures to increasingly
regulate knowledge. In the past two decades, for example, AIDS
research in the United States has been marked ‘by a sustained lay
invasion of the domain of scientific fact-making’ (Epstein 1996: 330)
breaking down some of the entrenched barriers between science and
13society. The experience of AIDS research signals that efforts to
control the application of knowledge – in this case prominently the
aspects of who is to benefit, when and for what ‘price’ – has repercus-
sions for the development of knowledge in academic science and for
research and development in corporations.
     It is perhaps self-evident that the growing efforts to police knowl-
edge signal that claims about the inevitability of a self-propelled
domination of society by science are simply unsupportable. The
specific issue I will therefore discuss is not what I consider almost
beyond dispute, namely that the deployment of control and regulation
measures will increasingly be aimed at knowledge, but rather the
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entirely unresolved issue of the likely efficacy of all efforts to police
knowledge. There is a yawning gulf between approaches that stress
the ease with which knowledge is monopolized and controlled by an
elite and the very different perspective advanced here, which emphasi-
zes the extent to which the expanded role of knowledge significantly
diminishes the ability of either major societal institutions or small
groups to harness without serious challenge the gains that result from
the growth of knowledge.
     During the evolution of industrial society, liberal democracies
successively instituted increasingly elaborate legal frames pertaining to
the social status and use of property and labor. Thus the freedom of
economic actors to exercise power and authority by virtue of their
individual or collective ownership over labor power or the means of
production is increasingly constrained and circumscribed by a host of
legal norms, as well as organizations and political programs that
emerge around these factors. Ownership is restrained not only
spontaneously by the market, for example, but also by the state.
Deliberate and anticipatory legal constraints on the use of property
and labor are not neutral. Legal norms convey, from the point of view
of certain actors, especially those who feel impotent in acquiring
ownership and in affecting the legal rules pertaining to their disposi-
tion, privileges; while they signal (natural) rights to those who control
property and labor. Unequal access to ownership, and therefore any
stratification of effective influence on the construction of the legal
restraints and rights, is in turn typically – but not always exclusively –
based on an unequal distribution of labor and property in industrial
society, elements that are constitutive for its social and economic
existence.
     It is almost self-evident that legal efforts and legislation in knowl-
edge societies will be increasingly directed toward ways of controlling
the employment, and indirectly the development, of knowledge. I
emphasize political and legislative efforts to control the implementa-
tion of scientific knowledge rather than more tenuous forms of infor-
mal or spontaneous social control because the latter are simply part
and parcel of the conventional state of affairs of science and its relation
to society, namely the standard selectivity with which knowledge
develops and is utilized. Vigorous opposition to political ventures to
limit the considerable autonomy of the modern scientific community
and to control knowledge will be as common as was opposition to
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efforts to control the use of property or the ways in which labor
power might be utilized by the owners of the means of production.
     One question that must be examined in the face of demands for the
regulation of scientific findings has to do with the problem (which is
not merely a new problem) of the extent of the social independence of
science, its origins, its foundation and development; as well as the
demand, which under certain circumstances opposes such independ-
ence, for some kind of control over scientific development, the
communication of scientific findings and / or the consequences of
scientific knowledge, whether through a kind of voluntary self-con-
trol by scientists or by means of externally implemented measures.
     The type of control over science that is chiefly of interest here is
therefore not related to the (primary) social control of scientific
findings, that is to say, to forms of control that arise from the exist-
ence of such social constructs as the ‘scientific community’ itself. The
system-specific regulation of knowledge has already been mentioned.
Robert K. Merton, in one of the most influential treatments of this
topic, has attempted to describe the peculiar form of primary or
system-immanent social control in the modern scientific community
by drawing attention to the existence of a number of special social
norms that regulate the social relations among scientists. The presence
of a particular social convention, such as for example the demand for
unimpeded access of all scientists to all research findings, which also
simultaneously means a ban on any form of secrecy or selective
communication of scientific results, represents, no matter what
attitude one takes to the concrete rules of conduct, a form of social
control that influences or regulates, for example, the possible content,
extent, goals and methods of communication. In summary, only a
limited palette of possibilities from a multitude of other possibilities in
the relevant context can be realized. In terms of primary social con-
trol, it is therefore a matter of a control taken for granted by scientists,
and of a form of constraint on their social and intellectual life that is
largely regarded as legitimate and necessary. Whenever the control
and / or the freedom of science are under discussion, this taken-for-
granted social control cannot be at issue. This control, which certainly
must vary in its extent and manner and in the degree to which it is
accepted, is, if you like, one of the indispensable resources of the
social cohesion or solidarity of any institution, and thus of the scien-
tific community as well.
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     Against the background of system specific social control within
science, therefore, those discussions that lead to a revision or exten-
sion of the already existing forms of control in the scientific commu-
nity are of interest. With mounting efforts outside of science to
regulate new knowledge produced by science, the nature of social
control within science is bound to be effected and changed. I do not
merely mean to refer to what constitutes a kind of anticipatory
regulation of research efforts and the informal or formal acceptance of
zones that constitute investigatory matters and methods that are off
limits, for instance, in the form of ethical certification requirements. In
fact, what can and likely may increasingly occur is a convergence or
mixture of regulatory practices.
     Appended to the United States Human Genome Project is an
NIH / DOE Committee to Evaluate the Ethical, Legal, and Social
Implications Program of the Human Genome Project (ELSI). The
committee has a short but contested history. The National Institute of
Health (NIH) has proposed to attach ELSI units to its other institutes
and research endeavors (cf. Murray 2000). Such a program, though
peer-review based but not in the usual sense since assessments of
research proposals are interdisciplinary, represents at least an en-
largement of traditional system specific mechanisms of social control
in science if not, in this instance, an intrusion of the state and the
public concerns into the regulation of the development of knowledge
and obviously difficult anticipatory judgments about its social impli-
cations. Such committees also raise the general question of the role of
democratic order and the influence civic society ought to have on the
ways in which the results of scientific research are deployed if at all.
The Public and Science
And in this context, the ‘loss of contact’ (Holton 1986: 92) between
science and the larger public is today emerging as a salient attribute of
the interrelation between knowledge and society. Large segments of
the public have become disenfranchised, at least in the view of the
scientific community. This loss of contact is not only the result of a
growing cognitive distance between science and everyday knowledge;
it is also affected by the ever increasing speed of knowledge expansion
and by the deployment of knowledge as a productive capacity. The
decreasing cognitive proximity increases the political distance from
science, for example by restricting public reflection on both anticipat-
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ed and unanticipated transformations of knowledge resulting from
14the application of knowledge. The scientific community shares
responsibility for this diminishing intellectual proximity, since the
preferred self-image of science as a consensual, even monolithic and
monologic, enterprise is increasingly in conflict with both its public
role and its own internal struggles about research priorities, as well as
the generation of data and their interpretation.
     However, on political and moral grounds many groups, constit-
uencies and institutions must be consulted before decisions are made
about issues that affect the regulation of knowledge and indirectly the
development of science and technology. It would be misleading to
think that the distance from and the loss of contact with science, or
the considerable scientific illiteracy in modern societies, is somehow a
‘potentially fatal flaw in the self-conception of the people today’
(Holton 1992: 105) and / or signals the possibility of a dramatic
collapse in public support for science. It is more accurate, perhaps, to
speak of a state of precarious balance affecting the autonomy and
dependence of science in modern society. A loss of close intellectual
contact between science and the public is perfectly compatible with
both a diffuse support for science in modern society and an assent to
legal and political efforts to control the impact of science and technol-
ogy. In another sense, however, the loss of cognitive contact is almost
irrelevant, and highly controversial; for example, when ‘contact’ is
meant to refer to close cognitive proximity as a prerequisite of public
participation in decisions affecting scientific and technological knowl-
edge. Such a claim is practically meaningless because it almost requires
public engagement in science-in-progress (cf. Collins 1987: 691).
     From the point of view of the scientific community, the lack of
cognitive proximity to the general public has advantages and disad-
vantages. The loss of contact between science and the public can
perhaps explain, at least in part, why the scientific community, in view
of its attractiveness and usefulness for corporations, the military and
the state, has been able to preserve a considerable degree of intellectual
autonomy (cf. Gilbert / Mulkay 1984). Such autonomy, however, is
contingent on a host of factors within and without the scientific
community. The loss of contact is a resource for the scientific com-
munity. It signals a symbolic detachment and independence that can
be translated into an asset vis-à-vis the state and other societal agen-
cies. Science becomes an authoritative voice in policy matters; or it
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represents, in ideological and material struggles with other political
systems, the openness of society (cf. Mukerji 1989: 190–203). But the
cognitive distance also limits the immediate effectiveness of the ‘voice
15of science’ in policy matters, and extensive autonomy and independ-
ence of science may result in an excessive celebration of ‘normal’
scientific activity and lead to a lack of innovativeness.
     From the point of view of the non-scientific institutions, the lack of
intellectual proximity of the public to scientific knowledge in general
and research fronts in particular also has both advantages and draw-
backs. Selected disaffection with science and technology has always
accompanied its development; strong demands and efforts to legislate
selectivity in the ways in which knowledge is implemented and de-
ployed can lead to even stronger disaffections with science, although
such a response may be dismissed as part of an anti-science crusade or
movement. But the term ‘anti-science’ is vague and brings together a
broad range of things that typically ‘have in common only that they
tend to annoy or threaten those who regard themselves as more en-
lightened’ (Holton 1992: 104).
The Developments of Social Controls
The social control and regulation of scientific knowledge that has
moved from the stage of being-in-progress to some form of comple-
tion and desires to be implemented outside of the scientific communi-
ty is already quite extensive. In all modern societies, we now find
elaborate drug regulations and corresponding agencies that register,
test, control or permit pharmaceutical substances to enter the market
as legalized drugs. Until a few decades ago, decisions about the pro-
duction and marketing of chemicals as drugs were typically made by
corporations, by individual pharmacists or by physicians (cf. Bode-
witz et al. 1987). As scientific knowledge is ‘applied’, it becomes
embedded in social contexts external to science. As a part of such
embeddedness, knowledge is subject to the kinds of control mecha-
nisms and social constraints found in these contexts. It simply cannot
escape the selectivity that issues from such external contexts, even if
only in efforts designed to generate trust toward a certain artifact or
solution offered by novel knowledge.
     The whole area of national and international intellectual property
and copyright protection is another arena in which legislation to
control the deployment of scientific and technical knowledge is
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already extensive. In many ways, such controls date back at least to
the 1883 Paris Convention for patents and related industrial matters
and to the 1886 Berne Convention for copyrights. The acceleration in
the speed with which inventions reach the market, their shortened
economic life-span and the extent to which recent inventions, for
example in the field of microelectronics, the organization of produc-
tion, medical treatments and biotechnology, are difficult to protect
from copying efforts will increase pressures to enact further protective
legislation (cf. Vaitsos 1989).
     In social theory, the institution generating knowledge and the
institution contemplating and executing political action were once
regarded as entirely unrelated domains. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, the dilemma of the indispensable separation of
science and politics found perhaps its most influential expression in
Max Weber’s ([1921] 1948: 77–128; [1922] 1948: 129–156) essays on
science and politics as a vocation. Today, the intellectual foundations
that allowed Weber to legitimize the fundamental division between
the practices of knowledge and politics have fallen into disrepute.
Confidence in the neutrality, instrumentality and political neutrality
of science has been thoroughly eroded. Reference to the politics of
knowledge therefore no longer constitutes a profound break or a
violation of the norms of scientific action and the essentially means-
like attributes of scientific knowledge. Science is deeply implicated in
social action and political agendas hold sway over science. Precisely
how dependent or interdependent science and politics are is a matter
of ongoing debate and empirical analysis. But the widespread disen-
chantment with science and the extensive material dependence of the
scientific community on the state do not justify the equally unrealistic
proposition that the boundaries between politics and science have
altogether vanished. Science remains embedded in particular political
realities, and as long as it is situated in a form of civil and political
society free of totalitarian strains, scientific activity tends to benefit.
By the same token, as long as traffic across the boundaries of science
remains widely unimpeded and subject to negotiation, both science
and society gain.
     In as much as knowledge becomes the constitutive principle of
modern society, the production, distribution and especially the appli-
cation of knowledge can avoid political struggles and conflicts less
than ever. The distribution and implementation (and with it the
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fabrication) of knowledge increasingly becomes a domain of explicit
legislation and a target of political and economic decisions. Such a
development is inevitable, because ‘as the institutions of knowledge
lay claim to public resources, some public claim on these institutions’
(Bell 1968: 238) and their results are unavoidable. Even more signifi-
cant is that, as the importance of knowledge as a central societal
resource increases, its social, economic and political consequences for
social relations grow rapidly, together with demands to regulate the
specific utilization and access to knowledge.
     The dissemination and application of knowledge does not occur
in the imaginary world of perfect competition and equality of op-
portunities. As a result, a politics of knowledge must confront the
consequences of the social distribution of knowledge, especially the
stratified access to and utilization of knowledge. It remains an open
question, for example, to what extent dispossession of knowledge
generates social conflicts and in what specific ways such struggles
manifest themselves. Daniel Bell (1964: 49) warned several decades ago
that right-wing extremism may ‘benefit’ from any exclusion of social
groups from access to and acquisition of technical expertise.
     However, such predictions about the intellectual, social and
economic gaps sustained by knowledge overestimate the extent to
which knowledge and its use can in fact be controlled. It will be
increasingly difficult to control knowledge, in spite of the many
efforts that will undoubtedly be made. Efforts to control knowledge
encounter contradictions. Sustaining economic growth, for example,
requires an expansion of knowledge. And knowledge that expands
rapidly is difficult to control. The expansion of knowledge enlarges
the segment of knowledge-based occupations. Knowledge expansion
and knowledge dissemination rely on conditions that are themselves
inimical to control. Nonetheless, as I have observed, the typically
expressed fear that an inevitable outcome of such developments is the
greater ease with which knowledge (and information) can be monopo-
lized and effectively employed for repressive (even totalitarian)
purposes, or even as a tool of maintaining the benign status quo, had
been a widely accepted premise of discussion of the social control of
knowledge even before Orwell’s classic book on the subject. What
exactly nourishes this point of view? What is the basis for the wide-
spread conviction that knowledge and technical artifacts are relatively
easy to control and that access to knowledge can be easily denied?
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Knowledge Hierarchies and Monopolies
One of the ways to understand the various means by which knowl-
edge is seen to be controlled, perhaps even monopolized, and its gains
– following the Matthew principle – primarily allocated to the rich
and powerful, is to examine the literature that has incessantly in-
formed us that precisely such outcomes are built into the very logic of
scientific and technological development. What exactly is it, in the
view of these critics, that gives technology and scientific knowledge
such potency and discriminatory power? And what kinds of mundane
encounters with modern science and technology may have prompted
or at least reinforced the critics’ theoretical conceptions of science and
technology? Typical encounters with science and technology in
everyday life must have left their mark and strengthened otherwise
rather abstract assessments of the technical artifacts and scientific
knowledge. I will suggest that these essential and affirming encounters
are experiences with ‘frozen’ or arrested technical artifacts and knowl-
edge forms.
     My aim is not an exegesis of the epistemological or theoretical
ancestry of such views. I presuppose that the critique of modernity,
insofar as it touches upon the rationality of science and technology,
represents a form of civilizational critique that has accompanied the
emergence of modern societies from the beginning. The critics of
modern civilization flatly reject the claim that science and technology,
as celebrated by its proponents, are socially and politically neutral. As
Marcuse pointedly asserts: “Science, by virtue of its own method and
concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domi-
nation of nature has remained linked to the domination of man”
(Marcuse [1964] 1989: 166). For illustrative purposes, I refer in some
detail to two representative philosophical and sociological critiques of
the interrelations between the social and intellectual fabric of society,
knowledge and technology; namely, the analysis of modern science
16and technology by Herbert Marcuse and Helmut Schelsky.
     Marcuse’s views of the role of modern science and technology
gained considerable public resonance with the publication in 1964 of
his One-Dimensional Man, subtitled ‘Studies in the Ideology of Ad-
vanced Industrial Society’; but they can be traced back to his writings
and those of both Adorno and Horkheimer in the early 1940s. Critical
theory, in effect, abandons Marx for Weber on the issue of the eman-
cipatory potential of modern reason. Marcuse observes at the time,
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‘National Socialism is a striking example of the ways in which a highly
rationalized and mechanized economy with the utmost efficiency in
production can operate in the interest of a totalitarian oppression and
continued scarcity. The Third Reich is indeed a form of “technocracy”
(Marcuse 1941: 414). In the case of National Socialism, politics is still a
decisive force; yet technical knowledge is already seen as an indispens-
able instrument of political control.
     A quarter of a century later, Marcuse assails the scientific mind and
the transformation of knowledge into a form of scientific-technical
rationality that has perverted the project of emancipation and has led
to the human domination of nature. Marcuse (1964: 146) argues that
such outcomes are inherent in science, that ‘scientific-technical ration-
ality and manipulation are welded together into new forms of social
control’ resulting in a kind of epistemic enslavement of modern indi-
viduals. Modern individuals become incapable of seeing and dealing
with the world in any other manner, hence their entrapment.
     The technical presumption of science becomes a political presump-
tion and has consequences for human social organization because the
transformation of nature, according to the logic of technology, also
involves changes in the social relations of individuals. Whatever claims
may be made on behalf of the essential political neutrality and poten-
tial of technology, Marcuse stresses emphatically, even against Marx,
that a technology that has become the universal form of material
production, “circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical
totality – a ‘world’” (Marcuse 1964: 154). In other words, the relation
and respective implication of science and its technical application, and
of the nature of the society that is thereby created, can in the final
analysis only be viewed as an intimate connection that operates under
the same logic. Technological reason and its universals, namely the
discipline and control of production resulting in regimentation, the
pursuit of narrow goals or specialization and the absolute uniformity
of regimented and specialized labor or standardization, are bound to
17predominate throughout society.
     The same inherent force, the rationality of domination, soon
propels the universes of scientific and ordinary discourse. All sectors
of society, all social activities and all subjectivities are brought under
the control of technical forms of discourse. The domination of nature
and society go hand in hand. Science and society become reflections of
the logic of technical rationality. Marcuse therefore concludes that the
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“scientific method which led to the ever-more-effective domination of
nature thus came to provide the pure concepts as well as the instru-
mentalities for the ever-more-effective domination of man by man
through the domination of nature … Today domination perpetuates
and extends itself not only through technology but as technology, and
the latter provides the great legitimation of the expanding political
18power, which absorbs all spheres of culture” (Marcuse 1964: 158).
The resulting lack of freedom and autonomy appears neither as
irrational nor as the result of political forces but as a ‘rational’ submis-
sion to the technical necessities of existence. In the final instance,
therefore, instrumental reason becomes ubiquitous and turns life in
society into a ‘totalitarian’ existence. The sphere of the political be-
comes, as in Schelsky’s scientific civilization, the sphere (‘the incessant
dynamic of technical progress has become permeated with political
content’ [Marcuse 1964: 159]) and rationality becomes irrationality.
The state becomes merely an expression of the technical base and is
depoliticized. Social change will be arrested for the most part, espe-
cially by virtue of the power and the primacy of the society’s adminis-
trative apparatus, and this containment of social transformations is
perhaps the most singular achievement of advanced industrial society.
     Marcuse’s analysis of scientific rationality is highly abstract and
lacks congruence with social reality, especially with the ways in which
and the extent to which many modern individuals experience spheres
of autonomy and responsibility. He provides no examples of how
technological means are turned into mere means of social control and
domination; for example, how the telephone or television invariably
become instruments of domination. The reluctance of dictators to
promote a modern telephone system in the early part of this century
would indicate that they feared its subversive possibilities. To this
very day, differences in economic and demographic factors do not
satisfactorily account for the large disparities in the dissemination of
the telephone in state socialist and capitalist societies after the Second
World War (cf. Buchner 1988). But even more to the point is Alain
Touraine’s observation that Marcuse’s theory of modern society lacks
reality congruence: “The image of a totally unified society, in which
there is a perfect correspondence between technology, firms, the State,
and the behavior of consumers and even citizens could not be further
removed from observable reality” (Touraine [1992] 1995: 159).
     Helmut Schelsky’s thesis that advanced industrial society is evolv-
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ing into ‘scientific civilization’ was first expounded by him in a
lecture in 1961 entitled ‘Humans in scientific civilization’. For Schels-
ky, modern technology represents not merely an adaptive capacity to
the constraints of nature, but a reconstruction of nature by society,
and therefore of society. In the context of modern technology,
humans no longer confront nature with the assistance of organs aided,
improved and developed in their capacity by technology, but on the
basis of a ‘detour’ via the brain, or the application of theoretical
knowledge in practical contexts. The outcome is that, using the
language Schelsky employs, an ‘artificial’ nature as well as an ‘artifi-
cial’ change of humankind itself. The result therefore is a “re-construc-
tion and re-creation of man … in his corporal, psychological and
social existence” (Schelsky [1961] 1965: 16). We produce, as Schelsky
observes, “the scientific civilization not only as technology but
necessarily also in a much broader sense continually as ‘society’ and as
‘soul’” (Schelsky [1961] 1965: 17).
     Modern technology changes the relations of humans to nature, to
themselves and to others. The result of this dual transformation is the
‘circulation of self-determined production’ (Schelsky [1961] 1965: 16)
representing the real foundation of scientific civilization. The self-reg-
ulated and self-propelled nature of this process, the constant produc-
tion and reproduction, evolves into a self-steering process which does
not appear to allow for any escape:
Every technical problem and every technical solution invariably becomes also
a social, a psychological issue because the self-propelled nature of this process,
created by man, confronts humans as a social and psychological dictate which
in turn requires nothing but a technical solution, a solution planned and
executed by man since this is the nature of the condition to be tackled (Schels-
ky [1961] 1965: 16–17).
Modern technology constitutes a particular logic, and this logic neces-
sarily becomes the dominant logic of human life. One of the signifi-
cant consequences of such a conception of technology is that the tradi-
tional ‘logic’ of technology reverses itself. That is, technology as a prod-
ucer of mere means of human action becomes a producer of ends or
meaning, or in other words, ‘means’ of action determine its ends and
prefigure the direction of social change. Schelsky describes technology
as an intellectual process which dissects varied natural objects into
277
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 259-290) T01_10 stehr.p 286938514662
Nico Stehr
their elementary parts in order to re-assemble them according to the
principle of the least effort or maximum efficiency. The result of mod-
ern technological construction, therefore, is a novel product or process
with artificial features and, in analogy, an artificial human being.
     Schelsky’s and Marcuse’s theories evidently converge. They share
the thesis that there is the distinct danger that technology in modern
society will increasingly displace spontaneous social and political
action and significantly reduce individual spheres of responsibility and
autonomy, resulting, in the end, in the ‘death of the self’.
     Marcuse and Schelsky are by no means alone in their assessment of
the trajectory of the social, political and economic development of
advanced industrialized societies. Nor are they alone in attributing the
societal changes they describe to intrinsic and enslaving ‘laws’ of
science and technology. On the contrary, their observations and
warnings resonate with a broad intellectual trend that actually began
to take on its peculiar characteristic in the 1950s, when social theorists
first noted distinctive and presumably irreversible trends in industry
19and production. Social scientists asserted a tendency in industry
toward increasing technological progress, manifesting itself in the
rapid mechanization or automation of production. While the in-
creased automation of production that is, as Marcuse (1964: 35) ob-
serves, inherent in technological progress itself enormously enlarges
the output of commodities, it does not, as many observers then noted,
make work more meaningful, demanding and challenging. The result
is summed up by David Riesman and his collaborators in The Lonely
Crowd (1950): Industry is now producing bored workers through
simplified work routines, and the central meaning of life is increasing-
ly shifting away from work toward a search for creative expressions in
leisure activities.
     Schelsky’s and Marcuse’s observations resonate with Bell’s (1960)
thesis about the end of ideology, as well as with the prognosis by
Robert Lane (1966) that we are about to enter an age in which
scientific knowledge increasingly dislodges the political element from
politics. By the same token, the futurists Herman Kahn and B.
Bruce-Briggs (1972: 8–29) in the early 1970s discern multi-trends
within modern society that have been widely noticed by ‘macro-his-
torians’, including the ‘centralization and concentration of economic
and political power’ as well as ‘innovative and manipulative social
engineering’. The growing rationality that comes with the rapid ac-
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cumulation of scientific and technical knowledge, according to Kahn
and Bruce-Biggs, is increasingly applied to “social, political, cultural,
and economic worlds” (Kahn / Bruce-Biggs 1972: 9). Although this
trend may not accelerate, the desirability of social engineering is
widely supported and an “almost universal belief among the educat-
ed” (Kahn / Bruce-Biggs 1972: 29).
     The influence of ideological and, more generally, of political factors
on scientific and technical developments remains unanalyzed, howev-
er. This suggests that the conventional central theoretical categories
employed in the analysis of modern society, partly inherited by
present-day social science from the past century, such as class or
economy but also such notions as capitalist or socialist, have lost their
crucial role in social theory. Observers were increasingly convinced
that the distinction between capitalist and state socialist economic
orders was becoming obsolete. At the same time, however, confidence
in the power and the uniqueness of scientific knowledge remained
strong. Raymond Aron ([1962] 1967: 42) embraced and highlighted
these assumptions in his theory of ‘progressive’ industrial society. At
the same time, questions about the motor of ‘social change’ or the
centrality of the economic system for societal transformations were
raised anew. It is at this time that theorists began to advance the thesis
that technology and science, rather than the economy, are the real
motor of societal change in modern social systems (cf. Parsons 1970:
619).
     More generally, however, Schelsky’s and Marcuse’s accounts of the
social and political force of modern science and technology suffer
from an unintended but nonetheless misplaced confidence in the
practical efficacy of scientific reasoning and quantification. Knowl-
edge and technology are for the most part treated as a black box. The
concern with technical artifacts is primarily functionalist. The major
question posed concerns the psychological, social and political
consequences of objects in the sphere of social relations. What exactly
confers such power on objects is never examined. Marcuse and
Schelsky presuppose an image of science and technology that then
gives them reason to despair. One perceived consequence of technolo-
gy and science, the extent to which the world of objects begins to
dominate the world of subjects, paradoxically rests on an acceptance
by both Marcuse and Schelsky of the positivist image of science as a
most efficient, rational enterprise that produces highly useful devices
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and knowledge claims. As a result, we must return to our initial
question: what nourishes such a view of science and technology, in
spite of Marcuse’s and Schelsky’s otherwise deep misgivings about
such a science and such efficient technical objects?
     At this point, we must take cognizance of some kind of phenome-
nological analysis of everyday experience and common sense under-
standing of science, especially regarding technical matters, that are not
further investigated by Marcuse and Schelsky, even though they serve
as starting point and as affirmation of their observations. The primary
experience in everyday contact with technology is the finished prod-
uct. The everyday experience of technology is not rooted in an
understanding of the conception and fabrication, in short: The deci-
sions that constitute the nearly always invisible ‘technical code’ of a
matter and that co-determine the ways of using such technologies in
everyday contexts are not manifest to the user.
     Feenberg has provided us with a fruitful explication of the concept
of the technical code: The technical code refers to those attributes of
an object that
reflect the hegemonic values and beliefs that prevail in the design process. Such
codes are usually invisible because, like culture itself, they appear self-evident.
For example, tools and workplaces are designed for adult hands and heights
not because workers are necessarily adults, but because our society expelled
children from the work process at a certain point in history with design
consequences we now take for granted. Technical codes also include the basic
definition of many technical objects insofar as they become universal, cultural-
ly accepted features of daily life. The telephone, the automobile, the refrigera-
tor, and a hundred other everyday devices have clear and unambiguous
definitions in the dominant culture (Feenberg 1995: 4).
While the technical code of an object originates or is provided in the
context of its production, it is thus not yet necessarily decided how
ultimately to handle an object – in the context of its use – as if it were
natural. For this, the ‘cultural code’ is a further requirement, since it
contributes to the decision of which possibilities for use are connected
with an object. Technical and cultural codes may overlap, but they can
also diverge. Ultimately, the cultural code can also change. In any
case, technical and cultural codes more or less definitively limit the
imaginative possibilities for use, and have as a consequence the fact
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that everyday experiences with objects are primarily ‘successful’
experiences. And this counters the disappointments that naturally also
continually occur, nonetheless probably basically confirming the
confidence in the predetermined technical and cultural process of the
object. The technical and cultural code endow the object with a
specific process or even a purpose which will be fulfilled by it. The
codes stabilize usage. Objects confer certainty. The degree of security
that allows these coded processes to be reproduced again and again is
then associated primarily with an image of reliability – although the
goals that can be realized with this reliability can be of various
different kinds. In any case, in the process an emotional connection
with the object takes form. This certainty, security and reliability in
principle in everyday dealings with technical objects at the same time
induces, according to my thesis, a high degree of confidence in the
efficiency of objects. The fact that connected with this efficiency there
might at the same time be a feeling of helplessness or of the ‘power of
objects over us’ is understandable. The limited technical and cultural
code of an object, even if ‘the radical constraints on possible integra-
tion of objects are in the interest of those integrations that serve to
satisfy the needs of powerful individuals or groups’ (Joerges [1979]
1996: 25) obstructs alternative possibilities for use and confirms one’s
helplessness in handling objects. This is, to be sure, nothing other than
a reification of the dominant code.
     A phenomenology of technology underlines some general observa-
tions by Alain Touraine about the actual role of technology in a
society that is increasingly based on technology:
We live in a society in which means were completely divorced from ends. Far
from determining or absorbing ends, the same means could therefore be used
for both good and evil ends, for both reducing inequality and exterminat-
ing minorities. The increasingly dense networks of technologies and signs in
which we now live, and which orient and govern the ways in which we
behave, by no means imprison us in a technological world and by no means
destroy social actors. They impose neither a logic of efficacy and production
nor a logic of control and reproduction. The image of technocracy triumphant
is pathetically inadequate if we contrast it with the increase in consumption,
the rise of nationalisms and the might of transnational companies (Touraine
[1992] 1995: 148–149).
281
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 259-290) T01_10 stehr.p 286938514662
Nico Stehr
Prospects
In my view, efforts to police knowledge and to defend society against
some of the anticipated but also uncertain effects of the utilization of
recent gains in knowledge ultimately will do little to seriously limit its
application, in one way or the other. But this will not keep various
societal agents from trying.
     One of the most immediate and controversial questions that awaits
regulation and resolution as the result of evolving knowledge about
the susceptibility to certain health risks in relation to specific genes is
the question of how insurance companies (and other organizations
and institutions), in particular health insurance companies, will use
such information.
     Private health insurance companies in Germany have announced
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 21, 2000: 17) that they plan to
continue to use established procedures when it comes to a determina-
tion of calculating the risks individual applicants represent (also
Murray 2000: 242–245; Task Force on Genetic Information and
Health Insurance, 1993). That is, full disclosure of all relevant infor-
mation is required. The applicant is under no obligation to disclose
information she / he does not happen to have. A genome analysis will
not, the insurer’s indicate, become a prerequisite in issuing a policy.
However, individuals who happen to such information, for example,
as the result of taking part in a research study, are expected to divulge
the genetic information.
     But how is one to insure that insurance companies limit their usage
of such information voluntarily? What exactly is genetic information?
How broad or narrow can or should one define genetic information?
And, how does one treat the interaction between genetic and non-
genetic ‘causes’? How does one attribute responsibility? Can an insurer
acquire genetic information indirectly, for example, on the basis of a
family history? Are special legal norms required? Genetic tests are
bound to become more common, more accessible, and less and less
expensive. Policing knowledge looks like work that Sisyphus might
know.
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Notes
1 By the same token, a report issued by the Rand Corporation
(Fukuyama / Wagner 2000: 1) anticipates that in the early part “of
stthe 21 century, the technologies emerging from the information
and biotechnology revolutions will present unprecedented gov-
ernance challenges to national and international political systems.”
The report deals with the governance of both research and
knowledge policies.
2 The discussion and formulation of the novel moral principle for a
“right to ignorance” by Hans Jonas (1974: 161–163) is germane in
the context of this discussion.
3 The new political field I identify as ‘knowledge politics’ is, cer-
tainly, not immediately connected with the often-described
ambivalent sense of crisis in modern societies, based on the over-
and / or mass production of knowledge. The tension between the
extent of knowledge production in advanced societies and the
limited capability of the individual person to assimilate the huge
amount of knowledge available, was already described by Georg
Simmel ([1907] 1978) a hundred years ago in a theory of the
current age in the final chapter of his Philosophy of Money. The
tragedy of culture manifests itself in the cleavage between objec-
tive culture made independent and the obstinacy of subjective
culture. The problem of the policing of knowledge is not related to
the production of knowledge in total – even if it is related to
overproduction, however that may be defined – but rather to the
range of incremental knowledge, which is conceived as being
capable of changing reality.
4 Dorothy Nelkin (1995: 447–456) has published an informative
typological summary of the public controversies in which science
has found itself embroiled in the United States in the past.
5 Steve Fuller (1993: 377) advances a similar assertion, as far as I
can see. He indicates that ‘in the world of tomorrow, break-
throughs in the natural sciences are regarded as triumphs of
applied sociology and political economy, rather than of, say
theoretical physics, chemistry, or biology’. It is better understood
and presumed that the implementation of a specific knowledge
claim can alter the social fabric of society and the anticipated
transformation is no longer seen as mainly beneficial.
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6 Cf. ‘Kansas Votes to Delete Evolution from State’s Science
Curriculum’, New York Times, National, August 12, 1999.
7 The regulation or the stratification of access to knowledge is
nonetheless a constitutive component of everyday life. The world
of adults, for example, is differentiated from that of children.These
stratified worlds go hand in hand with the ability to impede or
even to obstruct children’s access to certain forms of knowledge.
The quotidian forms of regulating access to knowledge are not
under discussion here.
8 I am grateful to Günther Küppers for this observation.
9 Whether the public willingness to support the field of knowledge
politics will intensify in connection with what some scientists have
defined as a ‘comprehension gap’ among the population, or
whether this willingness will have any significance at all, remains
to be seen. In a lead article, the English Sunday paper The Observ-
er (21 February 1999, p. 28) describes the perceived wide compre-
hension gap as follows: ‘Between the scientific upper class, the
latter-day Leonardos trekking into the brain or sketching the
universe, and the majority of voters and politicians in all Western
democracies, there is now a deep comprehension gap’. This deficit
in comprehension, however, should not be underestimated in the
sciences themselves either, given the growing division of labour
among the disciplines.
10 A shift toward concerns with the externalities of science does not
mean that contested efforts to regulate the conduct of ‘scientific
inquiry’ (cf. Wulff 1979) and, for that matter, attempts to manage
or plan scientific research (e. g., van den Daele / Krohn / Weingart
1979) will disappear. On the contrary, issues of ethics, accounta-
bility, and conflict, as they relate to the genesis and execution of
inquiry, will of course remain highly significant. At the same time,
discussions about the conduct of inquiry will be affected by
anticipated outcomes of research.
11 My use of the concept of ‘regulation’ resonates with the way in
which Steinmetz (1993) deploys the term to analyze the regulation
of the emergence of the welfare state in Imperial Germany. This
concept takes its distance from the economic literature on regulat-
ing the practices of capital accumulation (e. g., Jessop 1990)
because that approach tends to rely on an overdetermined image
of the ultimate efficacy of regulation practices.
284
09.05.01 --- Projekt: transcript.maasen.winterhager / Dokument: FAX ID 012a286938514334|(S. 259-290) T01_10 stehr.p 286938514662
Policing Knowledge
12 The enlargement of the scientific community into an international
or even global community is becoming a focus of reflection and
research in science studies (e. g., Schott 1988; 1993).
13 Assessing the impact of the interventions by uncredentialed
participants in biomedical research and in AIDS care, Epstein
(1996: 346) concludes that ‘the impact of the AIDS movement on
biomedical institutions in the United States has been impressive
and conspicuous [and] it has rapidly become something of a cliché
to say that the doctor-patient relationship will never be the same
in the wake of AIDS’.
14 As late as in the 1970s, confidence in the capacity of ‘disinter-
ested’ scientists to resolve public issues in the area of space ex-
ploration, nuclear power or food additive regulation, etc., was
still considerable and significantly exceeded confidence in other
groups or agencies (cf. Miller 1983: 90–93; Jasanoff 1990: 12). The
general decline in the last two or three decades among the
public of developed societies of the trust in science and tech-
nology as a problem-solver, a trust that had hitherto been a core
element of modernity, has been documented by Inglehart (1995:
391).
15 Chandra Mukerji (1989: 197) describes the trade-off: ‘What re-
assures scientists the most when they face the power of the voice
of science and their powerlessness to use the voice in the public
arena is the idea of their autonomy. Scientists are not, in the end,
politicians, and they suffer political defeats better than the loss of
face among their peers. As long as they can conduct research with
which they can advance science [both science itself and their
positions in it], they can feel potent. But the cost is that scientists
cultivate an expertise that empowers someone else’.
16 A more extensive description and analysis of both Schelsky’s and
Marcuse’s critiques of the excessive power of modern science and
technology in society may be found in Stehr 1994: 203–221.
17 The decisive outcome of these developments is that the workers
are incapable of acquiring a critical view of the repressive social
order. The ‘masterly enslavement’ is pervasive throughout society,
affecting all individuals at all levels of production.
18 Theodor W. Adorno’s ([1966] 1973: 320) image of the extension
of the rule of nature to a rule over man by man is similar. Adorno
warns that the “unity of the control over nature, progressing to
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over man and finally to that over men’s inner nature” is one of
the enormous dangers of the present age.
19 The genealogy of Schelsky’s and Marcuse’s fears about the impact
of modern science and technology is of course much longer. I will
refer to Max Weber but could list many more observers who have
expressed concerns about the fateful consequences of science and
technology in the age of modernity. Marcuse’s and Schelsky’s
diagnoses resonate closely with Max Weber’s analysis of the
modern age as a demystification of the world resulting from the
growing rationalization of social relations through science and
technology. Weber emphasizes the painful tension between
rational, empirical knowledge and meaning systems found in the
life-world. Moreover, Weber’s intellectual ‘grandchildren’ often
share an ‘Exodus impulse’, namely the attempt ‘to explode the
fatalistically closed “steel-hard casing” of the demystified world’
(Bolz 1989: 7). Schelsky and Marcuse therefore also make use,
although for the most part implicitly, of a long established radical
as well as conservative (romantic) intellectual tradition that
launched a highly critical and skeptical analysis of the impact of
technology and science on culture and social relations.
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